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ABSTRACT 
ON SECURE COMMUNICATION IN INTEGRATED INTERNET AND 
HETEROGENEOUS MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS 
Bin Xie 
April 13, 2006 
Integration of the Internet with a Cellular Network, WMAN, WLAN, and MANET 
presents an exceptional promise by having co-existence of conventional 
WW ANslWMANslWLANs with wireless ad hoc networks to provide ubiquitous 
communication. We call such integrated networks providing internet accessibility for 
mobile users as heterogeneous multi-hop wireless networks where the Internet and 
wireless infrastructure such as WLAN access points (APs) and base stations (BSs) 
constitute the backbone for various emerging wireless networks (e.g., multi-hop WLAN 
and ad hoc networks). 
Earlier approaches for the Internet connectivity either provide only unidirectional 
connectivity for ad hoc hosts or cause high overhead as well as delay for providing full 
bi-directional connections. In this dissertation, a new protocol is proposed for integrated 
Internet and ad hoc networks for supporting bi-directional global connectivity for ad hoc 
hosts. 
v 
In order to provide efficient mobility management for mobile users in an integrated 
network, a mobility management protocol called multi-hop cellular IP (MCIP) has been 
proposed to provide a micro-mobility management framework for heterogeneous multi-
hop network. The micro-mobility is achieved by differentiating the local domain from 
global domain. At the same time, the MCIP protocol extends Mobile IP protocol for 
providing macro-mobility support between local domains either for single hop MSs or 
multi-hop MSs. In the MCIP protocol, new location and mobility management 
approaches are developed for tracking mobile stations, paging, and handoff management. 
This dissertation also provides a security protocol for integrated Internet and MANET 
to establish distributed trust relationships amongst mobile infrastructures. This protocol 
protects communication between two mobile stations against the attacks either from the 
Internet side or from wireless side. Moreover, a secure macro/micro-mobility protocol 
(SM3p) have been introduced and evaluated for preventing mobility-related attacks either 
for single-hop MSs or multi-hop MSs. In the proposed SM3p, mobile IP security has been 
extended for supporting macro-mobility across local domains through the process of 
multi-hop registration and authentication. In a local domain, a certificate-based 
authentication achieves the effective routing and micro-mobility protection from a range 
of potential security threats. 
VI 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Recent advances in communication and computing technologies clearly indicate 
that future wireless networking environments will be heterogeneous in terms of 
diversified access technologies [1]. While some wireless technologies are already part of 
our everyday lives, such as Wireless WANs (e.g., 2G, 2.5G and 3G cellular systems), 
Wireless MANs (e.g., IEEE 802.16), WLANs (e.g., IEEE 802.11aJb/e/g), and Wireless 
PANs (e.g., Bluetooth), the emerging IEEE 802.15.3/4 WPANs and IEEE 802.22 
technologies are expected to provide even more exciting and efficient services. The 
available services would include voice, multimedia, messaging, e-mail, information 
services (e.g., news, stocks, weather, and travel), M-commerce, entertainment, location-
based public utility and health-care services, and so on. Availability of a multitude of 
wireless technologies has motivated research efforts towards the next generation of 
wireless and mobile communication systems, usually called "Beyond 3G" (B3G) or "4G" 
networks that are expected to have integrated heterogeneous wireless networks that 
would enable users equipped with either multi-interface or SDR-based wireless devices 
to use the appropriate network that meets their service levels and cost requirements, in a 
transparent and seamless way. In heterogeneous wireless networks, different types of 
network have distinctive underlying features, for example, WLAN provides higher 
bandwidth. On the contrary, the cellular system can only support low bandwidth. 
1 
However, the cellular network can cover larger area, and can possibly provide worldwide 
seamless connection. Also, integrating ad hoc networks with infrastructure networks can 
be beneficial for extending the service coverage of wireless networks via multi hop 
communication. In this case, wireless access points or base stations (APs/BSs) employ 
different radio spectrums to provide Internet accessibility for mobile stations (MSs) or 
wireless networks (e.g., a MANET network) to access the Internet. An ad hoc MS 
outside the coverage of any BS or AP may obtain the Internet services by way of multi-
hop relaying. Ad hoc networks can be used to extend the coverage of not only the cellular 
networks, but also the high frequency Wireless LANs as well as other wireless networks 
[2]. This phenomenon is totally different from a pure mobile ad hoc network where a 
self-configurable network capability is provided by communication among ad hoc MSs 
without any Internet-based infrastructure (e.g., BS/AP) for mobility and security support. 
Once attached to the Internet, the MANET communication is not isolated anymore, but is 
an integral part of the infrastructure-based networks for Internet access. In such an 
integrated network, a given MS of the ad hoc part needs to relay data packets hop by hop 
before they can reach a BS or another mobile station having access to a BS, which acts as 
a communication bridge between wireless network and the Internet. 
Our investigation in Chapter 2 shows that an integrated heterogeneous multi-hop 
network may be attacked from the Internet or wireless side for the purpose of 
endangering the MANET and other multi-hop communications. Firstly, the potential 
security vulnerability of the wireless infrastructure may impede the Internet accessibility 
of such wireless networks, thus destroy the civilian or other applications from these 
wireless networks (e.g., an ad hoc network). Secondly, mobility-related attacks may 
2 
occur in an integrated network and result in that a MS cannot find a correct BS/AP for 
Internet connection. Thirdly, a communication route may be distorted by an adversary 
with a routing attack. Because of these, infrastructure and information protection for 
secure communication is a crucial design issue in integrated heterogeneous multi-hop 
network. The security design and implementation should take the heterogeneous 
communication path into account, which could span the Internet, cellular networks, 
WLAN, and MANET. Therefore, many security issues in integrated networks should be 
reconsidered in this integrated environment rather than only as an individual cellular 
network, WLAN or MANET. It is obvious [64] that the current authentication protocols 
of UMTS, IEEE 802.16 and IEEE 802.11 security are not applicable to the integrated 
networks because these protocols are developed based on the assumption that a MS can 
connect to a BS directly and exchange authentication packets. Since the internet mobility 
protocol (i.e., mobile IP [33] [34]) in the conventional cellular and WLAN lacks security 
support for a multi-hop MS, new security features should be developed for the multi-hop 
MS to access the network with mutual authentication at every hop. In the integrated 
networks, possible non-cooperative behavior in MANET may significantly and adversely 
affect the performance of network in the case of multi-hop packet relaying. Therefore, 
collaborative protocols are needed in the integrated network to encourage cooperation 
during multi-hop packet relay. 
The design of such integrated Internet and heterogonous multi-hop wireless 
networks involves two fundamental problems with many sub-issues for each problem, 
which are addressed in this dissertation. 
• Problem 1: Secure communication for integrated Internet and MANET 
3 
A. Integrated protocol for Internet and ad-hoc network communication 
B. Secure interconnection protocol for integrated internet and ad-hoc 
networks 
• Problem 2: Secure mobility management in heterogeneous multi-hop wireless 
networks 
A. Macro/Micro-mobility approach to heterogeneous wireless networks 
B. Secure Macro/Micro-mobility protocol 
The following subsections give an overview of significant contribution made by this 
dissertation and describe the background as well as related work regarding the two 
problems in heterogonous multi-hop wireless networks. 
1.1 Secure Communication for Integrated Internet and MANET 
The dissertation in part A addresses the development of secure communication 
framework for integrated Internet and MANET. In an integrated Internet and MANET [3-
10], each ad hoc MS executes a MANET routing protocol to construct a communication 
path between two network stations (source and destination). The basic process of ad hoc 
route discovery such as AODV [16] and DSR [17], involves two messages: route request 
and route reply. In the beginning, the source MS broadcasts a route request if it has no 
route to a destination. The route request will be forwarded by intermediary node until it 
reaches the destination. Then the destination station (e.g., a BS or ad hoc MS) responses a 
route rep I y message carrying the reversed route. The process of ad hoc route discovery 
enables the ad hoc MS with the capability to reach a FA. Through the established route to 
the FA, a separate protocol [3-10] coordinates mobile IP [33] [34] and the MANET 
routing protocol to obtain the Internet connectivity for ad hoc MSs. Ad hoc routing 
4 
protocols can be coarsely divided into two groups: proactive and on-demand routing 
protocols. In the proactive routing protocols, each node keeps one or more tables that 
contain the routing information about the other nodes. The tables are created and updated 
through network routing control messages. The routing table in each MS maintains 
consistent and up-to-date routing information. This kind of protocols includes 
Destination-Sequence Distance-Vector (DSDV) [11], Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) 
[12], Global State Routing (GSR) [13], Hierarchical State Routing (HSR) [14], Fisheye 
State Routing (FSR) [21], and Zone-based Hierarchical Link State (ZHLS) [15], etc. On 
the other hand, in an on-demand routing protocol, each node creates a route when 
communication is needed. When a MS in a MANET requires a route to a destination, the 
host initiates a route discovery process. The protocols in this category are Ad Hoc On-
demand Distance Vector (AODV) [16], Cluster Based Routing Protocol (CBRP) [18], 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [17], Temporally Order Routing Algorithm (TORA) 
[19], Associativity Based Routing (ABR) [20], and Signal Stability Routing (SSR) [22]. 
A detailed survey and performance comparisons of the above ad hoc protocols can be 
found in papers [23][24]. 
The approaches discussed in [3-10] address the work of integrating MANETs with 
wired networks by extending mobile IP. In the approach [5], the MSs run a modified 
Routing Information Protocol (RIP) Daemon (routed) for dealing with mobile IP 
messages. Also a mobile IP routing daemon (mipd) runs on each MS. The routeds of the 
mobile hosts under the coverage of a FA receive and handle FA's agent advertisements 
and related mobile IP messages. These routeds relay the mobile IP messages to the mipds 
of the MSs that are outside the transmission range of the FA. The MIPMANET [7] 
5 
provides the global Internet connectivity by using mobile IP with FA's care-of-address 
and reverse tunneling. A FA periodically broadcasts its advertisement. The advertisement 
message spreads through the whole ad hoc network. This approach uses AODV protocol 
for communications in ad hoc network. The performance of this approach has been 
improved by more recent approaches given in papers [8] [25]. The approach used in [25] 
extends mobile IP to ad hoc networks using the on-demand AODV protocol; therefore 
each mobile node registers with a FA only when it requires the global Internet 
connectivity. The paper [8] further improves the performance of the approach given in 
[25] by reducing the mobile IP overhead. This approach minimizes the number of FA 
advertisements by using controlled flooding in the ad hoc network. 
In Chapter 3, the dissertation proposes an integrated protocol for internet and ad hoc 
network communication. Compared to the aforementioned integrated protocols, my 
protocol has four advantages (i) bi-directional internet connection for ad hoc host that 
means the Internet (i.e., BS) and each ad hoc host can reach each other all time, (ii) less 
control overhead in maintaining the bi-directional connection for ad hoc hosts, (iii) high 
throughput communication for ad hoc host to access the internet, (iv) less delay for 
packet forwarding. 
Since protocols mentioned above are based on a benign environment, these protocols 
may suffer from security threats in an adversarial environment. Security of ad hoc routing 
protocols has become an important issue. The Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [26] uses 
message authentication codes (HMAC) with pairwise shared keys to ensure the packet 
forwarding between any two MSs without violating the routing protocol. The 
computation of HMAC with a shared secret symmetric key between two MSs is very 
6 
efficient. SRP initiates a trustworthy relationship between sender and destination. Both 
the Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing Protocol (SEAD) [27] and the ARIADNE 
[28] are one-way hash MAC based security protocols. The authentication of routing 
message in SEAD and ARIADNE depends on TESLA [29] hash-chain-based protocol for 
key management. The SEAD is an ad hoc secure routing protocol that uses efficient one-
way hash functions to guarantee the routing safety on DSDV [11]. With the assumption 
of using a trusted node to sign public keys for each node and to distribute those keys, 
SEAD authenticates the sequence number and metric of a route table by using hash chain 
elements. ARIADNE [28] copes with the security in on-demand routing protocols by 
point-to-point authentication of routing message. One-way hash chain is less expensive 
than asymmetric cryptography. However the drawbacks of one-way hash MAC are: (i) 
one-way hash-based authentication requires clock synchronization at granularities that is 
hard to reach, (ii) delayed key disclosure results in the delay in the verification of routing 
message. 
ARAN [30] and SAODV [31] are the protocols based on digital signature with 
asymmetric key cryptography. ARAN assumes a trusted certificate server to maintain 
fresh certificates for nodes. Based on the public key of the trusted server, the source node 
begins a route discovery by initiating a packet with the signature of its private key. 
Mandatory end-to-end authentication, using certificate, timestamp and nonce are policies 
to guarantee the authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation during the 
processing of routing recovery. The drawback of the digital signature is that it involves 
more computation overhead. 
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A detailed overview of these ad hoc security protocols can be found in paper [32]. 
These ad hoc security protocols in [26-30] are based on the standalone MANETs. All of 
these security protocols endure a serious problem that there are no prior trust 
relationships among MSs because of the absence of central authority in the MANET. It is 
difficult to consistently identify a MS with a unique identifier because it is easy for a MS 
to change its identity. Therefore it is difficult to establish the trust relationships among 
MSs. A malicious ad hoc node can use a forged ad hoc identity and then makes feigned 
trust relations with other nodes and then attacks the MANET internally. In the integrated 
Internet and MANET, it is critical that a MS can be identified in a consistent and unique 
manner. This dissertation in part A provides a security protocol for the integrated Internet 
and MANETs by tightly combining Mobile IP security and ad hoc security. The 
dissertation further develops the trust relationship for MANET through the authentication 
from the Internet authorities. 
1.2 Secure Mobility Management in Heterogeneous Multi-hop 
Wireless Networks 
The dissertation in part B addresses a new mobility protocol and its Secure Mobility 
in integrated Internet and heterogeneous networks. Mobile IP [33] [34] provides 
continuous mobility functions for MS with two entities on the Internet: home agent (HA), 
and foreign agent (FA). A HA is the server on the mobile host's home network that 
maintains the information about the host's current location, as identified as care-of-
address (CoA), and security credentials. On the other hand, FA is the server on the 
visiting network providing the CoA and security administration of the visiting network. 
Mobile IP handles the mobility of MSs, but is inadequate for mobile wireless networks 
because of its high update latency, large Internet signaling load, and lack of support of 
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micro-mobility. The standard mobile IP protocol addresses the processes of discovery, 
registration, and tunneling. F AlHA periodically send out an advertisement message 
indicating its presence to mobile stations (MSs). From the advertisement, a MS obtains a 
CoA (care-of-address) or co-located CoA for registration. The registration of a MS 
informs its HA to update the mobility binding of the MS. A registration reply message 
issued by FA indicates the status of registration request. Only upon successful 
registration, datagram can be tunneled between CN (correspondent node) and MS. 
Recently a variety of enhancements have been proposed to overcome the shortcomings of 
the base mobile IP [35], e.g., MIP-RO, MIPv6, HMIPv6, IDMP, HAW All, TeleMIP, 
Cellular IP, Fast handoffs, EMA, and Proactive Handoff. For example, Cellular IP [36] 
[37] differentiates the global domain and the local domain, and thus supports micro-
mobility. Also, the Telecommunication Enhanced Mobile IP (TeleMIP) [38] is a scalable 
and hierarchical IP-based architecture that provides lower latency and signaling overhead 
in comparison with the standard Mobile IP. However, all above mobility protocols can 
not support heterogeneous multi-hop communication in an integrated Internet and 
heterogeneous multi-hop wireless networks. A new mobility management protocol is 
needed to support the migration for both single and multi-hop MSs in an integrated 
network. Each MS has a multi-hop paging/routing cache maintaining the necessary 
information for location management and connection management. In Chapter 5, a new 
mobility management protocol is proposed to support the multi-hop communication. 
When a single hop or multi-hop MS is in an idle state, the location management of the 
protocol provides micro-mobility management while is moving in the local domain. On 
the contrary, when the MS have packets to send or receive the MS moves to active state 
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and a connection management scheme enables the MS to maintain the high performance 
route for connecting the Internet. 
Although the basic mobile IP protocol defines an Authentication Extension (AE) to 
support authentication in registration (secret-key based authentication), there are some 
deficiencies in this protocol [40] [41]. Since the protocol only requires authentication 
between HA and MS, network may be attacked unless overall authentications are 
enforced between the FA and HA and between the FA and MS. To enforce an overall 
authentication, besides the secret-keys between MS and HA, extra heavy secret-key 
management is necessary between MS and FA. The Mobile IP protocol doesn't prevent 
replay attack between FA and either MS or HA. The MoIPS [39] implements a public 
key management system that supports the mobile IP as well as the route optimized 
mobile IP. The system is built upon a DNS-based X.509 public key infrastructure in order 
to supply cryptographic keys to authenticate mobile IP registrations and to establish IPsec 
tunnels for mobile IP redirected packets. 
Public-key based authentication [40] provides a strong, scalable authentication 
strategy for MS, HA, and FA to authenticate one another based on asymmetric or public 
key cryptography. The protocol enables mobile IP to work exactly the same way as 
secret-key-authentication. The minimal public-key based authentication [41] protocol 
uses secret key cryptography in order to minimize the requirement of computing power, 
as well as the administration cost imposed on MS. In addition, the protocol provides the 
scalability and non-repudiation that are likely to be demanded by the users. 
In an integrated Internet and heterogeneous multi-hop wireless network, however, all 
of these authentication protocols suffer two serious problems: 
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• A multi-hop MS, which is outside the direct coverage of a BS and connects to the BS 
with a multi-hop route, doesn't have the capability of verifying the authenticity of the 
advertisements that are forwarded by an intermediate node. 
• The existing mobile IP protocol cannot provide security protection for the registration 
of a multi-hop MS. Current mobile IP security is deployed on single wireless hop in 
which each MS can exchange registration and authentication directly with the FA. 
Therefore, above authentication protocols cannot be used for an integrated multi-hop 
network to support authentication of a multi-hop MS. 
In a single hop network, the above authentication protocols [39] [40] [41] have no need to 
maintain a multi-hop cache for each MS. Data packets are sent between each MS and the 
FA directly. However, in a multi-hop network, a multi-hop routing cache at the BS is 
required for maintaining the path to each multi-hop MS [2] [10] [42]. Thus, beside the 
mobile IP registration security, it is very important to create and update a multi-hop 
routing cache in a way to prevent it from poisoning. 
1.3 Dissertation Structure 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. After illustrating the network 
architecture of heterogeneous multi-hop networks, Chapter two provides a detailed 
investigation of potential vulnerability in heterogeneous multi-hop networks and then 
develops a security thread model covering a variety of security attacks, including Internet 
connectivity attacks, MS mobility attacks, multi-hop routing attacks, packet forwarding 
attacks, and specific protocol attacks. Then, the dissertation is divided into two parts: 
• On secure communication for integrated Internet and MANET, 
• On secure mobility management in heterogeneous multi-hop wireless networks. 
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Each part has two chapters. In part A, Chapter three provides a design and 
implementation of an integrated Internet and MANET protocol for providing bi-
directional Internet connectivity for ad hoc hosts. Our extensive experimental results 
show the protocol achieves higher packet delivery rate and less latency in multi-hop 
communication in comparison with other leading protocols. Chapter four proposes an 
effective authentication and multi-hop routing protocol between ad hoc MSs and their 
accessing IP networks in a heterogeneous multi-hop wireless network. Our authentication 
protocol is different from other mobile IP authentication protocols in two important ways 
(i) the protocol supports the authentication request from a single hop or multi-hop MS, (ii) 
the protocol uniquely identifies each MS to enhance the trust relationship between MSs 
and provides identity and integrity protection for multi-hop communication. Based on the 
authentication protocol, a secure routing protocol is further developed to provide 
protection for the process of route discovery for multi-hop communication. The security 
analysis, comparisons and performance studies show the effectiveness of secure multi-
hop communication in integrated Internet and MANET. 
Part B has two chapters illustrating the Secure Mobility Management in 
heterogeneous multi-hop wireless network. In Chapter five, a proposed mobility protocol, 
called Multi-hop Cellular IP (MCIP), integrates mobile IP and cellular IP in support of 
heterogeneous multi-hop communication for ad hoc MSs. This protocol supports the 
migration for both single and multi-hop MSs in heterogeneous multi-hop networks. In the 
architecture of a MCIP network, a heterogonous multi-hop network is divided into 
multiple domains. For each MS in a local domain, a HAlF A acts as the administrator with 
a multi-hop paging/routing cache to maintain necessary information for location 
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management, connection management as well as multi-hop routing reconfiguration. Then, 
in Chapter six, a secure macro/micro-mobility protocol (SM3p) is introduced for mobility 
security of the MCIP. In the proposed SM3p, mobile IP security has been extended for 
supporting macro-mobility across local domains through the process of multi-hop 
registration and authentication. In a MCIP local domain, a certificate-based 
authentication achieves the effective routing and micro-mobility protection from a range 
of potential security threats. Our evaluation and simulation demonstrates the 
effectiveness of the SM3P. 
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CHAPTER II 
SECURITY SURVEY IN INTEGRATED INTERNET AND 
HETEROGENEOUS MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS 
It is widely recognized that many new wireless technologies have been introduced to 
cater ever growing demands for diversified services [1]. WLANs (e.g., IEEE 
802.11a/b/e/g and HiperLANI2), MANs (e.g., IEEE 802.16), and WANs (e.g., IG, 2G, 
2.5G, 3G, GSM, the proposed IEEE 802.20, etc.) employ different operating radio spaces 
for satisfying various communication scenarios. A multitude of architectures and 
protocols [3-10] [43-52] can extend traditional cellular and WLAN to multi-hop 
communication using the revolutionary paradigm of MANET (mobile ad hoc network). 
In these approaches, a MS outside the coverage of a BS may access the Internet through 
ad hoc relaying with the help of other MSs. Moreover, mesh network technology [53], 
"opportunistic MANETing", intends to integrate wireless PAN (i.e., IEEE 802.15), 
WLAN, MAN, and WAN with MANET as a commodity multi-hop MANET. Integration 
of wireless Cellular (MANIW AN), WLAN, and MANET (lCWM) implies providing 
ubiquitous Internet connectivity for MSs. A remarkable characteristic of the 
aforementioned ICWM networks is that the MANET communication is not isolated 
anymore, but is an integral part of the infrastructure-based networks for Internet access. 
Research in ICWM networks is increasingly gaining popularity due to availability 
14 
of multi-mode MSs. The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has recently taken 
an initiative to develop a cellular-WLAN interworking architecture to enable 3GPP 
system operators provide public WLAN as an integral component of the services offered 
to cellular subscriber [54]. Thus, ICWM networks provide flexible and effective 
communication where a MS can communicate with the Internet either by a single hop or 
by a multi-hop path. These networks also support peer-to-peer connection when the 
source and destination are in close vicinity [1] [53]. These proposed ICWM architectures 
expectedly offer one or more of the following benefits in terms of ubiquitous Internet 
connectivity: 
• An ICWM network provides heterogeneous wireless network access (e.g., cellular, 
IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16) to multi-mode MSs; 
• An ICWM network supports the Internet connectivity to the MSs, which are 
located outside the radio coverage of the BSs, and thus extends the network 
coverage to multi-hop MSs; 
• In a ICWM network, a single cellular transmission between a MS and a BS can be 
broken into multi-hop HDR (Higher Data rate) communication links for the 
purposes of supporting higher communication speed and reduced co-channel 
interference; 
• An ICWM network improves the communication throughput and reduces packet 
transmission latency, based on availability of different types of radio network in 
the roaming area (cellular, WLAN or MANET); 
• An ICWM network can enhance the capacity of a BS by using multi-hop relaying 
and diverting the traffic from a congested BS to a neighboring BS and the 
network provides load balancing among BS, thereby increasing the effective 
network system capacity; and 
• An ICWM network allows MANET communication between two MSs without 
going through the BSs, and these results in saving radio bandwidth of the BSs 
thereby increasing the overall capacity of BSs. 
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Because of ICWM's deployment flexibility, it is very attractive from a commercial 
perspective [2] [3-10] [43-52]. However, before practical applications of ICWM 
networks become widely available, such networks need to have adequate built-in security. 
Various security threats are possible in ICWM networks due to the vulnerability of 
heterogeneous communication and relaying by the MANET. Existing ICWM 
architectures are based on the assumption that all MSs trust each other where each MS 
honestly participates in the process of route discovery, and faithfully forwards all data 
packets to their respective destinations. In multi-hop communication, however, a 
malicious MS may attack a network just by injecting or modifying the messages. The 
malicious MS may also masquerade itself as someone else. A forged wireless 
infrastructure (such as BS) may imperil the trustworthiness between a MS and the 
Internet. A multi-hop route may be modified intentionally during the process of route 
discovery. These attacks certainly degrade the efficiency of packet relay, increase packet 
delivery latency, lower packet delivery rate, mislead packets, or even tum the Internet 
connectivity down. As opposed to research on routing protocols and internetworking 
architectures, research on ICWN network security is still in its inception stages and has 
gained attention recently [54][55]. It is an important issue to investigate the security 
properties of ICWM networks so that comprehensive security control protocols can be 
developed. 
The goal of this chapter is to provide a better understanding of the security threats and 
challenges in this emerging field. Our main contributions in this chapter can be divided 
into four groups. 
• We discuss the unique characteristics of ICWM networks to better understand 
security attacks and solutions. 
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• We provide significance of and the nature of security attacks against ICWM 
networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive 
investigation that identifies security weaknesses associated with the ICWM 
architectures. 
• We introduce several possible attacks against ICWM networks and provide novel 
solutions. 
• We provide an insight into the research challenges and latest developments on 
ICWM security protocols and present various open research issues that need to be 
explored in a much greater depth. 
The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 investigates the 
ICWM architecture and its communication protocols. We particularly emphasize these 
network characteristics that impact the secured communication. Then, in Section 2.2 the 
security model provides a comprehensive study of ICWM security threats. Section 2.3 
describes open challenges for designing and implementing security protocols. Finally, 
the concluding remarks are included in Section 2.4. 
2.1 The Architecture of Integrated Cellular, WLAN and MANET 
Before studying the possible attacks and evaluating any ICWM security solution, it is 
necessary to have a clear understanding of the network architecture as well as possible 
breaches in the network security. 
2.1.1 An Overview of ICWM Network Architecture 
The architecture in Figure 1 depicts a simplified ICWM network that integrates 
infrastructure and wireless multi-hop networks covered in [3-10] [43-52]. As can been 
seen from Figure 1, an ICWM network is divided into domains/subnets (e.g., domain 1 
and 2) and the basic components of this network are MSs, BSs/ APs, Home Agent 
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Figure I. A Simplified ICWM network Architecture. 
the communication bridge between wired and wireless networks for MSs. A BS provides 
one or more wireless radio access interfaces (i.e., cellular, IEEE 802.11, and IEEE 
802.16) to MSs. The communication path for a MS spans through wireless link (link d as 
shown in Figure 1) and wired/Internet (a->b->c and c->d as shown in Figure 1). The BSs 
can be connected in many different ways [36] [53]. A BS can be connected to the Internet 
by cables or connected to other BSs through wired [36] or wireless connection [53]. A BS 
and an AP can be co-located in the hot-spot area where the traffic is high, as shown in 
Figure 1. A multi-mode MS possesses multiple radio interfaces, i.e., cellular interface or 
WLAN interface. The MS can connect to a BS with a single hop or multi-hop path, using 
an appropriate radio interface. In the multi-hop communication, a MS operates in 
MANET communication mode and can move in an arbitrary direction and speed. At a 
given instance, a particular MS can be either located within or outside the coverage of 
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BSs. If a MS moves outside the coverage of direct transmission from BSs, multi-hop 
relaying is needed for MSs to obtain services from BS to communicate with the Internet. 
When the MS is visiting a foreign network, it registers with the FA for the purpose of 
creating a mobile binding at its HA so that upon receiving packets from a CN 
(correspondent node), the HA can deliver them to the FA, which further forwards the 
packets to the destination by single hop or multi-hop path. In an ICWM network, multi-
hop route discovery protocol is needed for supporting multi-hop communication. 
According to routing protocols, ICWM architectures can be divided into three categories: 
multi-hop cellular networks, multi-hop WLANs, and integrated Internet and MANET as 
illustrated in Figure 1: 
• Multi-hop WLAN networks, 
• Multi-hop cellular networks, and 
• Integrated Internet and MANET networks. 
The Multi-hop WLAN networks allow the MSs to obtain services from the Internet 
through WLAN. A WLAN AP provides a higher communication speed to MSs at the 
expense of smaller radio coverage as compared to a cellular BS. For example, MS5 in 
Figure 1 accesses WLAN and obtains services from the Internet with the help of MS4 
using the IEEE 802.11g link. The routing protocols for multi-hop WLAN networks 
include Two-Hop-Relay [50], HWN [51], I-hop and 2-hops Direct Transmission [52]. 
The mUlti-hop cellular networks provide the Internet connectivity to MSs through 
WAN/MAN BSs such as GSM, IEEE.802.20, and IEEE 802.16. For example, as shown 
in Figure 1, MS3 connects to the Internet with the path MS3- MS2-MSI-BSl. A cellular 
BS may be connected to the Internet directly or via cellular infrastructure gateway such 
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as a TCP/IF gateway. The routing protocols for multi-hop cellular networks include A-
GSM [43], MCN [44], iCAR [45], MADF [46], UCAN [47], ODMA [48], and 
SOPRANO [49]. 
In an integrated Internet and MANET networks, each ad hoc MS runs a MANET 
routing protocol [32] such as DSDV, AODV, or DSR. The MANET routing protocol is 
used to construct communication path between two MSs. Meanwhile, a separate protocol 
[3-10] coordinates mobile IF and the MANET routing protocol to obtain the Internet 
connectivity. 
2.1.2 ICWM Network Traits 
Similar to other wireless systems (single hop cellular, WLAN, and MANET), an 
ICWM network has the basic characteristics such as open wireless medium, mobility and 
constrained terminal power capability. However, as shown in Figure 1, an ICWM 
network differs from other distributed mobile systems in some important ways: 
infrastructure-support, multi-hop, and multi-mode terminals with multiple radio 
interfaces. Many security preconceptions must be discarded because of these differences. 
Table 1 illustrates the crucial distinctions between ICWM networks with other networks. 
2.2.1 Infrastructure-support vs. Ad Hoc 
A MANET is a self-configurable network with the capability of communication 
among ad hoc MSs without any infrastructure or any centralized administration. The 
traffic in MANETs is typically between any pair of MSs. ICWM networks share 
similarities with MANETs: multi-hop networking and multi-hop communication. The 
dominant distinction between ICWM networks and MANETs is infrastructure-support in 
ICWM networks. In contract, the Internet and wireless infrastructure provides the 
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centralized administration for MSs in ICWM networks. In an ICWM network, most of 
the traffic goes through BSs. It is difficult to establish any distributed trust relationships 
among MSs as a central authority is absent and MSs' have ability to forge identity. A 
malicious MS can use a forged ad hoc identity and then makes feigned trust relations 
with other MS to attack the network internally. However, in an ICWM, a MS can access 
the Internet by way of single or multi-hop connectivity through a BS or an Internet 
Gateway. The wireless and Internet infrastructure (i.e., Authentication, Authorization, 
and Accounting - AAA server [74]) can serve as an authentication authority and a 
security administrative center for ICWM security. The infrastructure-supported security 
21 
deployment has a fundamental impact on ICWM security implementation in comparison 
with pure ad hoc security. 
2.2.2 Single Hop vs. Multi-hop 
A MS in an ICWM network communicates with a BS or another MS by using single 
hop or multi-hop path with the help of other MSs. On the contrary, a MS in traditional 
cellular or WLAN connects to Internet through BS using single wireless hop. Multi-hop 
imposes many new challenges such as open network architecture, shared wireless 
medium, limited resource constraints, and dynamic network topology that have a 
significant impact on security. All possible attacks found in MANETs can be easily 
mounted on ICWM networks due to the common characteristic of multi-hop route. In 
cellular or WLAN, security solutions only provide protection for one hop connectivity 
between a MS and BS by securing MAC/link-layer protocols. However, in an ICWN 
network, the security solutions should extend beyond the single hop to multi-hop routing 
security at the network layer. Therefore, traditional cellular and WLAN security 
protocols are not applicable to multi-hop communication between a MS and a BS. 
Although the security protocols for MANETs provide routing security, unfortunately, 
they can not be adopted for ICWM networks directly because these protocols are based 
the assumption of the absence of infrastructure-supported authentication. 
2.2.3 Single Radio Interface vs. Multi-mode 
Another distinguishing characteristic of ICWM networks is multiple radio interfaces 
in MSs. A dual-mode MS equipped with two radio interfaces may switch from one radio 
interface to another (e.g., redirecting a flow from a cellular radio interface to WLAN 
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radio interface when a dual-mode MS moves to the WLAN area) as network accessibility 
or topology changes. Cellular, WLAN and MANET security protocols are based on a 
single radio interface and do not have any provision for protection when communication 
migrates from one radio interface to another. It is necessary to develop integrated 
schemes for security interworking between multi-mode radios. For example, a 3GPP 
subscriber MS, which is equipped with cellular-WLAN radio interfaces, may handoff its 
service from a 3GPP network to a public WLAN network. Here, in order to provide 
security features to the MS while accessing the public WLAN network, it is necessary for 
the public WLAN network to reuse the 3GPP subscription and 3GPP-based 
authentication/authorization as well as 3GPP-based security key agreement using 
SIMfUSIM card [1] [55]. In the case of multi-hop route, the infrastructure security 
protocols (e.g., 3GPP cellular security, mobile IP security for WLAN) must coordinate 
with multi-hop routing protocols for multi-hop MSs. At the same time, it is important for 
the security protocols to minimize the authentication latency induced by the multiple 
radio interfaces (e.g., networking selection) and multi-hop route. 
2.2 Security Threat Model 
Several types of attacks are possible on the Internet including Domain Name Service 
(DNS) "hacking", routing table "poisoning", packet "mistreatment" and denial-of-service 
(DoS) attacks. Numerous approaches have been developed for defending against these 
types of attacks. An excellent survey of various types of attacks can be found in [56]. In 
an ICWM network, the security issue is more complex than that of individual cellular, 
LAN or MANET. Because of multi-hop transmissions, BSs have the task to locate a 
destination MS, and then forward packets to the destination MS. For this purpose, it is 
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necessary for each BS to record the routes for the destination MSs. In this case, a 
malicious MS may poison the multi-hop route, resulting in a packet loss. Most of the 
attacks against ICWM networks fall into one of the following categories: 
• Eavesdropping and traffic analysis, unauthorized Internet access, Internet-wireless 
DDoS, Wireless-Internet DDoS, 
• Registration attacks (registration poisoning, bogus registration, registration replay 
attack), forged BS, BS cache poisoning, 
• Avoiding tracking by having unknown mobility, avoiding tracking by changing 
identity, 
• Multi-hop routing attacks (modification, impersonation, routing loop, duplication, 
selfishness and other denial of services), 
• Packet forwarding attacks (modification, selfishness, and power drain), and 
• Mobility handoff attacks, specific wireless protocol attacks (WLAN, UMTS, and 
IEEE 802.16). 
This section provides a general discussion on these types of attacks and emphasizes 
the specific attacks that differ from other wireless networks or remain undocumented in 
the literature. 
2.2.1 Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis 
Figure 2. Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis. 
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The broadcast nature of the wireless transmission medium renders radio links 
msecure m ICWN networks. An attacker can easily eavesdrop on all ongomg 
communication. In addition, an attacker in an ICWN network may reside on the multi-
hop path and present itself as an intermediate relaying MS. The data packets can be 
copied and distributed by the attacker when it forwards packets to next hop (e.g., MS2 is 
the intermediary relaying MS for MS4, MS5 and MSl). The attacker can read the 
transmitted data, and also gather information by examining the monitored packets such as 
address, size, number and time of transmission. The attacker can seize the information of 
BS such as location and IP address. Also the attacker can know the critical MSs, which 
provide the Internet connectivity for other MSs (e.g., MS2). The information obtained is 
useful for many attacks. As an example, consider Figure 2. When the MS3 (an attacker or 
attacker conspirer) knows that MS2 is the critical MS for providing the Internet 
connectivity for MSl, MS4 and MS5, the attacker can launch the attack towards MS2 for 
the purpose of turning down the Internet connection of MS 1, MS4 and MS5. 
2.2.2 Unauthorized Internet Access and Attacks 
A malicious MS may access the ICWM network and enjoy free network usage by 
way of single hop or multi-hop communication. Wireless Internet service providers (lSPs) 
may be accessed by an unauthorized MS because of the lack of correct ISP configuration. 
As for the network devices without having adequate security measures, the security 
threats may come from within the network itself. A registered MS of the network may 
access, read, copy and distribute data file that is no business of the MS. 
When the Internet is accessed by way of a multi-hop, the malicious MS consumes 
precious resources like power and bandwidth. Although the free network usage may not 
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be a significant threat to the Internet, an authorized access is the first step for the MS to 
control the Internet infrastructure and to attack these components. After entering the 
Internet, the attacker may use some techniques like Medium Access Control address 
spoofing to gain access to the network infrastructure. For instance, in Figure 3 MS I 
implements the man-in-the-middle attack between MS3 and its default network router 
(Router shown in Figure 3) from which MS I sees all the traffic between MS and Router. 
First MSI connects to the Internet and sends a malicious ARP (address resolution 
protocol) reply to Router, associating MSI's MAC address with MS3's IP address. With 
such access, the Router assumes MSI to be MS3. Next, MSI sends a malicious ARP 
reply to MS3 associating MSl's MAC address with the Router's address. In this case, the 
MS3 believes MSI is its router (Router). Finally, MSI can access the session between 
MS3 and Router. Thus, all data packets from MS3 will be delivered to MS I first and then 
MSI forwards the received data packet to Router. Finally, the router sends the packets to 
destination (e.g., MS4 as shown in Figure 3). In the opposite direction, all the packets 
from MS4 will be forwarded to MSI by Router and MSI sends the packets to MS3. In 
this manner, MS 1 intercepts the traffic between MS3 and MS4. 
Figure 3. Unauthorized Network Access and Man-in-the-middle Attack. 
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2.2.3 Internet-Wireless DDoS 
We introduce a common attack that could be disastrous against ICWM networks as 
Internet-Wireless DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) and shown in Figure 2. An ICWM 
network may be crippled by the attacks from the Internet. Such attacks are referred to as 
from the internet as the Internet-Wireless-DDoS. Compromising a BS or wireless router 
can disable or congest the wireless communication in a domain. As a typical example, an 
attacker first initiates the control over one or several computers on the Internet by using 
some kind of automatic intrusion software to hack them [56]. After getting control of the 
computers, the attacker synchronizes them to send traffic in bulk towards one or more 
multi-hop MSs that are associated with the same BS. The traffic first travels through the 
Internet toward the BS. The BS is not aware of the illegality of the packets. Then, the BS 
forwards the traffic towards the destination MSs (e.g., MS4 in Figure 2) according to the 
address given in each packet header. In the end, the packets travel through the multi-hop 
wireless network. This process can achieve the following goals. 
• Exhausting the wireless resources of the BS: Limited availability of BS radio 
spectrum is always a bottleneck in the Internet-wireless communication. When 
the compromised MSs transmit a huge number of packets to a BS, the BS may 
exhaust its radio resource by forwarding the packets on its air interface. Therefore, 
the attack can immediately block a large number of MSs that are communicating 
through the BS. 
• Depleting the wireless resource of MSs (power, radiolbandwidth): A MS has 
limited communication capability as compared to fixed devices in terms of 
available power and bandwidth. The packets transmitted by compromised 
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computers travel through multi-hop wireless network definitely cause the power 
and bandwidth consumption at each intermediate MS. The multi-hop 
transmissions can simply disable or slow down other communications along the 
multi-hop path. It can be observed from Figure 2 that the traffic from the 
compromised MSs consumes the bandwidth of the intermediary relaying MS2. 
The attack at least slows down the communication between MSS and eN because 
MSS uses the same intermediary relaying MS2 as the attack. Moreover, if the 
power of MS2 is exhausted, then the Internet connections for MS 5 and MS 4 will 
also be turned down because MS2 is the only MS to reach BS from MS 5 and MS 
4. 
2.2.4 Wireless-Internet DDoS 
This section introduces a new attack called wireless-Internet DDoS which could be 
initiated at the wireless side to the Internet and the multi-hop wireless network. It can 
attack the BS radio spectrum when a number of wireless devices around a BS send 
packets simultaneously in bulk to the BS by single or multi-hop routes. In this case, at a 
given instant the BS may be disabled after using up all spectrum resources. At least the 
bandwidth for normal traffic may be significantly reduced when a number of junk 
packets take up the majority of communication channels. 
Figure 4. Wireless-Internet DDoS. 
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The attacker accessing the Internet through a BS by single hop or multi-hop can 
impair the Internet infrastructure and its communication. As shown in Figure 4, the 
attacker, which operates in an ad hoc mode and runs the ad hoc routing protocol, 
connects to BS via the MANET. In this case, attacker attacks wired network using its ad 
hoc identifier. The attacker can attack the cellularlWLANlinternet infrastructure 
including router, DSN server, TCP/IP gateway etc. In a similar manner, an attacker can 
also access the wired network with an invented or spoofed IP address through multi-hop 
cellular or WLAN network. Moreover, the attacker can collude with other attackers or 
compromised internet components for implementing more sophisticated attack on the 
Internet or wireless network. For example, to execute DDoS, the attacker from the 
wireless network can compromise several computers on the Internet as attacking "agents". 
Then the attacker directs the "agents" to send a huge number of packets (i.e., UDP, TCP, 
or ICMP packets) to disable a target (e.g., a server). The compromised "agents" may also 
launch the "Internet-Wireless DDoS" to attack an ICWM network as illustrated in 
Section 2.2.3. Since the attacker has accessed the Internet by multi-hop path and a 
temporary ID (e.g., an ad hoc ID), it is very difficult for victim to trace back the source of 
the attack (see Section 2.2.8 and 2.2.9). 
2.2.5 Registration Attacks 
Mobile IP provides continuous Internet accessibility for MS when it visits a foreign 
network. When switching between networks, the MS has to create a mobility binding at 
home network through a registration procedure with visiting network. The registration 
procedure occurs immediately after the MS is switched on or moves to a visiting network. 
Although the specific registration procedures for different wireless networks (cellular 
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roaming, IPv6) are different, the general registration procedure in ICWM networks is as 
follows: 
1. In case when a MS is single hop away from the BS, the MS obtains the 
connection to the BS directly. On the other hand, if the MS is outside of all BSs' 
transmission range, then the MS establishes the connection to the BS with a multi-
hop route. 
2. After obtaining the connection to the Internet, a MS sends a registration request to 
the foreign network. The registration request contains the MS's identity, the home 
network address etc. 
3. Upon receipt of the registration request, the foreign network forwards the request 
to the MS' s home network for the purpose of creating a mobility binding for the 
MS. 
4. After the mobility update for the MS, the home network replies the foreign 
network with a registration reply message carrying the registration result. 
5. In the end, the foreign network forwards the registration reply to the MS with a 
reversed route. 
The registration procedure provides the desirable property of mobility, but results in 
several serious security threats. Three typical types of registration attacks are possible 
including registration poisoning, bogus registration, and replay attack. 
• Registration Poisoning: Malicious MS in the ICWM network can poison the 
registration procedure. In the ICWN registration procedure, a MS registers with 
the foreign network through a multi-hop route with the help of some intermediate 
MSs. A malicious MS can entice a multi-hop MS to choose the malicious MS as 
an intermediate MS by claiming to have a short or fast route to a BS. When a 
malicious MS is selected as the intermediate MS for a registering MS, the 
malicious MS can modify or drop the MS's registration request/reply. When the 
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malicious MS modifies or rejects the registration request, the MS cannot correctly 
register with the foreign network. If the malicious MS modifies the registration 
result in a registration reply, the MS cannot access the Internet as if its registration 
request is rejected. For instance, in Figure 2, when MS4 moves to the ICWM 
network, it initiates a registration by sending out a registration request. When 
MS2 receives the registration request from MS4, MS2 modifies the address of 
MS4's home network in the registration request before forwarding the request to 
BS. Based on the modified request, the foreign network will forward the request 
to a wrong home network so that the foreign network cannot obtain a successful 
registration reply. Registration poisoning prevents multi-hop MSs from obtaining 
services from the wired network. 
• Bogus Registration: This occurs when a malicious MS does a fake registration 
by spoofing an IP address and masquerading itself as someone else. The bogus 
registration causes a wrong mobility binding at the home network so that all 
packets are tunneled to the illegitimate MS, in place of the correct MS. By bogus 
registration, the attacker obtains the right to access the Internet so that it can 
implement further attack on the Internet such as Wireless-Internet DDoS. For 
instance, in Figure 2, MS3 does a forged registration by masquerading itself as 
MS5. Thus, all packets coming from Internet for MS5 are forwarded to MS3. In 
this case, MS5 cannot receive any packet from the Internet. 
• Registration Replay Attack: In a replay attack, an attacker captures a legitimate 
registration request and replays the message to a BS. Even through the 
registration request message may be signed or encrypted and the attacker may not 
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know what the actual security keys are, the retransmission of the valid request is 
sufficient to gain access to the network if mechanisms to make the request unique 
(e.g., nonce or timestamp) are not used. In this case, the attacker gets a valid 
session with the right of the victim. In Figure 2, MS3 may forward a copy of the 
registration request originated from MS5. Without protection, the MS3 could 
perform a valid registration in the name of MS5 and obtain the right to access the 
Internet. Such attacks are more prominent in cases where tunneling is not used 
while carrying out the authentication. 
2.2.6 Forged BS 
In an ICWM network, an attacker can attack the multi-hop wireless network by 
advertising itself as a genuine BS using some forged messages or duplicate beacons 
recorded from a correct BS procured by eavesdropping. When a MS hears the fraudulent 
beacons from the malicious MS, it assumes that it is within the radio coverage of a 
genuine BS and then initiates a registration procedure. A registration request is issued 
from the MS to the forged BS. The forged BS replies with a bogus registration reply 
carrying the acceptance of the registration request. After receiving the registration result, 
the MS assumes that it has obtained the Internet connection through the forged BS and 
disconnects its communication from the genuine BS. One by one, the forged BS could 
entice a number of MSs to disconnect from the genuine BSs and establish connections 
with the forged MS either by single hop or multi-hop route. However, the MSs cannot 
obtain any Internet service correctly from the forged BS. This attack is valid in cases 
where the BS is not authenticated by the MS. For instance, in Figure 2, malicious MS3 
advertises a high-speed connectivity to the Internet by sending bogus beacons to its 
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neighbor. After hearing the beacons from the forged BS (MS3) but without realizing the 
fraud, MS2 and MS5 register with MS3 by a single hop. After registrations, MS2 and 
MS5 believe that they are connected with a BS with a higher speed, and thus disconnect 
the connection with genuine BS (BS 1). An attacker using forged BS achieves the 
following: 
• The forged BS captures registration information of MSs such as their home IP 
addresses, home network IP addresses. It can also break a proper Internet 
connection and can cause unwarranted registration delay. 
• The forged BS can act as the gateway to the Internet and can seize the data packet 
or capture sensitive personal (e.g., password) or network data of MSs. 
2.2.7 BS Cache Poisoning 
In a single hop wireless network, it is difficult for a malicious MS to modify the radio 
mappings from which MSs enter a BS because each MS and the BS interact with each 
other directly. On the contrary, the BS in ICWM suffers from possible BS cache 
pOIsonmg as multi-hop communication is now allowed. To support multi-hop 
communication, the routing cache is needed at each BS for the purpose of recording the 
multi-hop routes between the BS and each multi-hop MS. The multi-hop routing cache of 
a MS may be poisoned in several ways. For instance, when a multi-hop MS sends a 
multi-hop route update packet for creating or updating its multi-hop paging cache at a BS, 
the malicious MS may modify the packet that could result in multi-hop routing cache 
poisoning. Also, a malicious MS may send a wrong route-update packet on behalf of a 
genuine one. And the BS updates the routing information for the genuine MS with the 
wrong information sent by the malicious MS. To locate a multi-hop MS, the BS finds the 
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first hop MSs in routing cache that can reach the destination MS. The data packet from 
the BS is forwarded, hop-by-hop, to the destination in accordance with the multi-hop 
route. When a multi-hop route is poisoned, the BS is unable to locate the destination MS 
by following the multi-hop route provided in the BS cache. For instance in Figure 2, MS3 
sends a multi-hop route-update packet to the BS on behalf of MS5, and the BS updates 
the multi-hop routing cache from MS5-MS2-BS to MS5-BS. In this case, the packets of 
MS5 from the Internet will be lost due to the incorrect routing information. Note that 
cache poisoning has to be accompanied by address spoofing. 
2.2.8 Avoiding Tracking by Mobility 
The ability to avoid tracking is important to an adversary when it uses spoofed 
addresses during attacks. Many technologies, including link testing, logging, ICMP trace 
back, and IP trace back [57]; have been developed to enable the victim to trace back the 
source of the attacker. For example, link testing iteratively checks the upstream link until 
the source is reached [57]. It is a challenge for a victim to track the malicious MS in the 
ICWM network because: (i) the multi-hop route from a MS to a BS may change when the 
mobility forces network topology to alter in an ICWM network (ii) the visiting BS 
(network attachment) may change due to the mobility of MS. The tracking back 
technologies based on the fixed network may be invalid in the ICWM networks because 
of the change in multi-hop path. Meanwhile, the attacker can take advantage of the flaw 
of mobility protocol to implement some sophisticated technology so as to hide its IP 
address from being tracked. As for mobile IP mobility protocol, a MS has two IP address: 
the home address and the care-of-address. The care-of-address is temporarily assigned by 
foreign network and used as the current address for communication. The Non Disclosure 
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Method (NDM) [57] prevents against traceability of network connections III mobile 
environment by hiding the source and destination addresses of an IP packet from every 
forwarding device except the packet destination. 
2.2.9 Avoiding Tracing by Changing Identity 
A voiding identification tracking is another important issue for attackers but remains 
unexplored in ICWM networks. MANETs may use different addressing solutions [32]; 
AODV, DSR, and TOR A use Node ID; HSR has a hierarchical addressing solution; 
ZLHS use <zone id + node id> as MS's ad hoc address. When a MS enters a MANET, 
the MS will be automatically configured with an identity by the ad hoc protocol, using 
one of the above address solutions. For example, a DSR network will assign a MS with a 
Node ID (e.g., 001) when the MS enters the DSR network. If the MS leaves the DSR 
network and enters the DSR network again, the MS will be assigned a new available 
Node ID (e.g., 002). In the integrated Internet and the MANET, a malicious MS can 
participate in a MANET and establish its Internet connectivity by using its ad hoc 
identification. In this case, the malicious MS can easily implement its attacks to the 
Internet or wireless network over and over again by masquerading itself. When the 
malicious MS enters the Integrated Internet and MANET, the network configures the MS 
with an ID. If the malicious MS leaves the network, and enters the network again, the 
network will automatically configure the malicious MS with a new ID without knowing 
its last ID. The network cannot track and monitor the history of the malicious MS 
because each MS does not have a unique and consistent ID while leaving and entering the 
network. When malicious MS exhibits illegal actions on the Integrated Internet and 
MANET, the malicious MS can clear its bad record by reentering the network and 
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reinitiating a trust relation with network by using a new 10. As shown in Figure 5, the 
attacker exhibits its Wireless-Internet attack by using ID A. If the network finds the 
attack from ID A, the malicious MS reenters the network with a new ID (ID B), and 
could attack again. The ability of the malicious MS to modify packets to spoof MAC 
addresses prevents a detection mechanism to quickly identity the malicious MS. 
~!!.tt:,cJ'<"rwith ID B 
Figure 5. Wireless-Internet DDoS. 
2.2.10 Multi-hop Routing Attacks 
Almost all ad hoc routing attacks in a MANET can be carried to ICWM networks 
because of the common characteristic: multi-hop communication. Multi-hop route 
discovery is responsible for detecting the multi-hop routes between MSs and BSs. An 
. attacker may exhibit its intentions by refusing to participate fully and correctly in a multi-
hop route discovery process, without following the principles of integrity, authentication, 
non-duplication, confidentiality, and cooperation. Therefore, multi-hop routing attacks 
can be grouped into five categories: anti-integrity, impersonation, duplication, anti-
confidentiality, and anti-cooperation [58] [32]. 
• Anti-integrity is the action of breaking away the integrity of a message. 
Modification is a typical example of anti-integrity. The malicious MSs modify, 
inject or delete some fields of a routing packet, and then forward the packet with 
falsified values in the packet fields. These fields may include the source or 
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destination address, hop count, sequence number, etc. A typical example is the 
routing loop attack wherein, a malicious MS creates incorrect routing information 
at the routing table of each node. This is done by modifying the correct route 
packets destined to the victim MS in such a manner that a loop is created. Routing 
loop results in the consumption of power and bandwidth at the traveled MSs. 
• Impersonations are those actions in which a malicious station spoofs an existing 
or forged IP address, or uses broadcast address to generate or duplicate one or 
more messages, and then forwards them to other MSs. In Figure 2, MS3 may 
masquerade itself by spoofing an invented address or an IP address of another MS. 
With the spoofed address, MS3 could entice MS5 to use MS3 as the shortest route 
for reaching BS 1. Once MS5 starts sending packets to the BS, MS3 can easily 
compromise MS5's communication. 
• In a duplication attack, a malicious MS sends a legitimate message more than 
once. These duplicated messages cause multiple receptions and processing 
overheads on adjacent MSs. 
• In the anti-confidentiality attacks, an attacker may reveal sensitive information, 
such as the private key. Stealing, eavesdropping, guessing, brute-force and 
cryptanalysis are common ways for an attacker to identify sensitive information. 
• Anti-cooperation includes dropping of packets or colluding with other attackers to 
disrupt a routing process. Selfishness is an example of anti-cooperation that a MS 
does not participate in the routing protocol or perform packet forwarding for the 
purpose of conserving its own energy. 
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2.2.11 Packet Forwarding Attacks 
The protection for routing security cannot guarantee that each MS forwards the data 
packet in accordance with the routing table. It is possible that a MS honestly participates 
in the route discovery but mishandles data packets during packet forwarding. For instance, 
a MS participating in a route discovery may become a selfish MS during the multi-hop 
packet transmissions. In the packet forwarding stage, several types of security threats are 
possible. 
• Modification: A MS may intentionally modify, drop, or inject data packets. 
• Selfishness: A MS may drop all or a fraction of packets for the purpose of saving 
its power. 
• Power drain: A malicious MS sends unnecessary packets or broadcast packets to 
drain the battery of the other MSs. 
2.2.12 Mobility Handoff Attack 
As stated earlier, when a MS visits a new network, it initiate the process of mobility 
handoff, indicating its willingness to redirect its data flow to the new network. When the 
mobility handoff is between two different BSs, but in the same type of network, the 
migration is horizontal handoff. A vertical handoff is the migration between two 
heterogeneous components, i.e., from a BS to IEEE 802.11 WLAN. Also, a vertical 
handoff involves the migration between two different radio interfaces at a multi-mode 
MS. A typical procedure for a vertical handoff includes three stages: 
1. Detecting a single or multi-hop route to a new BS in a new radio interfaces, 
2. Interworking either from a cellular to WLAN and vice versa, and 
3. Flow redirection. 
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When a MS detects a new BS with better performance for the route (e.g., less delay, 
higher speed) than the current BS, the MS initiates a migration procedure to move from 
the current BS to the new BS. However, as seen from Section 2.2.10, the multi-hop 
routing could be easily misled. When a cellular subscriber MS migrates from a cellular 
service to a WLAN network, the WLAN network has the responsibility for securing 
interworking for the MS so that the data flow over a cellular network can be safely 
redirected to the WLAN network. In the mobility handoff attack, a malicious MS may 
entice a MS to initiate a false multi-hop handoff by 
• Claiming a higher speed or better multi-hop route metric to a new BS from the 
malicious MS, 
• Impeding interworking by dropping or modifying the registration packets, and 
• Advertising forged beacons or replaying the stale beacons of a legal BS to cause 
the forged BS attack as illustrated in Section 2.2.6. 
2.2.13 Specific Wireless Protocol Attacks 
IEEE 802.16 is a standard for constructing wireless metropolitan area networks 
(MANs). The IEEE 802.16 security is implemented as a privacy sub-layer below the 
MAC protocol. It provides protection in terms of one-hop connection between a MS and 
a BS. However, the IEEE 802.16e security cannot prevent a MS from the BS forgery or 
replay attacks due to lack of a BS certificate. Like IEEE 802.16 security, most of the 
wireless protocols suffer from various security threats. For instance, the GSM security 
protocol may suffer from the attacks on authentication algorithm like cloning, 
confidentiality attacks like brute-force attacks, crypt analytical attacks, and attacks using 
loopholes in the protocol as illustrated in [59]. It is well known that IEEE 802.11 WEP 
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Figure 6. Security Protocol Stack and Security Challenges for a Dual-mode MS in an 
ICWM Network. 
2.3 Open Challenges 
Research in ICWM network security is still in its early stage and many issues remain 
unexplored. The security protocol stack for a dual-mode MS is given in Figure 6. As can 
be seen, the dual-mode MS has two Physical, Data Link and MAC layers for the cellular 
and IEEE 802.11 radio interfaces respectively. The network layer selects a radio interface 
according to the performance requirement [1]. As illustrated in Section 2.1, the 
fundamental vulnerability of an ICWM network comes from its distributed environment, 
open wireless medium, and heterogeneous multi-hop wireless communication. In such 
system, the distributed trust relationship (DTR) is the base for the security framework as 
shown in Figure 6. A robust security solution should include a DTR scheme that has a 
cross layered structure and executes over the Internet and wireless domains. Securing 
Internet (e.g., DSN, internet router) and wireless infrastructure (e.g., BS) prevent attacks 
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such as unauthorized access or physical seizure. ICWM security should provide an end-
to-end communication protection to MSs. However, end-to-end communication 
protection cannot be achieved easily because of the intricacies of the networks and 
communication protocols. As shown in Figure 6, the ICWM security issues at network 
layer include multi-hop routing security, secure packet forwarding, and interworking 
security. 
2.3.1 Distributed Trust Relationship Establishment 
Trustworthiness is the foundation of security. Almost all attacks in ICWM networks 
infringe the trust relationship in some form or the other. For the ICWM security, a DTR 
model across wired and wireless networks is desired. The DTR model considers the 
nature and basis of the trust relationships. It enables an inter-component authentication 
(e.g., BS-MS or MS-MS) based on legal binding. An ICWM network should require each 
single or multi-hop MS to provide authentication information upon entering the network. 
If a MS does not have a security binding with the network, the MS must register with the 
BS to get its identification verified before communication. On the other hand, before 
entering a network, the MS must verify the authenticity of the network (the accessing BS). 
When a MS visits a foreign network, the foreign network and home network must be 
mutually verified. In general, the DTR model provides the capability to mutually validate 
two components and construct trust relationship between them [55] [59] [64] [65]: 
DTR l.A MS (single or multi-hop) +-+ Home network, 
DTR 2.A MS (single or multi-hop) +-+ Visiting network, 
DTR 3.Home network +-+ Visiting network, and 
DTR 4.A MS (single or multi-hop) +-+ Another MS (intermediate or destination). 
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Figure 7, ICWM Network OTRs. 
The OTRs in an ICWM network are illustrated in Figure 7. The horne network with 
. 
which the MS has legally contractual agreement (OTR 1) is supposed to be the most 
trusted domain for ICWM security [1] [SS] [S9]. OTRI and OTR2 preclude a MS without 
credentials to participate in the network, ~his is achieved by verifying the identification 
of the MS at its horne network. The attacks including unauthorized Internet access, 
wireless-Internet OOoS , and avoiding tracking by changing identity, violate the principle 
of correct identification to access the network. OTR 1 and OTR2 also provide each MS 
with the capability to authenticate the accessing network (visiting BS) in order to prevent 
BS forgery, OTR3 establishes the trust relations between two different domains, and 
OTR4 constructs the trust relations between any two MSs. 
A plethora of security protocols focus on the above OTR establishments based on 
various single hop wireless networks. These security protocols include GSM security, 
UMTS security, Mobile IP security, HiperLan/2, IEEE S02.1S, IEEE S02.11, IEEES02.16, 
and IEEE S02.20 etc. The essential scheme with regard to OTR establishments is a 
procedure from which the single hop MS and the visiting network implement the mutual 
authentication. This is achieved with the help of horne network and the negotiation of 
encryption keys for communication. In a cellular network. the GSM security 
(recommendations GSM 02.09 and GSM 03.20) enables the foreign network to 
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authenticate the identity of a MS through the home network, and establishes the 
encryption keys, which are required for providing the confidentiality services. In a 
WLAN, the IEEE 802.llx security (e.g., IKEv2 EAP-IKEv2) authenticates a single hop 
MS and establishes the keys that are used for encrypting/decrypting messages according 
to the IPsec security specification. IEEE 802.16 security implements X.509 certificate-
based authentication for MSs and ciphering key-based data association for confidentiality. 
However, it is a new and critical issue to support DTR establishment for multi-hop 
MSs. This has two essential challenges [59J [64J 165]: 
• A multi-hop MS ..... Home/visiting network: How can a BS trust a multi-hop MS 
such as MS I in the foreign network as shown in Figure 7, and vice versa? 
• A multi-hop MS ..... another MS (intermediate or destination): How can a multi-
hop MS trust another MS in an ICWM network (How can MSI trust MS2, and 
how can MS2 trust MS 1 as shown in Figure 7)? 
The current mechanisms in the literature to establish DTR for a multi-hop MS have 
three steps 1641 159 J: 
1) The multi-hop MS sends its credentials to the network (BS) so that the BS can 
authenticate the MS, 
2) The multi-hop MS validates the BS so that the MS can trust the BS for accessing 
the network, and 
3) After the mutual authentication, the BS creates a security binding for the multi-
hop MS. The security binding provides keys further used for multi-hop routing 
security and packet forwarding security. 
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The CAMA (cellular-assisted mobile wireless ad hoc network) security mechanism 
[64] implements DTR establishment with a mutual authentication scheme through 
cellular channel. After authentication, a key assignment scheme establishes the security 
binding for multi-hop WLAN communication on the IEEE 802.11 channel. A security 
protocol in [591 provides DTR for integrated Internet and MANET. In this approach, the 
F AiHA serves as the authentication center to check the credentials for each MANET MS. 
Upon receiving a registration request, the FA and HA carry out a series of authentications. 
Registration reply indicates the result of the registration. If the registration is successful, 
the FA binds the identity of MS with its public key in a certificate. Thereby, the MS can 
initiate a MANET route discovery for communicating with the other MSs by using the 
certificate. 
Open Research Issues: 
The process for DTR establishment is a nontrivial process during the multi-hop 
registration. DTR protocol for ICWM is largely open for study: 
• 
• 
Although a lot of network architectures for multi-hop cellular and multi-hop 
wireless LAN have been proposed 143-521, research on DRT establishments for 
multi-hop cellular and multi-hop LAN is very weak. It is a critical issue for a 
multi-hop MS to establish DTRs in a multi-hop WLAN or a multi-hop cellular 
network. 
The private/public key-based DTR protocols [59] cause heavy computation delay 
as compared to secret key-based HMAC. It is necessary to develop secret key-
based DTR between a multi-hop MS and the visiting network. 
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• How to facilitate the process of DTR establishment and provide enough 
protection in a multi-hop registration. 
2.3.2 Infrastructure Protection 
In case of the Internet infrastructure, a detailed investigation of the possible attacks 
and existing solutions can be found in 156 j. Wireless infrastructure including cellular BS 
and WLAN AP serves as the communication bridge connecting the multi-hop wireless 
network and the Internet. With regard to the ICWM security, each BS typically runs as 
the centralized authority and administrative center to provide security support for single 
and multi-hop MSs. A single or multi-hop MS establishes a DTR with the deployed BS 
and creates a security association. Moreover, a BS also provides support for route 
management 143-521 to enable the process of multi-hop route discovery for multi-hop 
MSs. To accomplish these functions, the BS should be sufficiently powerful to defend 
itself against security threats from the Internet or wireless networks. However, BS is 
vulnerable to various threats such as eavesdropping and traffic analysis, Internet-
Wireless-DDoS, Wireless-Internet DDoS, forged BS, and BS cache poisoning. As a 
result protocols must be implemented to withstand attacks that can lead to failure of the 
BS. The BS/AP protection primarily includes access control, and resource and 
identification protection. 
• Access Control: A BS may be accessed and reconfigured according to the 
attacker's convenience. The multi-hop routing or other information stored in a BS 
may be read or modified by an adversary. The sensitive information such as secret 
keys may be disclosed. Thereby the BS should have the capability of security 
access control scheme to prevent unauthorized access and operations. 
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• Resource Protection: Another mandatory requirement IS to improve the 
capability of resource (radio spectrum) management and resilience to the junk 
packets. Internet-Wireless DDoS, Wireless-Internet DDoS and attacking BS radio 
spectrum can be used to drain the radio spectrum resource in a BS by a batch of 
junk packets. The network (BS) should have the capability to identify the 
authenticity of packets for the purpose of filtering trash packets either from 
wireless networks or from the Internet. 
• Identification Protection: It is necessary to provide identification protection for 
critical BSs. Identification information includes BS' s IP address, physical location 
and physical link connection, etc. By using a directional antenna with a Global 
Positioning System (GPS), the adversary not only knows that there are BSs in that 
area but also know its physical position. An adversary can easily know the IP 
address of a BS by capturing an IP packet from the BS either on the Internet or by 
wireless eavesdropping. 
The personal communication device, such as a multiple air interface MS, should be 
properly protected. The identification (IP address), secret keys, certificates and other 
sensitive information should be stored in a proper manner so as to prevent getting 
compromised and running as a malicious MS. As for a multiple radio interface MS, the 
MS should properly manage the resource related to different air interfaces such as home 
IP address and the transition between different air interfaces. 
Open Research Issues 
A BS or a MS is often required to execute multiple distinct protocol standards so that 
security operation for various protocol layers and inter-working among different 
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networks (e.g .• cellular and wireless LAN) could be easily supported. The design of an 





Development of security specific platform for a BS or a MS to accommodate the 
implementations of different security protocols. 
Improving the security of the local wired networks, where the BSs arc located, 
and enhancing the BS security features to prevent unauthorized operations on the 
BS configuration and system sensitive data. 
Speeding up the MS's processing capability and optimizing cryptographic 
algorithms to increase the security operating capability of the MS. 
2.3.3 Multi-hop Routing Security 
Different routing protocols 13-101 143-52J have been developed to implement the 
procedure for MSs to effectively discover and maintain routes in ICWM networks. There 
are three types of basic routes in ICWM networks: the route from a BS to a MS, the route 
from a MS to a BS, and the route between two MS without BS. The notorious issue in the 
multi-hop network could be said to be the multi-hop routing security. Corresponding to 
the three types of routes, multi-hop routing security should provide security to all the 
above types ofroutes. 
As illustrated in Section 2.2.1, a major advantage of the ICWM routing security in 
comparison with the MANET security is the accessibility of the Internet through the BS, 
thereby having a mechanism for centralized security management. The MANET security 
has no explicit line of defense to distinguish a MS as trusted or non-trusted due to the 
absence of infrastructure-based authority. On the contrary, in an ICWM network, the 
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Internet infrastructure and BS acts as the security authority for multi-hop routing. For 
instance, a BS can verify the credentials of a single or multi-hop MS when required. By 
way of registration and authentication, the MSs can be divided into: registered MS and 
unregistered MSs. It is necessary to execute the required principles to enforce registered 
MSs to participate in honest route discovery and maintenance and to exclude the 
unregistered MS from the routing paths. In order to achieve authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity, cooperation and availability in routing security, some proposed 
fundamental principles [64] [59] are as follows. 
• Uniqueness: Identification uniqueness even if a MS enters an ICWM network 
many times. 
• Access Control: An ICWM network only provides routing and communication 
services to the trusted MSs which have established the DTR with the network. 
• Exclusion: Only the trusted MSs can serve as the intermediary relaying MS in a 




Authentication: Only the authenticated routing messages can be used to update 
the BS caching. 
Integrity: An appropriate cryptographic scheme to effectively protect routing 
messages by way of encryption/decryption or signature/verification. 
Credentials: The home network has the capability to operate MS' s billing and 
credential when a MS has any malicious action. 
In the integrated Internet and MANET [59], the FA acts as the distributed CA 
(certificate authority) server. Thus it issues a certificate to an ad hoc MS which has a 
successful DTR process. The certificate is uniquely bound with the MS's home address. 
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The certificate is also used as a pass for accessmg the network as well as the 
authentication of its routing messages. Therefore. any MS without a legal certificate is 
excluded from any multi-hop route discovery process. On the other hand, the CAMA 
security implements these principles for cellular-assisted WLAN networks by a set of 
keys such as secret key, public/private key, group key, and session key, etc. 
The next challenge is to execute the above defined principles across wireless and 
wired network. The enforcement of the defined principles is a complicated procedure, 
spanning different layers in the protocol stack and crossing multi-hop wireless network 
and wired network. In the transport layer, DTR establishment provides multi-hop MSs 
with security authentication and association based on celtification service as specified in 
the public key infrastructure (PKI) or other security technologies. One of the immediate 
results is that the process creates a binding that envelope the MS' s identification with the 
keys used for route discovery at the network layer as well as the keys used for encryption 
at the link layer. Only the MS having a legal binding is marked as a trusted MS on the 
network layer. Also, the encryption at the link layer is needed for the purpose of 
confidentiality. During the execution of the above defined principles, an appropriate 
identification binding procedure IS required to prevent a non-trusted MS from 
participating in routing activities. On the other hand, the process of route discovery 
across the multi-hop network should be executed without a high control packet overhead 
and computation of each MS. The security in the routing maintenance stage should be 
able to accommodate fast network topology changes. In the integrated Internet and 
MANET, the execution is divided into five stages [59]: key creation, FA discovery, 
secured registration, certificate issuance, and secured route discovery. 
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Another important challenge is the evaluation of the aforementioned principles and 
their executions. The measure need to include quantitative and qualitative evaluation of 
the security and performance of the defined principles. An important task in security 
evaluation is to check whether vulnerabilities are still incurred after defining and running 
the principles on the multi-hop network. The evaluation can be used for the further 
enhancement of routing security principles and execution until routing security protocol 
can have adequate robustness. 
Open Research Issues: 
In an ICWM network, MSs are generally cheap devices having less computation 
capability. The exchange of routing message with digital signature is based on 
asymmetric key cryptography (e.g., RSA) and the routing process consequently involves 
much more computation overhead in signing/decrypting or validating/encrypting 
operations. If a malicious MS feeds a MS or BS with a large number of bogus routing 
messages with false signatures, it can easily exhaust the computation resource of a MS or 




Defining, executing and evaluating desirable security routing principles, 
Developing secret key-based HMAC (message authentication codes) routing 
security to facilitate the efficiency of route discovery and maintenance, and 
Developing a protocol for DTR establishment and secured route discovery in 
supporting other different routing protocols (i.e., AGSM, UCAN). 
2.3.4 Securing Packet Forwarding 
Because of multi-hop communication, an intermediate relaying MS may correctly 
participate in a route discovery but improperly forward data packets in an ICWM 
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network. There are several challenges [61-71] in secured multi-hop packet forwarding. 
Few of these are (i) detecting and reporting misbehaviors, (ii) penalizing or isolating 
malicious MSs, and (iii) charging and rewarding scheme to encourage the packet 
forwarding. 
Several selfishness prevention schemes have been reported since Marti et al. [61] 
proposed a method to detect misbehaving nodes in August 2000 by dividing the strategies 
into three groups: reputatio/J-based scheme, credit-payment scheme, and game theory 
scheme. As the ratio of selfish MS increases, the packet delivery rates get drastically 
reduced. To detect misbehaviors, an approach in 1611 proposes a scheme where all ad hoc 
MSs maintain a set of matrices to record the past misbehavers of other MSs, and a MS 
selects well-behaved MSs as the intermediate relaying MS for packet forwarding. In 
addition, each MS 1621 creates a secure association in order that it can authenticate 
misbehavior reports before isolating a malicious MS. On the other hand, a set of rules and 
protocols 1661 are proposed as incentive for packet forwarding by the exchanges of 
fictitious currency called Nugget. In the ICWM context, which is infrastructure-based 
packet forwarding, BS collects the report of the misbehaviors including packet dropping, 
reduplication of packet, packet filtering, and packet modification etc [65]. 
Based on the reports from multi-hop network, the network (BS) decides which 
accounts should be charged or credited. To implement misbehavior reporting, two 
schemes are needed: authentication and packet acknowledgement 165]. An authentication 
scheme provides the capability for (i) authentication of the source and destination, (ii) 
authentication of the forwarding MS. The authentication of any message depends on the 
DTR establishment from which the necessary authentication keys are created and 
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uniquely bound with the MS. An acknowledgement scheme is the process for destination 
to acknowledge the reception of every packet either in per packet basis or batch basis. 
The BS can maintain the records of all activities of packet forwarding for each 
participating MS. The destination reports to the BS every time when it receives a data 
packet from the source [65]. In order to save resource, the destination acknowledges all 
received packets in a single batch at the end of packet tnmsmission. Such credit-payment 
approach requires global participation and a variety of heterogeneous MSs may exist in a 
practical MANET. Furthermore, some MSs may not earn enough credits not as they may 
just be badly positioned. Raghavan et al. 168] address this by proposing two layered 
forwarding service: priced priority.f{lrwarding andjree best-efj(Irt.f{lrwarding. 
A charging and remuneration scheme manipulates the accounts of all participating 
MSs. The manipulation of account depends on several factors: the number and size of 
packets, the number of hops of wireless route, and the transmission time. In the process 
of charging and remuneration, it is necessary to protect the network from cheating, 
refusal to pay, incorrect reward claims, free-riding, and invasive adversary. The trade-
based scheme in 158 J enforces the cooperation in mobile ad hoc W ANs by two 
approaches: packet purse and packet trade. The natural idea of the trade-based scheme is 
that a MS used a service should be charged and a MS providing a service should be 
remunerated. The charging and remuneration scheme in [65] achieves the collaboration 
of packet forwarding in multi-hop cellular networks. Upon receiving the upstream 
packets which are from a source MS in the multi-hop network, the BS credits their 
collaboration after authenticating each relaying MS. In the opposite direction of upstream 
packets, the destination MS in the multi-hop network acknowledges the receipt of packet 
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from the BS, and then BS makes the credits for each relaying MS. Sprite (a simple, cheat-
proof, credit-based system) [69] with a central authority server called CCS (Credit 
Clearance Service) also utilizes credit to give incentive to the MSs that forward packets 
to the source. However, the amount of credit charged to the source is not always equal to 
that given to other MSs. Yau et a1. 170] identifies many problems which make 
CONFIDANT and CORE impractical to be used in actual MANETs and propose a 
simple reputation system to enhance the robustness of a MANET by MS utilizing only its 
own experience about all neighboring MSs. Huang et a1. 171j address drawbacks and 
impracticality of both the reputation and the credit-payment incentive methods. 
Open Research Issues: 
The infrastructure-based scheme for detecting various misbehaviors is an important 
issue in ICWM networks but has been neglected in current security designs. A lot of 
issues about securing packet forwarding in ICWM network remain unexplored: 
• 
• 
How to enforce service availability and cooperation in a ICWM network with a 
secure mechanism to stimulate MS to participating in packet forwarding, to 
refrain from overloading the network, and to thwart the "selfish" MS. 
How to implement fair charging and rewarding for the cooperation between MSs 
in packet forwarding protocol and a reasonable fine for misbehavers. 
2.3.4 Interworking Security 
A dual-mode MS equipped with two radio interfaces discovers and selects an access 
network (GSM, GPRS, UMTS, and WLAN) from the available networks. The 
interworking of 3GPPIWLAN enables the provisioning of public WLAN access service 
to 3GPP system subscribers [I] [55]. Interworking security is a basic prerequisite for 
providing a cellular subscriber MS with WLAN IP Internet connectivity. 
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Figure 8 illustrates simplified cellularlWLAN interworking security architecture [54] 
[59]. When a cellular MS visits a foreign WLAN network. the 3GPP AAA interconnects 
WLAN security system and cellular (e.g .• GSM, UMTS) security system. To reuse 
SIM/USIM-based authentication in WLAN interworking, two new EAP schemes, EAP 
SIM and EAP AKA, have been specified for 3GPP-WLAN interworking. The EAP SIM 
encapsulates GSM SIM authentication and key agreement algorithms within EAP. And 
the EAP AKA specifies UMTS mutual authentication and key agreement (AKA) on EAP. 
L::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~~~.;~~~.~ .. ~.~~~~;~. 
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Figure 8. Security Architecture for Cellular/WLAN Interworking. 
Open Research Issues: 
The AAA framework is chosen as the basis of the WLAN and 3GPP-WLAN. The 
possible AAA protocols include RADIUS or Diameter. Many challenges remain in 




Extending AAA protocols to allow cellular (e.g., GSM, GPRS and UMTS) MS 
roaming from cellular system toward the WLAN system. 
Instead of GSM family system, how to support WLAN interworking such as 
IEEE 802.16 in which X.S09 certificate is the basis of access security for MSs. 
Since the proposed 3GPP-WLAN can not support multi-hop access, protocols are 




Many possible security threats against ICWM networks have been presented in this 
chapter, along with other open issues. The security attacks such as wireless-Internet 
DDoS may seriously degrade the performance of Internet services for multi-hop MSs. 
However, the current security solution for ICWM networks is only the first step toward 
tackling various security attacks. In this chapter, the lCWM security challenges of such 
schemes are discussed for providing ubiquitous and secure Internet services for mobile 
users in support of heterogeneous multi-hop communication. For the practicality of 
lCWM networks, robust and efficient security schemes have to design across 
heterogeneous multi-hop wireless networks and the Internet. 
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PART A 
ON SECURE COMMUNICATION FOR 
INTEGRATED INTERNET AND MANET 
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CHAPTER III 
AN INTEGREATED PROTOCOL FOR INTERNET 
AND AD-HOC NETWORK COMMUNICATION 
The integration of infrastructure networks and ad hoc mobile networks can be used to 
eliminate dead zones in wireless LANs and cellular networks, and can also be used to 
extend the coverage of wireless networks. Earlier approaches for the integrated networks 
either provided only unidirectional global connectivity for ad hoc hosts or caused high 
overhead and packet delay for full bi-directional connections. In this chapter, a protocol 
of integrating mobile IP and enhanced DSDV (EDSDV) is proposed to provide full bi-
directional Internet connectivity for ad hoc hosts. A detailed performance comparison is 
conducted between the proposed approach with a leading integration approach based on 
different network sizes, mobility of ad hoc hosts and other network parameters. The 
experimental results show that the proposed approach has smaller overhead for full bi-
directional connectivity and shorter average packet delay compared to the leading 
integration approach. 
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The spectrum of wireless networks can be classified into infrastructure (e.g., wireless 
LAN and wireless MAN) networks and infrastructureless (ad hoc) network. In 
infrastructure networks, a base station or an access point serves as a communication 
bridge for mobile hosts. Mobile users obtain their services under the coverage of a base 
station or an access point. A base station or an access point has both a wireless and a 
wired interface and acts as a gateway between two types of networks [25]. Mobile IP has 
been successfully extended to cellular networks and wireless LANs for providing global 
internet connectivity [3] [4]. In contrast to infrastructure networks, ad hoc nodes are 
mobile terminals connected in a dynamic and arbitrary manner without any infrastructure 
device. The existing wireless LANs and cellular networks only provide a single hop 
wireless extension to access points and base stations. Integrating ad hoc networks with 
infrastructure networks can be beneficial for extending the coverage of wireless networks 
via multi hop communication of ad hoc hosts. Many communication scenarios may 
benefit from multi-hops networks with the desirable properties of larger coverage and 
freedom of mobility. Integrated ad hoc and infrastructure networks can be used to 
eliminate dead zones in wireless LAN. This chapter proposes an efficient approach that 
provides bi-directional Internet connectivity to ad hoc hosts via mobile IP protocol 
implemented on infrastructure networks. 
Two important issues for providing the global Internet connectivity for ad hoc 
networks are bi-directional communication and the total overhead of Mobile IP as well as 
ad hoc routing protocol. Previous approaches [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [25] for the integrated 
Internet and ad hoc networks were developed by extending the mobile IP to ad hoc 
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networks. But these approaches cause high mobile IP and ad hoc network routing 
overhead for full bi-directional connectivity. The approaches discussed in [5] [7] [25] 
proactively flood agent advertisements through the entire ad hoc network. In approach [5], 
the ad hoc hosts run a modified Routing Information Protocol (RIP) Daemon (routed) to 
deal with mobile IP messages. Also a mobile IP routing daemon (mipd) runs on each ad 
hoc host. The routeds of mobile hosts within the coverage of a foreign agent (FA) receive 
FA's agent advertisements and related mobile IP messages. These routeds can relay the 
mobile IP messages to the mipds of the ad hoc hosts that are outside the transmission 
range of the FA. The MIPMANET [7] provides Internet connectivity for ad hoc hosts by 
using mobile IP with foreign agent's care-of-address and reverse tunneling. FA 
periodically broadcasts its agent advertisements. Agent advertisements spread through the 
whole ad hoc network. This approach uses AODV [16] protocol for communication in ad 
hoc network. The performance of this approach has been improved by more recent 
approaches given in [8] [25]. The approach used in [25] extends mobile IP to ad hoc 
networks using on-demand AODV protocol; therefore each mobile node registers with 
FA only when it requires internet connectivity. However, on-demand approaches only 
allow unidirectional Internet connectivity from the ad hoc hosts to wired network hosts. 
Implementing bi-directional connectivity with these routing protocols incurs a significant 
overhead in maintaining IP registration with the FA. The scheme in [8] further improves 
the performance of the integrated approach given in [25] by lowering the mobile IP 
overhead. This approach reduces the number of FA advertisement by using controlled 
flooding among the ad hoc nodes. However, the mobile IP overhead and related AODV 
overhead are still very high [8]. The approaches in the [9] [72] involve agent discovery 
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which results in more overhead for full bi-directional connectivity and introduces 
significant connection delay. 
The full bi-directional Internet connectivity for mobile user is very important 
especially in the integrated Internet and ad hoc networks. The implementation of bi-
directional connectivity has not been clearly addressed in the existing approaches. 
Moreover, the existing approaches have higher packet latency because they are mostly 
using either AODV or some extension of AODV. These approaches have high route 
discovery latency compared to the proposed approach. The integration of the mobile IP 
with table-driven (proactive) protocols, lends itself very well for providing bi-directional 
internet connectivity: either a host in infrastructure (wired) network or a host in the ad 
hoc network can initiate a global connection. In this chapter an enhanced DSDV 
(EDSDV) protocol is proposed that improves the performance of standard DSDV 
protocol. In the proposed integrated approach FA acts as one of the ad hoc nodes 
participating in the enhanced DSDV routing protocol. Also the FA serves as the mobile 
IP proxy for ad hoc hosts. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the basic model 
of combining ad hoc and infrastructure (wired) networks. Section 3.2 discusses why 
DSDV protocol [11] has poor throughput at higher mobility of ad hoc hosts. It then 
discusses an EDSDV protocol for overcoming the problem of lower throughput. In 
addition, this section proposes a protocol for full bi-directional connectivity by using FA 
as the mobile IP proxy for ad hoc hosts. Section 3.3 discusses the experimental 
configuration for integrating the infrastructure (wired) and ad hoc network. The 
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experimental results obtained from the simulations under different scenarios are also 
discussed in this section. Some conclusions are included in Section 3.4. 
3.1 Internet Connectivity for Ad-hoc Networks 
The goal of the proposed approach is to integrate ad hoc and infrastructure (wired) 
network by using mobile hosts, which are located under the coverage of a foreign agent 
(FA), as the communicating bridges between two heterogeneous networks. Mobile IP and 
ad hoc routing protocol coordinate with each other to build the connectivity across the 
heterogeneous networks as shown in Figure 9. There are only two alternatives for a 
mobile host to obtain the global Internet connectivity. In the first case, ad hoc hosts, 
which are under the transmission range of a FA, can communicate directly with the FA. 
In the second case, ad hoc hosts, which are outside the coverage of a FA, communicate 
with the FA using multi-hop ad hoc links. The key challenge in providing connectivity is 
to minimize the overhead of mobile IP and ad hoc routing protocol between infrastructure 
and ad hoc networks. Figure 9 illustrates an example of cooperation between the wired 
network and the ad hoc network. The inside area of dash circle represents the coverage of 
a FA; as shown in Figure 9, mobile host 1 and 3 are located in the coverage of the FA. 
The left side of Figure 9 represents a wired network that consists of Home Agent (HA), 
Correspondent Node (CN), FA, and the Internet. The right side is the ad hoc network 
using EDSDV. The ad hoc host 1 and FA can reach each other directly. Assume that all 
mobile hosts work in a promiscuous receive mode, therefore, each mobile host would 
deliver every packet received from its neighbors without filtering any information. 
Meanwhile ad hoc host 4 and 5 are neighbors allowing ad hoc host 5 to communicate 
with the FA using ad hoc routing protocol via ad hoc host 4 and 1. In the end, a path can 
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be established between eN and ad hoc host 5 via the Internet, FA, ad hoc hosts 1 and 4. 
Each ad hoc host registers with HA and creates a mobility binding at HA by mapping its 
home address to the care-of-address (eOA) provided by FA. Upon receiving data packets 
sent by eN and tunneled via Internet, FA delivers the data packets to the ad hoc host 5 
through the previously established path. On the other hand, after receiving data packets 
sent by the ad hoc host 5, FA delivers them to eN using IP routing in the infrastructure 
network. 
Wired Network 
Figure 9. An Integrated Internet and Ad hoc Network. 
3.2 Design of Integrated Framework 
3.2.1 Motivation for Enhanced DSDV 
The DSDV [11] routing protocol is based on classical Bellman-Ford Routing 
Algorithm for finding shortest paths between ad hoc nodes with some improvements. In 
DSDV protocol, each mobile host maintains a routing table that stores the number of 
hops and the sequence number assigned by the destination mobile host for all the 
destinations. The routing table updates in DSDV could be time-driven or event-driven. In 
time-driven routing table update, mobile hosts periodically transmit their routing tables to 
their immediate neighbors. The interval between two updates is referred as the DSDV 
periodic route update interval. On the other hand, in the event-driven routing table update, 
the mobile host notifies its routing information if a significant change has occurred in its 
62 
routing table since its last update. There are two ways of performing routing update: "full 
dump", in which an ad hoc host transmits the complete routing table to its neighbors, and 
"incremental update", in which an ad hoc host sends only those entries from the routing 
table that have changed since the last update. A sequence number is used to distinguish a 
stale route from a new route to avoid the formation of loops in the routing process. 
At higher rates of mobility in ad hoc networks, the performance of DSDV protocol is 
worse than many other ad hoc routing protocols. The packet delivery fraction can drop up 
to 70 percent with 50 nodes and a maximum mobility of 20 m1s (average speed 10). The 
low packet delivery rate results from the fact that an ad hoc host uses stale routes to a 
destination to send packets. Higher mobility rate results in higher number of broken links 
in an ad hoc network. These broken links result in the creation of stale routes in the 
routing tables. In our extensive simulation studies, we have found that packet dropping 
occurs due to traffic forwarding via a stale route generated by a broken link between two 
ad hoc hosts. Figure 10 illustrates how many packets are dropped during 600 seconds at a 
source node due to the broken links. The size of DSDV network is 50 nodes. A source 
node sends packets to a destination at the rate of 10 packets per second. As seen from 
Figure 10, the average number of packets dropped at the source node increases when the 
mobility of ad hoc increases. For example, at 50 m1sec mobility, 765 packets were 
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Figure 10. Number of Packets Lost due to Broken Links. 
In DSDV, a stale route at an ad hoc node doesn't mean that there is no valid route to a 
destination. Packets can be forwarded to some other neighbors that may have routes 
leading to the destination. When an immediate link from an ad hoc host A to destination 
D is broken, the proposed EDSDV protocol creates a temporary link via a neighbor that 
has a valid route to the destination D in its routing table. In EDSDV protocol, a 
temporary link is created by one-hop ROUTE REQUEST and ROUTE ACK messages. 
The ad hoc host A having the broken next hop link to the destination broadcasts a one-
hop ROUTE REQUEST message to all its neighbors. The neighbor returns a ROUTE 
ACK message if it has a route to the destination and the ad hoc host A is not the next hop 
on the route from the neighbor to destination D. 
In the proposed EDSDV protocol, each entry in routing table has an additional 
element for recording the route update time. This route update time is sent in ROUTE 
ACK message and is used for choosing a temporary route. After ad hoc host A broadcasts 
ROUTE REQUEST, there may be more than one neighbor that responds with ROUTE 
ACK. The ad hoc host A chooses a route that has least number of hops to the destination 
and the latest update time. The EDSDV protocol maintains all the desirable features of 
standard DSDV but reduces the packet loss due to broken links. The EDSDV protocol 
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uses the following approach to overcome the stale route problem of standard DSDV 
routing protocol: 
• If the link from host A to next hop link in route to a destination is broken, then 
in-coming packets are buffered; the maximum packets buffered at an ad hoc 
host for each destination is N. 
• When host A identifies that the next hop link in route to a destination is 
broken, the host A suspends forwarding packets to this next hop. In order to 
find a temporary next hop leading to the same destination, host A immediately 
broadcasts a one-hop ROUTE REQUEST to its neighbors. ROUTE 
REQUEST includes the host ID, and the destination. If a neighbor has a route 
leading to the destination in its routing table and the route does not take use of 
A as the next hop, then the neighbor responds by sending a ROUTE ACK 
message. ROUTE ACK includes its host ill, the destination, the hop count 
metric for the destination, and the last updated time for this path to destination. 
• The host A chooses the best neighbor as the temporary next hop, and then 
resumes forwarding the buffered and in-coming packets via the temporary 
route. The logic of choosing the best neighbor for the ad hoc host is to select a 
neighbor with the least number of hops to the destination. If there are several 
next hop nodes leading to the destination with same hop count, then host A 
chooses the neighbor having the latest routing update time. 
• Later, regular DSDV protocol updates the route to the destination in the 
routing table of host A. An updated route from the host A to the destination 
replaces the stale route. At this time host A switches from the temporary route 
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to the updated route for sending the in-coming packets. Also during creation 
of a temporary route, if the routing table entry from host A to the destination is 
updated by the regular DSDV protocol, then host A stops creating the 
temporary route and sends packets via the updated route. 
Figure 11 illustrates how host A creates a temporary route to destination D after the 
immediate link from A to B is broken. When the link from host A to destination D is 
broken because of its own or host B' s movement, host A suspends sending packets 
(Figure 11 (a». Then host A immediately broadcasts a ROUTE REQUEST to its 
neighbors( C, E, G and I). As an example, Table 2 represents the current routes leading to 
destination D at each neighbor. Because the next hop in routing entry of the neighbor I is 
A, the ad hoc host I does not respond to A's request. Ad hoc hosts C, E, and G respond 
with ROUTE ACK messages along with hop count metrics and the route update time to 
ad hoc host A (Figure 11 (b». 
T bl 2 Th a e e snaps h t f o 0 curren t t rou es 
Neighbor Metric (hops) Next Hop Route Route updated time 
C 2 H C->H->D 1005 
E 2 F E->F->D 1010 
G 3 E G->E->F->D 905 
I 3 A I->A->B->D 1002 
The ad hoc host C and E have the same value for hop count metrics, but the latest 
routing update time for E is greater than that of C, which indicates that the path through E 
is updated more recently. So host A chooses E as the next hop to the destination D. Host 
A resumes sending packets to the destination D (Figure 11 (c». Therefore, the packets in 
host A are forwarded to the destination D via E and F. After a while, the route entry in 
host A to the destination D is updated by the regular DSDV process, then host A switches 
its route from the temporary route to the updated route. In the Figure 11 (d), C moves 
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close to D, and the DSDV routing process updates the route at A. Therefore, ad hoc host 
A uses the updated DSDV route <A->C->D> for sending packets to D. 
CD 
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Figure 11. Creating a Temporary Route in Node A. 
3.2.2 Integrated Mobile IP and Ad hoc Network 
Mobile IF protocol [33] [34] provides a continuous connectivity for mobile hosts, in 
which discovery, registration, and tunneling processes are involved. In mobile IP 
mechanism, a mobile host uses a fixed home address. The home address is bound to a 
care-of address (COA) provided by a FA while the mobile host visits a FA. This mapping 
is available at home agent for forwarding packets to FA which can deliver packets to a 
roaming ad hoc host. However, the role of FA is extended in the proposed approach: 
• FA takes part in the routing protocol just as other ad hoc hosts do . 
• FA acts as the mobile IF proxy for the ad hoc hosts. The detailed information on 
registration process for ad hoc hosts is provided in the following sections. 
In the proposed integration approach, FA participates in ad hoc routing protocol as ad 
hoc hosts, thus FA doesn't broadcast agent advertisements for the purpose of integrating 
ad hoc hosts. This FA broadcast has been a significant source of overhead in earlier 
approaches [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [25]. In the proposed EDSDV protocol, ad hoc hosts and 
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FA automatically know each other's presence via routing update EDSDV protocol. Also 
each host doesn't send solicitations to request care-of-address from FA. When a mobile 
host H joins the ad hoc network, the host H broadcasts DSDV advertisements to its 
neighbors for the first time with a sequence number of O. Each neighbor of the host H 
inserts a route entry in its routing table for the host H and broadcasts immediately with an 
increased sequence number to its neighbors. The process continues until the 
advertisement of the host H has reached all the destinations. Eventually the FA inserts a 
route entry for the host H also. At the same time, the host H gets a routing table from 
each of its neighbors and creates its own routing table. The route to FA is also included in 
the host H's route table via routing update messages from its neighbors. Then the host H 
sends FA the registration information, for example, H's home address. Based on the 
registration information, FA acts as the mobile IP proxy for the host H. FA sends the 
registration request to the host H's home agent. After successful registration at the home 
agent, a registration reply message is returned from HA to FA. FA then informs ad hoc 
host H about its registration status. In the proposed approach FA keeps the registration 
information for all ad hoc hosts and uses it again during re-registrations. FA uses its 
foreign agent address as COA to register with the HA for each ad hoc host. The mobile IP 
registration lifetime for each mobile host is 2 to 3 times of the DSDV periodic route 
update interval. 
In the proposed approach, FA serves as the mobile IP proxy for each ad hoc host. 
Each ad hoc host registers with FA only once when it joins the network. Mobile IP 
maintenance in the proposed approach includes two parts: 
• FA re-registration or deregistration for each ad hoc host, 
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• Ad hoc host location management. 
FA Re-registration or deregistration: Each ad hoc host doesn't participate in the mobile 
IP registration after exchanging registration information at the moment of joining the ad 
hoc network. Since FA keeps all the registration information for each node, FA updates 
the registration for each ad hoc host before its expiration only if an ad hoc host has a 
valid path from FA. FA has the consistent and up-to-date routes for each ad hoc host via 
EDSDV so the FA surely knows whether or not an ad hoc host is part of the mobile 
network. In case the hop count metric for an ad hoc host in FA's routing table becomes 
infinite, it implies that FA has lost its route to that ad hoc host. It may mean that the ad 
hoc host has roamed away from the network. If it loses the route to an ad hoc host for 2 
times of the periodic EDSDV route update interval, FA assumes that the ad hoc host has 
moved away from the ad hoc network. The FA sends the ad hoc host's home agent a 
deregistration message to notify the home agent that the ad hoc host has disconnected 
with the FA. If the host joins the ad hoc network again, the host needs to res end its 
registration information to FA. 
Ad hoc host location management: The location and route to each destination ad hoc 
host can be identified from an ad hoc host's routing table. If the route from an ad hoc host 
to FA is reachable (the hops from the ad hoc host to FA is finite), it means that the global 
connectivity is possible to the ad hoc host. If a mobile host roams away from the ad hoc 
network, it will be reflected in routing table of the mobile host because the hop count 
metric of FA will be infinity. 
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3.2.3 Bi-directional Internet Connectivity 
In order to provide bi-directional communication, the framework allows the following 
three types of interaction between ad hoc hosts and a eN in Internet: 
• Intra-MANET communication 
• Inter-MANET communication from ad hoc hosts to eN 
• Inter-MANET communication from eN to ad hoc hosts 
For the first type of interaction, the ad hoc hosts keep the up-to-date routing 
information about other hosts in ad hoc network through EDSDV. To communicate with 
another host, an ad hoc host first checks its routing table. If the destination is inside the 
ad hoc network, a routing entry leading to the destination will be found in the routing 
table and packets will be forwarded to next hop in the route table according to EDSDV 
protocol. 
The second type of communication occurs between an ad hoc host and a 
correspondent node on the Internet, initiated by an ad hoc host. In Figure 9, 
communications between an ad hoc host 5 and a eN, initiated by ad hoc host 5, is an 
example of this type of communication. In order to communicate with a eN on the 
Internet an ad hoc host checks its routing table. If no routing information to the eN is 
found, then the ad hoc host checks the routing to a FA. If the routing entry to a FA is 
found, then the packets will be forwarded to that FA. Otherwise the packet is discarded. 
When a FA receives packets from an ad hoc host for the eN, it forwards those packets to 
the destination via Internet following the Internet IP routing protocol. 
The third type of communication occurs between a eN and an ad hoc host, initiated 
by the eN. For example in Figure 9, communications between the eN and host 5 is 
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initiated by eN. If the eN wishes to send packets to an ad hoc host, the packets will be 
delivered to HA that the ad hoc host visits. If the ad hoc host registers with HA domain, 
HA checks its routing table, finds a route to the ad hoc host, and then forwards the 
packets to the ad hoc host. If the ad hoc host is roaming away from its HA, HA maintains 
the ad hoc host's current location via FA registration. Using eOA of FA, HA forwards 
the packets to FA visited by the destination ad hoc host. The FA checks it's routing table, 
and delivers the packets to the requested destination ad hoc host via EDSDV routing 
protocol. 
Table 3: Simulation Parameter for EDSDV Implementation 
DSDV Periodical route update interval 15.0 seconds 
DSDV Periodic update missed before link declared broken 3.0 seconds 
Initial triggered update weighted setting time 6.0 seconds 
Weight settling time weighting factor 7/8 
Routing advertisement aggregation time 1 second 
Number of times that a ROUTE REQUEST may be resent 2 
Time before a new ROUTE REQUEST is sent 1.0 second 
3.3 Simulation and Experimental Results 
3.3.1 Experimental Configuration 
The effectiveness of the proposed integration approach is demonstrated by carrying 
out extensive experiments, in which FA acts as mobile IP proxy and combines the 
EDSDV protocol with Mobile IP routing. The experiments are conducted using NS-2 [73] 
simulator. Different sizes of ad hoc networks (20 and 50 nodes) were tested. In the 
integrated network, FA is configured as an ad hoc node as well as mobile IP proxy for ad 
hoc hosts. Table 3 lists the constants used in implementing EDSDV protocol in the 
simulation. In Table 3, the first five parameters are same as the parameters in paper [24]. 
When a next hop link from an ad hoc host A to destination D is broken, the ad hoc host A 
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sends ROUTE REQUEST message to its neighbors. The decision for temporary next hop 
is based on the responses received from the two rounds of ROUTE REQUEST messages. 
If there is no response after 1.0 second another ROUTE REQUEST is sent to the 
neighbor. 
The maximum mobility speed of ad hoc hosts is set between 1 to 50 mls during the 
lifetime of simulation runs according to a uniform random distribution. For example, if 
the maximum speed of nodes is set at 20 mis, the nodes move randomly ranging from 0 
to 20 mls; the average speed is 10 mls. The direction of movement is also changed 
according to the random waypoint model [6]. The pause time is consistently 10 seconds 
between each movement. Constant bit rate packets are sent for 600 seconds during the 
simulation. The ad hoc network size is varied in order to keep consistency in node density. 
Experimental scenarios are set with the following dimensions: 
• 670m x 670m simulation area with 20 mobile nodes 
• 1000m x 1000m simulation area with 50 mobile nodes 
Instead of just unidirectional global connectivity for ad hoc hosts [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
[25], the proposed approach achieves full bi-directional connectivity. The experiments 
here show the full bi-directional communication where CN initiates three calls to three 
randomly selected ad hoc hosts, and two randomly selected ad hoc hosts initiate two 
separate calls to CN also. The two randomly selected ad hoc hosts send Constant Bit Rate 
(CBR) packets to CN. In addition, CN sends CBR packets to three ad hoc hosts selected 
to receive packets from CN. The CBR packet size is set as 512 bytes and does not include 
the packet head. Figure 12 illustrates the experimental configuration. A router, connected 
to HA, CN and FA, represents the delay on the Internet. The FA is located in the center 
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of experimental domain. The dash circle represents the coverage of FA. For a mobile host 
located in the coverage of FA, a bidirectional connection can be established directly 
between the FA and the mobile host. FA and wireless ad hoc hosts use the EDSDV 
protocol. For each sampled data point, NS-2 was executed five times under different 
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Figure 12. Experimental Configuration. 
3.3.2 Experimental Results and Comparisons 
The performance of proposed integrated ad hoc network is analyzed based on the 
following parameters: 
• Packet Delivery Fraction (throughput) 
• Mobile IP overhead and the related ad hoc protocol overhead, 
• Packet Latency 
The experimental results obtained for the proposed integrated approach are compared 
with the leading hybrid approach [8]. In order to lower the mobile IP and related AODV 
overhead in ad hoc networks, the hybrid approach [8] sets the TTL-field as N in the IP 
header of the advertisements to limit the flooding of advertisements. Advertisements are 
only spread within the N-hop neighborhoods directly. Instead of flooding advertisements 
through the whole ad hoc networks, any ad hoc host in the hybrid approach can 
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eavesdrop and cache fresh agent advertisements for the mobile IP purposes. In the hybrid 
approach [8], the ideal TTL value of 2 is used and a best FA beacon interval of 10 
seconds is chosen. In the proposed approach in this chapter, it is not necessary to choose 
a TTL value and the beacon interval because there are no FA advertisements in the ad 
hoc network. The comparison of performance is based on the 50 node network with 
different movement patterns as given in [8]. All the results are compared against the 
results obtained using ideal TTL and the best beacon interval suggested in the hybrid 
approach [8]. 
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Figure 13. Comparison of Throughput. 
Figure 13 illustrates the results of packet delivery fraction in the proposed approach 
and in the hybrid approach [8]. The impact of mobility on the packet delivery fraction 
was tested by varying the maximum movement speed of the ad hoc hosts. The mobility of 
ad hoc hosts is varied from 0 mls to 50 mls in the proposed approach. As seen in Figure 
13, the packet delivery fraction goes down as the mobility increases. Figure 13 also 
presents the throughput of the hybrid approach with 50 nodes in which the FA beacon 
interval is 10 seconds. The throughput of the proposed integrated approach is better than 
that of the hybrid approach. 
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Mobile IP Overhead of the Proposed Approach 
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Figure 14. Comparisons of Overhead. 
Figure 14 compares the overhead of the proposed approach with the hybrid scheme 
given in [8]. It is evident from Figure 14 (a) that the overhead of mobile IP in the 
proposed approach is very low. This is because ad hoc hosts send their registration 
information to FA only at the moment of joining the ad hoc network. Figure 14 (b) shows 
the overhead of EDSDV for maintaining the routing tables at ad hoc hosts. The overhead 
increases when the mobility of ad hoc host increases. 
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To maintain the global connectivity for ad hoc hosts, the hybrid approach [8] results 
in mobile IP overhead and related AODV overhead. The related AODV overhead is used 
for establishing the route between an AODV node and FA to exchange mobile IP 
messages. Figure 14 (c) presents the mobile IP and related AODV overhead in the hybrid 
approach [8] with different numbers of registrations. The related AODV overhead in 
Figure 14 (c) is only the AODV routing overhead generated by exchanging mobile IP 
messages between ad hoc hosts and FA for maintaining Internet mobility of ad hoc host. 
The overhead of the AODV routing caused by transmitting data packets is not included in 
Figure 14 (c). Figure 14 ( c) also shows the total overhead to maintain global connectivity 
for different registered ad hoc hosts (from 10 to 50 nodes). The size of network is 50 
nodes, and the TTL is 2. The maximum speed of movements is 20 mls. The number of 
registered ad hoc hosts varies from 10 to 50 nodes. Therefore bi-directional connectivity 
is provided for 10 to 50 nodes in accordance with the number of registered nodes. For 
instance, if the number of registered ad hoc hosts is 30 out of 50 nodes, it only provides 
30 nodes with bi-directional Internet connectivity. To provide data packet transmissions, 
the hybrid approach needs more AODV routing overhead to maintain the path from a 
source host to a destination host. On the contrary, Figure 14 (a, b) show the overhead 
incurred due to Mobile IP and the EDSDV protocol. 
It is clear from Figure 14 that the total overhead of the proposed integrated approach 
is lower than that of the hybrid approach developed in [8]. If the hybrid approach keeps 
the full bi-directional connectivity for all ad hoc hosts (50 nodes), the total overhead will 
be much higher than that of the proposed approach. The following conclusions can be 
derived by analyzing the overhead of 50 nodes: 
76 
• The total overhead for maintaining full connectivity for ad hoc hosts in the hybrid 
approach [8] is higher than that of the proposed approach. 
• In addition to the overhead for maintaining full connectivity for ad hoc hosts, 
extra AODV routing overhead is needed for communication between two ad hoc 
hosts in the hybrid approach [8]. The proposed EDSDV protocol causes no extra 
overhead for communication between two ad hoc hosts. 
• If AODV hosts don't register with FA, CN cannot reach these AODV hosts. Thus, 
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Figure 15. Comparisons of Packet Delivery Delay. 
Figure 15 compares the average packet delay from ad hoc network to CN in the two 
approaches. Figure 15 shows the packet delay in the hybrid approach where TTL is 2. It 
can also be concluded from this study that the average packet delivery delay for the 
proposed approach is better than the hybrid protocol [8]. The reasons for better packet 
delay are: 
• The EDSDV protocol uses better routes than AODV so that packet can 
quickly reach their destination. 
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• The EDSDV does not need time for Route Discovery before communications 
since the routes already exist between the source and destination; but in the 
case of AODV, the route is created on demand. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The proposed EDSDV protocol overcomes the stale link problem that degrades the 
performance of standard DSDV protocol at higher rate of mobility of ad hoc host. This 
chapter also presents a scheme for providing full bi-directional Internet connectivity for 
ad hoc networks. The global Internet connectivity is especially important when it is used 
to extend the coverage areas of wireless LAN infrastructure, and to improve the services 
in poor coverage of wireless infrastructure in the cellular network. In this paper, instead 
of flooding the FA advertisement through the whole ad hoc networks for registration 
protocol, FA acts as the mobile IP proxy for ad hoc hosts. The simulations show that the 
scheme of integrating the Internet with the EDSDV networks achieves higher throughput 
compared to a leading approach [8]. Also the scheme has extremely low mobile IP 
overhead for ad hoc hosts while keeping full bi-directional connectivity. The packet delay 
in the proposed scheme is also better than the hybrid approach [8]. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SECURE INTERCONNECTION PROTOCOL FOR 
INTEGRATED INTERNET AND AD-HOC 
NETWORKS 
The Integration of ad hoc networks with the Internet provides global Internet 
connectivity for ad hoc hosts through the coordination of mobile IP and ad hoc protocols. 
In a pure ad hoc network, it is difficult to establish trust relationship between two ad hoc 
hosts due to lack of infrastructure or centralized administration. In this chapter, an 
infrastructure-supported distributed authentication protocol is proposed to enhance trust 
relationships amongst ad hoc hosts. In addition an effective secure routing protocol is 
discussed to protect the multi-hop routing for internet and ad hoc communication. In the 
integrated ad hoc networks with Internet accessibility, the ad hoc routing security 
deployed with the help of infrastructure, has a fundamental impact on ad hoc hosts in 
term of internet access, integrity, and authentication. The analysis and experimental 
results show the achievements of the proposed security protocol. 
4.1 Introduction 
A pure mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-configurable network with the 
capacity of providing communication amongst ad hoc mobile stations (MSs) without any 
centralized administration. In contract, a MS in an integrated internet and MANET can 
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access the Internet by way of single hop or multi-hop connectivity through a base station 
(BS) or an Internet gateway [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [25]. In an integrated Internet and 
MANET, each MS runs a MANET routing protocol, such as DSDV, AODV, or DSR. 
The MANET protocol has the capacity to construct communication path between two 
MSs. Meanwhile, a separate protocol [3-8] [25] coordinates mobile IP [33] [34] and the 
MENET routing protocol to obtain the internet connectivity. 
In such an integrated environment, MSs can obtain various services and applications 
from the Internet or the MANET. With the multi-hop internet connectivity, the integrated 
networks can be used to extend the coverage of wireless WANs (e.g., GSM, 3G, 4G etc.), 
Wireless LANs (e.g., IEEE 802.11a/b/e/g and HiperLANI2), and wireless MANs (IEEE 
802.16). A MS in an integrated network, which is outside the radio coverage of all BSs, 
may connect the Internet with a multi-hop path. In the integrated network, the MS can 
obtain the services from the participating MANET, e.g., sharing files, conference, 
multimedia, and games etc. Also, as an everyday experience, through the MS a user may 
enjoy the services from the Internet, including email, voice, messaging, information 
services (e.g., new stocks, weather, travel). 
Similar to a MANET, an integrated network has the basic security-related 
characteristics such as open wireless medium, multi-hop route discovery, mobility, and 
constrained power capacity. However, an integrated Internet and MANET differs from a 
pure MANET in an important way: mobile IP with infrastructure-support. For instance, in 
the integrated network, Mobile IP [33] [34] could perform continuous mobility functions 
for mobile hosts with two entities: home agent (HA), and foreign agent (FA). A HA is the 
server on the mobile host's home network that maintains the information about the host's 
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current location, as identified as care-of-address (CoA), and security credentials. On the 
other hand, FA is the server on the visiting network providing the CoA and security 
administration of the visiting network. Thus, an integrated Internet and MANET has 
some crucial distinctions with a pure MANET with regard to multi-hop routing security: 
• In a pure ad hoc network, it is difficult to establish distributed trust relationships 
between two MSs as a centralized authority is absent and a MS has the capacity 
to forge identity. A malicious host may attack an ad hoc network many times 
with different identities. On the contrary, in an integrated network, the wireless 
and internet infrastructure (e.g., AAA server) may serves as an authentication 
authority and a security administrative center for MANET. 
• In an integrated network, in addition to ad hoc routing security, it is necessary to 
enforce the security for mobile IP either for single hop or multi-hop. However, 
the existing mobile IP [33] [34] cannot support multi-hop communication as it 
is needed in an integrated MANET. Before the initiation of a communication, 
the Internet has to authenticate the accessing MS by a mobile IP security. 
Meanwhile, the MS should have the capacity to authenticate the visiting Internet 
for preventing a forged BS or fraudulent Internet gateway. 
Due to the above differences, in the integrated networks, there are several 
fundamental questions that have to be addressed with regard to the Internet security and 
multi-hop routing security. Some of the critical questions are: 
• How to build a secure FA or Internet gateway discovery protocol for a multi-
hop MS? 
• How to enforce a protected authentication process for the mutual validation 
81 
between a MS and it visiting network, and establish trust relationships amongst 
multi-hop MSs? 
• How to uniquely identify a MS and prevent it from changing its identity in the 
purpose of attacking the network? 
• How to secure an ad hoc route discovery? 
However, the existing approaches [3-8] [25] for the integrated networks are based on 
the assumption that all MSs trust one another such that all messages can be forwarded to 
various destinations without any modification, drop, or injection. In a trustable 
environment, each participating node cooperates honestly during the process of route 
discovery. In practice, the Internet connectivity and routing protocols are susceptible to a 
wide variety of attacks in adversarial environment. The policies of security for MANETs 
and mobile IP have been studied separately in the existing literature and have never been 
considered in an integrated environment. To our knowledge no dedicated work has been 
carried out to address the problem of securing communication in the integrated MANET 
and the Internet. The following specific issues are addressed in the chapter: (i) Providing 
secure FA or Internet gateway discovery from MSs to the Internet, (ii) Providing secure 
multi-hop authentication to implement the mutual authentication between MS and the 
accessing Internet, (iii) Providing secure route discovery between MSs. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the background 
of the integrated Internet and MANET and the security challenges differing from pure 
MANETs. Then, the potential security threats, including the Internet connectivity and ad 
hoc route discovery, are discussed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 gives the details of the 
proposed security protocol: global Internet security of mobile IP and ad hoc routing 
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security. Section 4.5 analyzes the security achievements on the Internet connectivity as 
well as the ad hoc network. The experimental results are also shown in Section 4.5. The 
related works about mobile IP security and ad hoc security are addressed in Section 4.6. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with Section 4.7. 
4.2 Background of the Integrated Network and Security Design 
Challenges 





Figure 16. A MANET with global Internet connectivity. 
Mobile IP and ad hoc routing protocol coordinate with each other to build the 
connectivity across the heterogeneous networks as shown in Figure 16. The inside area of 
dash circle represents the coverage of a FA; as shown in Figure 16, MSs 1, 2, and 3 are 
located in the coverage of the FA. The left side of Figure 16 represents a wired network 
that consists of a HA, a Correspondent Node (CN), a FA, and the Internet. The right side 
is an ad hoc network using ad hoc routing protocol, e.g., AODV, DSR. The MS 1 and the 
FA can reach each other directly. The basic process of an ad hoc route discovery involves 
two messages: routing request and routing reply. In the beginning, the source node 
broadcasts a routing request if it has no fresh route to the destination. The routing request 
is forwarded by intermediary nodes. In the end, the destination responds with a routing 
reply which has the route from the source to the destination. The ad hoc routing protocol 
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enables the multi-hop MS with the capability to reach a FA. For example, in Figure 16, 
MS 5 may find the FA using ad hoc routing protocol via MSs 4 and 1. Moreover, the MS 
can obtain the Internet connectivity using mobile IP with which the MS creates a mobility 
binding at the HA through the visiting FA by initiating a mobile IP registration. When the 
FA receives a registration request from the MS, it forwarded to its HA through the 
Internet. After updating the mobility for the MS, the HA responds the registration with a 
registration reply to the MS. There are two kinds of possible communication in the 
integrated network. Intra-MANET communication involves interaction between hosts 
within the ad hoc network, e.g., in Figure 16, communication between the mobile host 6 
and 8. Inter-MANET is the communication that involves infrastructure nodes (like CN) 
and ad hoc network nodes (like 1-9). Some properties of the integrated Internet and 
MANETare: 
• In the integrated network, the FA can provide ad hoc nodes the capability to 
connect to a wired network. 
• A MS that do not have direct wireless connection to the FA can communicate 
with the wired network by establishing a multi-hop ad hoc path. 
• In the integrated network, MSs can communicate with other MSs using ad hoc 
routing protocol. In addition, they can also use a Mobile IP protocol to 
communicate with the Internet. 
• Security must be implemented from the MS to the CN and vice versa. 
Furthermore, secure routing must also be provided for the communications 
between any two MSs. 
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4.2.2 Security Design Challenges 
The routing security deals with the protection of routing messages exchanged 
between the nodes. Before an Intra-MANET communication, an ad hoc route discovery is 
needed to construct the route between two MSs. To support inter-MANET 
communication, a wired (Internet) route to eN is required by following the mobile IP [33] 
[34] that provides the continuous mobility and location management for each MS. There 
are two critical issues for providing a secure multi-hop route discovery: Internet 
connectivity and ad hoc routing protocol. 
In order to obtain the internet connectivity, each MS has to register with the visiting 
FA and create a mobility binding at its HA [33] [34]. Before registration, a MS has to 
discover a FA and establish a multi-hop route to the FA. If the MS is misled by a forged 
FA or a malicious intermediary node, it cannot get a correct Internet connection with 
services. During the process of multi-hop registration, the registration messages may be 
modified by a malicious intermediary node. This may not allow nodes to register with its 
HA. The existing ad hoc routing security approaches cannot provide a secure FA 
discovery because all these security protocols are based on the assumption that a 
MANET has no any centralized infrastructure (FA). Also, the existing mobile IP protocol 
cannot provide the security protection for a multi-hop registration [39][40][41]. It is the 
fact that current mobile IP security [39][40][41] is deployed on single wireless hop in 
which each MS can exchange registration and authentication directly with the FA. Thus, 
for the Internet connectivity, two schemes are required: a secure FA discovery and a 
secure mobile IP registration for MS. The security of a FA discovery allows a MS to find 
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a correct FA, and the secure mobile IP registration provides the integrity protection to 
registration messages across the multi-hop wireless network and the Internet. 
In a pure MANET, it has no infrastructure for key management, and it is hard to 
verify the identity of a MS [61-71]. An integrated internet and ad hoc network is not 
isolated anymore like a pure MANET. The integration with infrastructure has significant 
impact on ad hoc routing security. The availability of the Internet enables the possible 
validation of MS's identify (i.e., home IP address) and credentials (i.e., billing and 
account). This information is generally stored at its HA and thus the routing security 
protocols [25-31] for pure ad hoc networks cannot be adopted for the integrated networks. 
4.3 Security Requirement for Integrated Internet and MANET 
Figure 17 illustrates the connectivity of an integrated Internet and MANET that can 
be implemented according to the routing protocols in [3-8] [25]. Figure 17 (a) shows the 
integrated network with malicious nodes while Figure 17 (b) illustrates the corresponding 
network without malicious nodes. The solid lines represent wired connection while the 
dash lines stand for wireless links. In Figure 17 (a), MSs 1, 5 and malicious node (M1) 
can reach the FA directly (MSs 1, 5, and M1 are under the coverage of the FA). 
Therefore MSs 1,5, and M1 can act as the potential gateways for integrating Internet and 
MANET. This section summarizes the possible attacks against the Integrated Internet and 
MANET, and identifies the various security requirements. 
4.3.1 Attacks on the Internet Connectivity 
In general, malicious nodes, which modify, drop, forge or generate mobile IP 
messages (e.g., Advertisement, Registration Request, or Registration Reply) to corrupt 
mobile IP support for MANET, can cause attacks on Internet connectivity. There are 
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mainly three types of attacks on the Internet connectivity at the network layer: bogus 
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Figure 17. An example of Integrated Internet and MANET. 
4.3.2 Attacks on Ad hoc Routing Protocol 
Ad hoc routing protocols are vulnerable to different types of attacks that have been 
extensively studied and addressed in Chapter 2. After a multi-hop route is constructed, 
various attacks may happen in the stage of packet forwarding as illustrated in Chapter 2. 
The attacks include: 




• Denial of Service (anti-cooperation) 
• Modification 
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4.4 Proposal for Securing Global Connectivity 
a e T bl 4 N otatIOns use or t e propose proto co df h d 
M,N Concatenation of two messages M and N in the order specified 
MSHM MS home address 
HA id, FAid HA and FA IP address as its identity 
Nx Nonce issued by X, e.g. HA, MS (a pseudo-random number). 
<M>K MAC value of message M under key K 
CA Certification authority 
Kx,K x Public and private key of X 
[MJ K x Digital signature of message M generated using private key of X 
Certx Certificate of X 
Tissue. Texpire Issuing and expiration time of a MS's certificate 
t Timestamp, current estimated time 
MSCoA MS's Care-of-Address 
SMS-HA Shared secret key between MS and HA 
MSHMx Permanent Home address of Mobile Station X 
MSx Mobile Station X 
a e T bl 5 M essages £ th or e propose pro oco d t 
Request A bit pattern indicating a registration request 
Reply A bit pattern indicating a registration reply 
Result A value indicating the result of registration 
R Request A packet indicating a route request 
R Reply A packet indicating a route reply 
R Error A packet indicating a routing error 
Advertisement A bit pattern indicating an advertisement 
Solicitation A bit pattern indicating an advertisement solicitation 
This chapter proposes a secure connectivity framework for integrated Internet and 
MANET. The securing protocol combines the mobile IP security with ad hoc routing 
security. Before developing the security protocol, three assumptions and related 
clarifications are made here. Firstly, it assumes that if two entities (e.g., MS, HA, FA) 
have security association (public/private key or secret key), and their identities have been 
authenticated by authorities, e.g., Diameter [75] and AAA authorities [74], thereby the 
two entities are mutually trustable. Secondly, it assumes that each MS belongs to a 
88 
certain administrative domain (HA) and has a security association with its authority [39] 
[40] [41] [74]. Otherwise the MS is an unauthorized node. The authorized node and its 
HA are mutually trusted after validation. The HA is in charge of a MS for maintaining its 
credit, account, service policy, even marking the MS as a malicious node. Thirdly, it 
assume that a FA and a HA have a security association [39] [40] [41] [74] [75]. The FA 
and HA can be trusted by each other after mutual validations. The trust chain for 
integrated MANET, mobile IP, and AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and 
Accounting) is provided in Section 4.5.2 (Figure 7). Table 4 and Table 5 list the notations 
and messages used for the development of the proposed protocol. 
The security protocol for integrated Internet and MANET includes two parts: the 
global Internet security of mobile IP and the security of integrated MANET. In order to 
communicate with the nodes, a MS performs the following security operations: 
1. Key establishment: the MS generates a pair of private and public keys. 
2. FA discovery and FA advertisement: the MS finds a route to a FA, sends its public 
key to the FA, and obtains FA's advertisement. 
3. MS registration with FA and HA: The MS follows an authentication protocol to 
register with the FA and HA. 
4. Identity Binding at FA: MS's home address, its ad hoc identifier and its public key 
are bound by the FA in a certificate for a MS. 
5. Certificate issuing: the FA issues this certificate for a MS, and the certificate acts 
as the MS' s authenticated pass in the integrated network. 
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Figure 18. An Example of Routing Security. 
The sequence diagram in Figure 18 illustrates the basic process of security 
implementation in the integrated network. The example assumes that it is the first time 
for a node (e.g., MSA) to communicate with a destination (e.g., MSD). Other MSs have 
already been successfully registered with the FA. In order to obtain the services from the 
Internet and MANET, node MSA must register with the FA first. At first, the MS 
generates its private and public keys. The private key is kept secret by the MS. Then MSA 
initiates a process of FA discovery to find a route to the FA for registration. FA discovery 
starts at node MSA by issuing a routing request message (R_Request) with its signature. In 
the route request message, the MS provides its identity and public key to the FA. 
R_Request is forwarded to the FA hop by hop. The FA selects a route and replies MSA 
with R_Reply. Then node MSA sends solicitation to the FA to request an advertisement 
with a CoA. After receiving an advertisement from the FA, node MSA registers with its 





authentications for checking the registration request. Registration reply indicates the 
result of the registration. If the registration is successful, the FA binds the identity of 
node MSA with its public key in a certificate. Then FA issues node MSA a certificate. 
Hereby, node MSA can initiate an ad hoc route discovery for communicating with the 
other mobile hosts, e.g., MSD in the integrated MANET or a CN in the Internet. 
4.4.1 Global Internet Security of Mobile IP 
In the proposed approach, each MS has a local table to record recently received 
packet information, e.g., packet source address (MSHM), nonce (NMS), and time (t). Each 
node shares a secret key with its HA for calculation and validation of MAC (Message 
Authentication Code). Certification Authority, HA, and FA have a pair of public and 
private keys separately for their mutual authentication. 
4.4.1.1 Key Establishment 
As a first step in the protocol, a MS uses a key generation function to calculate a pair 
of private and public keys. An example of key generation is provided at appendix. The 
MS keeps its private key secret. Its public key as well as its identifier (the horne address 
of the MS) is sent to the FA via a FA discovery. The MS starts a process of a FA 
discovery according to the following subsection. 
4.4.1.2 FA Discovery and FA Advertisement 
A FA periodically advertises to ad hoc MSs with advertisement: MI, [MIl Kl FA 
CertFA; where MJ is advertisement, Sequence, t, FAid and MScoA ' The sequence number is 
incremented every time a new advertisement is issued by the FA. While receiving an 
advertisement from the FA, the MS decrypts the advertisement by using FA's public key, 
and compares the FA's address, timestamp (t), and sequence number with those of 
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previously received advertisement in its local table. MS discards the duplicate 
advertisements. If it is a fresh advertisement, MS records the FA's certificate, IP address, 
timestamp, and sequence number to avoid duplication. The record is also used for 
tracking the history of FA's advertisement. A MS may rebroadcast this advertisement on 
its interface for the purpose of sending advertisement to the other MSs. 
In the beginning, each MS does not have an authenticated public key of the FA. The 
process of FA discovery enables a MS to search an available FA and obtains a certificate 
of the FA. The public key inside the certificate will be authenticated in the process of 
followed registration. If a MS has never received a FA advertisement, but it wishes to 
have the knowledge of the route to a FA (i.e., Internet gateway), the MS issues a FA 
discovery with a destination address of FA_Address (224.0.0.11); this address is the 
mobile agent multicasts group address. Otherwise, if the MS has registered with the FA, 
the MS can start its route discovery according to the steps in Section 4.4.2.1 (ad hoc 
route discovery). The process for a MS to discover a route to a FA includes two stages as 
shown in Figure 19: FA route request and FA route reply. 
The process of the FA route request from a MS has four steps as shown in Figure 19 
(a). MS initiates R_Request with FA_Address that is signed with its private key. In the 
R_Request message, the MS claims its identifier (its home IP address) and its public key 
(MSHM, KMS)' When any neighbor A of MS receives R_Request, node A checks against the 
local table (MSHM, NMS, and t) to verify whether it has already seen the request and 
whether the packet has a valid timestamp. If A has seen this packet before or an invalid 
timestamp is found on the packet, A discards the duplicated or invalid request. Knowing 
that the destination is FA, the neighbor A cannot verify MS' s identifier because the ad 
92 
hoc MS still has not its certificate issued by the FA. Therefore neighbor A leaves the job 
of verification of MS' s signature to FA. The neighbor A rebroadcasts the FA discovery 
request after appending its address and signing the packet. All intermediate nodes, e.g., A, 
B, and C, must be registered nodes (Figure 19 (a». Aside from above steps, each 
intermediate node, except for MS's neighbors (e.g., node Band C, but no A), must 
validate the signature of its preceding node with the public key of preceding node, which 
is issued by FA and enveloped inside the certificate. Each intermediate node other than 
MS's neighbors (e.g., node B and C) but not A, removes the signature of preceding node 
before its rebroadcast. In the end, FA receives the route discovery packet. The detailed 
message exchanges based on Figure 19 (a) are given below. 
@ ~0 ~® ~@ ~@ 
2 3 4 
(a) FA discovery: Route Request 
8 7 6 5 
(b) FA discovery: Route Reply 
Figure 19. Steps of FA Discovery. 
I. MS broadcasts route request: 
R_Request: [R_Request, MSHM• KMS, FA_Address, NMS• t] Kl MS 
2. A receives R_Request from MS: 
R_Request: [[R_Request, MSHM• KMS, FA_Address. NMS, t] Kl MS. MSHMa ] Kl HMa. CertHMa 
3. B receives R_Request from A: 
R_Request: [[R_Request, MSHM• KMS, FA_Address, NMS• t] Kl MS. MSHMa, MSHMb] KI HMb. CertHMb 
4. C receives R_Request from B: 
R_Request: [[R_Request, MSHM, KMS, FA_Address, NMS, t] Kl MS. MSHMcp MSHMb, MSHMc1 Kl HMc. CertHMc 
When a FA receives the route discovery packet from node C as shown in Figure 19 
(b), the FA validates C's signature. Also the FA verified MS' s signature using their 
public keys claimed in the R_Request message. The FA records the claimed identifier and 
the public key of the MS. The identifier and public key will be future verified through the 
followed process of the MS's registration (Section 4.4.1.3). If the FA receives several 
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valid discovery packets from the same MS, it chooses the best route (e.g., shortest path). 
Then, the FA initiates an R_Rep/y packet by using FA's address with a new nonce. FA 
returns the R_Reply to MS with the reverse path from MS to FA. Before R_Reply arrives 
to MS' s neighbor, each intermediate node validates the signature of the preceding node 
and prevents duplication by comparing nonce and timestamp with its local table. Then 
each intermediate node rebroadcasts the R_Reply after removing the signature of 
preceding node and signing with its own private key. When R_Reply reaches the MS's 
neighbor A, A validates the signature of preceding node, and then rebroadcasts the packet 
to MS without signing on it. The detailed message exchange based on Figure 19 (b) is 
shown below. 
5. FA receives R_Request from C: 
R_Rep/y: [R_Rep/y, MSHM, MSHMa, MSHMb• MSHMc• FA id, NFA , tJ Ki FA, CertFA 
6. C receives the R_RepJy form FA: 
R_Rep/y: [[R_Rep/y, MSHM, MSHMw MSHMb• MSHMc FA id• NFA , tJ Ki FA, CertFAJ Ki HMco CertHMc 
7. B receives the R_RepJy form C: 
R_Rep/y: [[R_Reply, MSHM• MSHMG> MSHM1" MSHMc FA id• NFA• tJ Ki FA, CertFAJ Ki HMb. CertHMb 
8. A receives the R_RepJy form B: 
R_Rep/y: [R_Rep/y, MSHM• MSHMa, MSHM1" MSHMc FA id• NFA • tJ Ki FA, CertFA 
When the MS receives R_Reply from the neighbor A, it validates the signature of the 
FA. Node A doesn't sign R_Reply. It doesn't matter because if any malicious node 
provides falsified route information, the MS can detect the falsification by checking the 
signature of FA. The MS extracts the route between itself and the FA from the R_Reply. 
In the above example, < MSHM, MSHMa, MSHMb, MSHMc FAid > is the route from the MS to 
the FA. Now MS can use the route to send a solicitation message to FA. Upon receiving 
solicitation message, the FA returns an advertisement to the MS with a CoA. Both the 
solicitation and advertisement are protected with signatures. Then, the MS selects the 
advertised CoA to register with FA by issuing a registration request message. The 
processing of registration has the following steps. 
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4.4.1.3 MS Registration with FA and HA 
For the purpose of the security of ad hoc network, each node must register with FA 
and obtain a certificate from FA before participating in ad hoc routing protocol. There are 
two functionalities during registration for a MS: (i) mutually authentication between the 
MS and the visiting network (i.e., FA), (ii) mobility binding for the MS according mobile 
IP protocol. The scheme assumes that a public key infrastructure (PKI) is available by 
HA and FA [74] [75]. Each MS and its HA share a security association to create MAC 
(Message Authentication Code) for registration request and reply [41]. A MS performs 
cryptographic operation using its secret-key (SMS-HA) to protect the integrity of 
registration request. The MS starts its registration by issuing a registration request 
carrying the original advertisement as well as its HA address (HAid) etc. The registration 
request message is signed by the MS with the secret key (SMS-HA). Then the registration 
request message is forwarded to the FA hop by hop according to the established route 
constructed via a FA discovery. Then the registration request is sent to the HA through 
the FA after appending FA's nonce. The HA verifies the registration request by checking 
the MAC with the associated secret key. The HA further checks advertisement and the 
FA by validating the certificate and the signature of FA. After the validation the 
registration request and the FA, it returns the registration result to the FA. Then, the FA 
validates the HA by checking the certificate of the HA and its signature. After the 
validation, it returns the registration result to the MS. Once MS receives a successful 
reply from HA, it is guaranteed that FA's certificate is valid. The registration protocol 
operates as follows: 
(Rl) MS -> FA: Mb < M 2> SMS-HA. Where M 2 = Registration Request, FA id, HA id, MSHM, 
MScoA' NMS, NHA , {Message in advertisement} 
(R2) FA->HA: {Message in Rl}, NFA 
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(R3) HA: (upon receipt of R2): 
Validate < M 2> SMS.HA using SMS.HA 
Check whether FAid in advertisement = FAid in M2 
Validate CertFA based on existing PKI at HA 
Validate [MJi Kl FA using authenticated KFA 
Continue with the steps in [33][34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support, e.g., updating mobility binding for the MS) 
(R4): HA->FA: M 3, [M3J Kl HA, CertHA , 
WhereM3= M4,NFA ; 
M4= Reply, Result, FA id, HA id, MSHM, MScoA, N'HA, NMS, < M4> SMS.HA 
(R5): FA: (upon receipt of R4) 
Validate NJo"'A 
Validate CertHA based on existing PKI at HA 
Validate [M3J Kl HA using authenticated KHA 
Log this message as a proof of serving MS 
Identity binding and certificate creation 
Continue with the steps in [8] (Perkins, Mobile IP support, e.g., creating mobility binding for the MS) 
(R6): HA->MS: M4 
(R7) MS: 
Validate < M4> SMS.HA using SMS.HA 
Continue with the steps in [33][34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support, e.g., obtaining registration result) 
The process of the secure registrations for all MS creates a trusted integrated MANET. 
As shown in Figure 17 (a) the integrated Internet and MANET may have malicious nodes. 
The malicious nodes can attack the integrated Internet and MANET by participating in 
the activities of routing protocols. The security registration excludes these malicious 
nodes by disallowing them from participating in the routing protocols shown in Figure 18 
(b). The malicious nodes cannot obtain services from the Internet and MANET. The 
detailed information as regards how to achieve it by using certificates and signatures is 
discussed next. 
4.4.1.4 Identity Binding 
Depending on ad hoc network protocols, ad hoc networks may use different 
addressing solutions; AODV, DSR, and TORA use Node ID; HSR has a hierarchical 
addressing solution; ZLHS use <zone id + node id> as MS ad hoc address. In a 
standalone ad hoc network, any MS can easily masquerade itself through changing its ad 
hoc identity so that it is difficult for ad hoc network to trace its previous actions. 
However, in an integrated network, the proposed security protocol requires each MS uses 
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its home address as its ad hoc identifier. Moreover, the home address is bound with its 
public key. For each registered MS, the FA issues a certificate to associate the binding. 
This binding makes it possible to trace the MS' s history so that the bad credit MS can be 
excluded from the ad hoc network routing. A MS claims its home address and its public 
key in the process of its FA discovery, and the FA verifies the information through HA 
during the MS' s registration. Therefore if a match is found between a claimed home 
address and the home address in registration request, the FA associates MS and MS' s 
public key to be a certificate as a passport to the MS. 
4.4.1.5 Certificate Issuing 
Each successfully registered node maintains a copy of certificates of itself issued by 
FA as (RS). The certificate (CertMs = < <MSHM, FAd, KMSi, Tissue, Texpire» Ki FA) of an 
ad hoc MS includes its permanent IP address (MSHM), public key (KMS) , issuing time 
(Tissue), and expiring time (Texpire). Because of the uniqueness of the permanent IP address 
of the MS, the certificate is unique for each MS. Each certificate has the signature of the 
FA, providing the integrity protection from being forged or modified. Since each 
registered MS has an authenticated public key of the FA, they can validate the legality of 
a certificate using the public key of FA (KFA). The certificate can be used as the passport 
for multi-hop routing security. For instance, in the Figure 19, if the registered MS B 
receives a routing request packet from the neighboring MS A with the certificate of MS A, 
MS B first validates the legality of the certificate of MS A (CertMSa = < <MSHMa, FAid, 
K MSa, Tissue, Texpire» Ki FA) by verifying the signature of the FA and checking the issuing 
and expiration times of the certificate. If the certificate is validated, the MS B reads the 
public key of MS A (KMSa) from the certificate, and uses it to verify the authenticity of 
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route request packet. In the next cycle, if MS B receives another packet from MS A with 
the same certificate, the MS B can verify the packet directly using the public key of MS A 
without validating the certificate again. Before the expiration of the certificate, if the MS 
is still on the ad hoc network, it requests the FA with a new certificate and the FA 
reissues certificate to the MS with an extended period as (R8). 
(R8) FA-> MS, Certificate of MS: CertMs = <MSHM. FAi<b KMSb Tissue, Texpire> K J FA 
4.4.2 Security of Integrated MANET 
Only authenticated MS has a certificate from the registered FA. It guarantees only the 
authenticated nodes have the capability to participate in ad hoc route discovery. 
Unauthorized nodes cannot obtain services from either the Internet or MANET because 
the packets issued by unauthorized nodes are ignored by other nodes. The routing 
security for multi-hop communication includes ad hoc route discovery, routing cache, 
and routing maintenance. 
4.4.2.1 Ad hoc Route Discovery 
In order to discover a route to a destination node in the ad hoc network, a MS follows 
the steps outlined in Figure 20. If it is the first time for a MS to discover the destination 
node, MS creates a pseudo-random number as nonce. Each intermediate node on route to 
the destination node validates whether the neighbor, from which the packet is received, is 
an authorized one by validating its certificate and the signature. The validation uses the 
association between the IP address of the neighbor and its certificate. If in the local table 
the Tissue and Texpire of the neighbor are invalid or expired, the received packet must be 
discarded. Each intermediate node records its reverse route, from which the packet is 
received, and then signs with its private key before sending a packet out. Ad hoc route 
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discovery has two stages: route request and route reply. Figure 20 illustrates the route 
discovery with AODV ad hoc routing protocol. In Figure 20, A, B, and C are intermediate 
nodes, and X is the destination node. Firstly, MS broadcasts RREQ (Route Request) 
marked as R_Request with its signature. The R_Request includes home addresses of the 
source and destination node, a nonce, and issue time. The signature of the MS to non-
mutable fields (MSHM, MSHMx, NMS, and t) protects the integrity of non-mutable items of 
R_Request. The signature of intermediate node is to protect mutable field, such as 
hOPJnt, from being modified by other nodes. After receiving the route discovery at the 
destination node, the destination node checks the request and replies with R_Repy. For 
convenience, in the following example, some route fields, such as route lifetime and 
broadcast id, are not shown but those fields should be included in practice. 
(a) Ad hoc route discovery: Route Request 
@+OIII --{0140111-~@~0111--{@~0111---'@ 
8 7 6 5 
(b) Ad hoc route discovery: Route Reply 
Figure 20. Steps of Ad-hoc Discovery. 
I. MS broadcasts: 
R_Request: [R_Request, MSHM, MSHMx, N Ms, t] KI MS, CerlMs 
2. A receives R_Request from MS 
R_Request: [[R_Request, MSHM, MSHMx, NMs, t] K 11,fs, hopJnt] KIMSw CertMS. CerlMSa 
3. B receives R_Request from A 
R_Request: [[R_Request, MSHM, MSHMx, NMs, t] KI MS, hOPJnt] KI MSb, CertMs, CertMSb 
4. C receives R_Request from B 
R_Request [[R_Request, MSHM, MSHMx, N Ms, t] K 1MS' hOPJnt] KI MSco CertMS. CertMsc 
5. Destination node X receives R_Request from C : 
R_Reply: [R_Reply, MSHM, MSHM" Nx, t, hOPJnt] KIMSxo CerlMSx 
6. C receives R_Reply from destination node X 
R_Reply: [[R_Reply, MSHM, MSHMx, Nx, t, hOPJnt] KI MSx] KI MSco CertMS:o CertMsc 
7. B receives R_Reply from destination node C 
R_Reply: [[R_Reply, MSHM, MSHMx, Nx, t, hop_ent] KI MSx] KI MSb, CertMS" CertMsb 
8. A receives R_Reply from B 
R_Reply: [[R_Reply, MSHM, MSHMx, N x, t, hOPJnt] K·1 MSx] KI MSa' CertMsxo CertMSa 
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4.4.2.2 Routing Cache 
Routing cache is used to provide a faster routing response via intermediate node 
before the routing request arrives at the destination node. A MS starts an ad hoc route 
discovery by issuing a routing request (R_Request) to search the destination node. If an 
intermediate node, which receives the R_Request, has a valid route to destination node in 
its route table, the intermediate node issues a route reply (R_Reply) and forwards it to the 
source node. In the R_Reply issued by the intermediate node, the original route reply, 
which is issued and signed by destination node, should be included. Therefore the source 
node can construct a route from the source node to the destination node after checking the 
signature of the intermediate node as well as the signature of the destination node. In 
Figure 20 (a), for example, when node B receives a route request from MS, if node B has 
a valid route leading to the destination node, node B creates a route reply message 
(R_Reply) and sends the message to the source node. After checking the signature of 
node B and X, source node MS constructs the route from MS to X via B. 
9. B receives R_Request from A 
R_Reply: [R_Reply, MSHM, MSHM" NMSh, t, [Rx_Reply] Kl MS" hOPJnt] Kl MSb, CertMSh; where Rx_Rep/y is the 
routing reply issued earlier by destination node x. 
10. A receives R_Request from B 
R_Reply: [R_Reply, MSHM, MSHMxo NMSb, t, [Rx_Rep/y] K 1MSx, hOPJnt] K 1MSb' CertMsb 
4.4.2.3 Routing Maintenance 
A route error message (R_Error) is generated by a node to report the failure of a link 
due to the movement of nodes. Based on R_Error messages, the source node reconstructs 
a new route to destination node. All R_Error messages must be signed by the issuing 
node. For example, when the link from node A to node B is broken in Figure 20 (a), node 
A creates R_Error to notify node MS the link failure. Upon receiving the R_Error and 
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knowing the link failure at node A, node NN issues a new route discovery to search other 
route to the destination. The route error message (R_Error) issued by node A is of the 
form: [R_Error. MSHM, MSHMx, MSHMb, Nb, tJ KI MSb. 
4.5 Security Analysis and Network Performance 
This section evaluates the security protocol for the integrated Internet and MANET. 
The evaluation has two parts: security and performance analysis. The security analysis 
illustrates the security achievements on the Internet connectivity as well as the integrated 
MANET. The performance analysis includes the effectiveness of key and certificate 
management as well as the communication cost for maintaining the security protocoL 
Appendix also includes a discussion on key creation, signature and verification algorithm. 
4.5.1 Security Analysis on Internet Connectivity 
The long-term shared secret key SMS-HA is used for authentication at the MS's home 
network. We assume that SMS-HA is kept secret meaning that a malicious MS cannot obtain 
SMS-HA. Moreover, the long term private keys held by FA and HA cannot be obtained by 
an attacker. We also assume the security operations at FA and HA are strong enough 
from being compromised. For example, HA correctly authenticates the credentials of the 
registering MS. The certificates issued by FA are resilient to brute-force and 
cryptanalysis attacks. The private keys of FA and MSs are properly kept secret by 
themselves from stealing and guessing. It means that the signatures of FA and MS cannot 
be broken by an attacker. According to above assumptions, the security protocol achieves 
the goals of preventing the attacks of bogus registration, reply attacks, unauthorized 
routing, and forged FA. In order to obtain services from the Internet or MANET a MS 
first issues a FA discovery to establish a path between the MS and the FA by using 
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authenticated nodes. This avoids unregistered malicious nodes to mislead route or drop 
registration messages with the intention of hindering MS registration. Then, by trusting 
HA for authentication, the security protocol ensures that the MS' s registration request is 
legitimately created. Moreover, the security protocol also ensures that the MS's 
registration request has not been changed during the forwarding from MANET to F AlHA. 
In the end, the certificate issued for the successful registered MS, protects the ad hoc 
route discovery. 
In this security protocol, all the route creations and communications take place among 
the trusted nodes verified by FA (Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2). The registered MS ignores all 
the control messages from an unauthorized MS. Thus, an unauthorized node cannot 
participate in the routing activity of this protocol due to lacking a validated certificate. 
The only exception is the route request in the process of FA discovery. The genuineness 
of this request is authenticated by verifying the MS' s identity during the registration. 
Bogus Registration: When a malicious node in the integrated MANET makes a fake 
registration by masquerading itself as someone else, the malicious node issues a forged 
registration message with an invented or spoofed address. The forged registration will be 
stopped at the step (R3) of Section 4.4.1.3 (Validate < M2 > SMS-HA using SMS-HA) because 
the malicious node does not have the knowledge of secret key (SMS-HA) associated 
between the invented or spoofed address and the related HA. 
Replay Attacks: The nonce (e.g., NMS, NHA, and NFA) and timestamp (i.e., t) is used in 
all mobile IP and routing messages to ensure that a registration or routing message 
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contain a unique data to prevent replay attacks. Each registration or routing request has a 
nonce, and a new nonce in the registration or routing reply message indicates the next 
nonce for the next request. 
Forged FA: When a MS advertises itself as a fraudulent FA, there are two possibilities 
for MSs that are under the coverage of the forged FA 
1. the MSs that have not yet registered with HA via a correct FA, 
11. the MSs that have successfully registered with FA and HA. 
Assume MS A is in the first case and it starts FA discovery by providing its public 
key in the route request message. The forged FA then replies the MS A directly because 
the MS A is under the coverage of the forged FA. Then MS A tries to register with the 
forged FA. A registration message with a MAC association created by using MS A's 
secret key (SMS-HA) is sent to the forged FA. The forged FA cannot reply MS A a 
registration reply message with a correct MAC because the forged FA has no knowledge 
of the secret key of MS A (SMS-HA). If the forged FA sends the registration message to MS 
A's HA, the registration is declined at the step of (R3) in IV.A.2 (Validate CertFA based 
on existing PKI at HA, Validate [Mll Ki FA using authenticated KFA). If the forged FA 
uses an earlier registration reply message in attempt to cheat the MS A, the MS A can 
know the trick due to the protection of nonce. Therefore the forged FA cannot cheat MS 
A and its HA. Then MS A tries another FA until it registers with a correct FA. 
Let's consider the second case. When MS B receives an advertisement from the 
forged FA, if MS B doesn't want to leave the integrated MANET, MS B will not go to 
register with the forged FA since the MS B has successfully registered with a correct FA. 
The worse situation is that MS B tries to make a handoff to the forged FA by registering 
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with the forged FA. However, MS B cannot successfully register with the forged FA for 
the same reasons as explained in the first case. Therefore, MS B will keep its registration 
with the correct FA. 
In the next cycle, if MSs A and B receive the fraudulent advertisements again, MSs A 
and B just ignore it because there was no successful registration with the forged FA 
earlier. The MSs, which are located in the direct transmission range of the forged FA, 
will not forward the fraudulent advertisement to other MSs. So the forged FA has no 
negative effect on the MSs that are outside the radio coverage of the forged FA. 
4.5.2 Security Analysis on Integrated MANET 
The important principle in the security protocol IS that unauthorized MSs are 
excluded from the integrated MANET. Unauthorized nodes cannot obtain services from 
the Internet and MANET since the packets from unauthorized nodes will be discarded by 
registered MSs. Before participating in ad hoc routing protocol, a MS must register with 
FA to obtain a certificate from FA. During registration, the HA authenticates the 
registering MS and its visiting FA. Once the MS receives a successful registration reply 
from the HA, it is assured that the FA is valid. Meanwhile if MS successfully registers 
with FA, it is an authorized ad hoc MS. The proposed registration plays two main roles: (i) 
unique mobility and security certificate binding at the HAIFA, and (ii) establishment of 
trust relationships amongst ad hoc MSs. 
Unique mobility and security certificate binding at HAIFA: Each MS has a unique 
home address. Each MS's home address is bound with a public key in a certificate by FA. 
No node other than FA can create a correct certificate on behalf of FA because no other 
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node has the private key of FA. Hence the identity binding in each certificate is unique 
for each MS. 
Establishment of trust relationships amongst MSs: Figure 21 illustrates the trusted 
model for integrated MANET, Mobile IP, and AAA (authentication, authorization, and 
accounting). If there is a security association (SA) between the two entities (e.g., HA, FA, 
MS), and the SA has been validated, then the two entities are trusted with each other. For 
example, in Figure 21, SA2 can be established after the mutual authentication between 
node A's HA and its AAAH server. In Figure 21, node A and HA AAA server of node A 
(A's AAAH server) have the SAL If the SAl is verified, then the trust relationship 
between node A and A's AAAH server is established. The proposed protocol verifies the 
SAl with the process of registration. Node A starts a security authentication by issuing a 
registration request with a MAC calculated by using the secret key (SMS-HA). The 
registration request messages are protected from being modification during the ad hoc 
and internet delivery due to the MAC protection. Therefore, the HA can validate SAl 
after receiving the registration request. Also, the A's AAA H checks whether node A has 
the acceptable credentials or not. In the wired network, a series of security associations 
(SA2, SA3, and SA4) are checked based on the peer trust relations [74] [7S]. The FA 
authentication server (AAAF) obtains the authenticating result from the external home 
authentication server (AAA H of node A). Finally, if the node A's registration request is 
approved, then the node A and FA are mutually trusted. It is because the security 
associations constructs a trust chain (SAS) between node A and FA (in Figure 21, if SAl, 
SA2, SA3, SA4, then SAS). 
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In the same way, when node B is successfully registered, the trust relationship 
between node B and FA (SAlO) is established (in Figure 21, if SA6, SA?, SA8, SA9, 
then SAlO for node B). Further, node A and B both are authorized nodes, and can be 
trusted by each other (in Figure 21, if SA5, SAlO, then SAIl). Similarly, if other nodes 
(e.g., C, D, and E) are authorized nodes, these nodes are trusted nodes too. The trust 
relations are associated by way of certificates issued by FA. 
Figure 21. The Trust Model for Integrated MANET, Mobile IP, and AAA. 
The proposed ad hoc route discovery prevents attacks in terms of integrity, impersonation, 
confidentiality and cooperation. 
Integrity: Each ad hoc routing message is signed by using the private key of each sender. 
The receiver verifies the certificate and signature of the sender. Each authorized node 
keeps its private key secretly. Therefore, the signature and verification prevent anti-
integrity attacks in the ad hoc routing protocol. The attacks of modification and routing 
loop can be prevented by the integrity protection of routing messages. 
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Impersonation: In the integrated network, the proposed approach binds the MSs' home 
addresses with public key in the ad hoc network. The binding is unique because of the 
uniqueness of MS' s home address. The secret key encryption prevents impersonation on 
registration by way of MAC. The private key and the certificate prevent impersonation on 
ad hoc routing by signing and verifying. Therefore, it becomes difficult for any MS to 
masquerade itself by spoofing or inventing an address either in registration or in ad hoc 
routing. Fabrication can be avoided by protecting the identity of each MS. 
DOS: The access control is achieved by issuing a certificate to each MS by FA in step 
IV.A.S of the protocol. Based on the assumption stated at the beginning of Section 4.4, 
trusted nodes with valid certificates will participate properly in ad hoc routing and 
communication protocol. On the hand, we can consider all MSs are selfish and are not 
willing to relay traffic for other MSs in order to save their own resources. Thus, schemes 
like [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] are needed to stimulate the active participation of packet 
forwarding and deter malicious actions through manipulating ~he billing or credit account. 
Since each MS has a certificate, all nodes on a multi-hop path can be authenticated by the 
source or destination. Based on the reports from multi-hop network, the BS can verify the 
communication path and keep track of each register MS. According the traffic on the path, 
the BS can decide which accounts should be charged or credited [66] [67]. The low credit 
node is given less priority in network services such as low internet bandwidth. Even if a 
registered MS acts as a malicious node, malicious behaviors can be detected with the 
complaints of other MSs. 
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4.5.3 Performance Analysis 
Analysis and simulations are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
security protocol in terms of computation overhead, communication cost, and security 
achievements. The computation overhead depends on many factors, for instance, the 
algorithms for key creation, signing and verifying as well as security level. A MS can 
pre-create a pair of private and public keys. Currently, there are a number of asymmetric 
key cryptosystem in literature, e.g., RSA, DSA, EIGamal, and Elliptic Curve DSA. The 
RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman) is based on the difficulty of factoring large integers. 
The EIGamal is the cryptosystem based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm 
in the multiplicative group of a field. The ECC (Elliptic curve cryptosystem), which is 
based on the difficulty of solving a discrete logarithm problem in the group of points on 
an elliptic curve, is a competing system because it offers equal security with a smaller 
key size. An implementation of the key creation, signature and verification based on the 
DUEC signature techniques is implemented for evaluating the proposed security 
approach for integrated network (see appendix). 
The communication cost incurred by the proposed security protocol includes two 
parts (i): communication cost of FA discovery, registration, and distribution of 
certificates, (ii) the communication cost for maintaining the certificates. The overhead of 
ad hoc routing is not considered because it is not caused by the proposed security 
protocol. We assume that the ad hoc network uses AODV protocol, and there are n MSs 
in the integrated MANET, in which n' is the node outside the coverage of the FA. 
Therefore, it has (n-n') nodes located inside the coverage of the FA). Let Anh is the 
average number of hops from all MSs to FA. Let A'nh is the average number of hops from 
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the MSs, which is outside the coverage of FA, to FA (A'nh 2: Anh). Let Aps be the average 
package size of all kinds of control packets, e.g., R_Request, R_Reply, Registration 
request and reply, and Certificate. 
The communication cost for initiating an integrated MANET: It has two stages for 
registration and authentication during initiating an integrated MANET. In the first stage, 
(n- n') nodes hear the advertisement from FA, and register with the FA. For each 
registration, it has 5 messages (advertisement solicitation, advertisement with CoA, 
registration request, registration reply, and certificate issuing of the MS). The number of 
wireless transmissions needed for (n- n') registrations is 5*(n- n'). In the second stage, 
the n' nodes outside the coverage join the MANET one by one. Considering k (k :s n') 
nodes have already joined the integrated MANET, the (k+ 1) th MS joins the integrated 
MANET according to the steps illustrated in Figure 18: 
• The number of transmissions for a route request during FA discovery is ((n-n') 
+ k + 1) for the route request to reach a FA. In this case, the route request 
floods through the whole integrated MANET. 
• The route reply message returns to the (k+ l)th node via A'nh transmissions 
• 
because the route from the MS to FA has been constructed. 
Each message including advertisement solicitation, advertisement with CoA, 
registration request, registration reply, and certificate issuing of the MS, needs 
Anh transmissions. 
Therefore, the number of transmissions (lnitiating_MANET [(k + 1) th)) caused by the 
(k + 1) th MS to join the integrated MANET is: 
Initiatin~MANET [(k+ 1) th] = «n-n') + k + 1) + 6 A'nh = 6 A'nh + (n - n') + k + 1 
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The number of transmissions (Initiating_MANET (n'» for initiating an integrated 
MANET (n nodes) is: 
n'-l 
Initiatin~MANET (n') = I [6A'nk + (n - n') + k + 1] = n'(6 A'nh + n - o.S n' + o.S) 
k~ 
The total number of transmissions (lnitiatin~MANET (n» for initiating an integrated 
MANET (n nodes) is: 
Initiating_MANET (n) = S * (n-n') + Initiatin~MANET (n') = Sn + n' (6 A'nh + 
n - O.S n' - 4.S) 
The total communication cost (lnitiating_MANETcost (n» for initiating an integrated 
MANET with n nodes is: 
Initiatin~MANETcost (n) = Initiatin~MANET (n) * Aps = (Sn + n' (6 A'nh + n -
o.S n' - 4.S»Aps 
The communication cost for maintaining certificates: For simplicity, we assume each 
MS has the same certificate updating interval. Let t is the certificate updating interval for 
each node. Before a certificate expires, its MS issues an ad hoc route discovery for 
constructing a route from the MS to FA if the MS has no fresh route to FA. The routing 
packets are not counted because it depends on routing protocols and mobility of mobile 
hosts. After the route from the MS to FA is constructed, the MS issues a certificate 
request message to FA. FA broadcasts a new certificate with a new issuing time and an 
extended expiration time to other nodes in the integrated MANET. 
• A certificate request message is sent to FA via the constructed route. It causes 
A' nh transmissions. 
• A new certificate is sent back the MS. It also causes A' nh transmissions. 
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Therefore, the number of transmissions for reissuing a certificate in an integrated 
MANET with n nodes (Certificate_MANET (1)) is: 
Certificate_MANET (1) = Anh + Anh = 2Anh 
The communication cost for reissuing a certificate in an integrated MANET with n 
nodes (Certificate_MANETcost (1)) is: 
Certificate_MANETcost (1)= Certificate_MANET (1) * Aps = 2AnhAps 
The total number of transmissions for reissuing n certificates in an integrated MANET 
with n nodes (Certificate_MANET (n)) is: 
n 
Certificate_MANET (n) = L Certificate_MANET (k) = 2nAnh 
k=1 
The communication cost for reissuing n certificates in an integrated MANET with n 
nodes (Certificate_MANET cost (n)) is: 
Certificate_MANETcost (n) = 2nAnhAps. 
Experimental result of Security Achievement: 
In order to verify the proposed approach, experiments were carried out to evaluate the 
security achievements and the communication cost on the proposed security protocol. 
The experiments were conducted by using NS-2 [73] and the tested integrated network is 
configured as shown in Figure 2. An integrated network, which has a FA and 100 ad hoc 
nodes are tested for various security attacks. The FA was located in the center of 
simulation areas and connected to HA by a router. MSs are randomly located in the 
simulation area. The AODV protocol coordinates with Mobile IP protocol for providing 
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Figure 22. Security Attacks and Security Achievements. 
The scenarios with the dimensions 1000m x 1000 m are created with different 
percentage of malicious nodes that are randomly distributed in the simulation area. For 
the first scenario, the malicious nodes modify registration request from a genuine MS so 
that the MS cannot obtain the correct Internet connectivity. As shown from Figure 22(a), 
when the percentage of malicious nodes increases, the more MSs cannot obtain the 
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Internet connectivity. However, in the secure registration process, most of the MSs obtain 
the internet connectivity because of secure registration scheme in the IV.A. Only a few 
MSs are isolated and cannot reach the FA with correct intermediary nodes. 
In the second scenario, we measure the DOS attack, as described in IILB, with the 
metric of packet delivery ratio, which is the percentage of CBR packets received by the 
destination in comparison with the number of the CBR packets generated by the source 
MS. In the DOS attack, the malicious nodes drop the data packets from a MS when they 
are selected an intermediary node for ad hoc communication. In the experiments, five 
connections were initiated between five pairs of randomly selected MSs. CBR packets 
were sent on each connection with the rate of 10 packets per second. If there is no route 
discovery security, as shown in Figure 22 (b), the packet delivery ratios decrease when 
the percentage of malicious nodes increases. However, a secure route discovery in 
Section 4.4.1.2 circumvents the malicious nodes. In this case, the packet delivery ratios 
are almost not affected by malicious nodes as can be seen from Figure 22 (b). 
Also, experiments were designed to test the Internet connectivity with the attack of 
Forged FA. In the experiments, one, two or three forged FAs are created and randomly 
distributed in the simulation area. Each forged FA send advertisements to allure MSs to 
register as illustrated in Section 2.2.6. It can be observed from Figure 22 (c) that a very 
higher percentage of MS cannot obtain the correct Internet connectivity because of the 
forged FAs. By following the secure registration in Section 4.4.1, each MS authenticates 
the forged FA, and finally creates the correct connections to the correct FA. Similar to 
scenario-I, it also has a few MSs that are temporally isolated and cannot reach any 
correct intermediary nodes. 
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Experimental result of communication cost: In the following experiments, different 
sizes of ad hoc networks (10 to 100 nodes) are tested. The experimental scenarios were 
set with the following dimensions (i): 670m x 670m for 10, 20 and 30 nodes, (ii) 1000m 
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Figure 23. Communication Cost in Different Sizes of Ad hoc Network 
Each theoretic value in Figure 23 (a) and (b) is calculated based on an estimated value 
of Anh and A/nh. For example, observed from a scenario of 20 nodes in a 670 x 670 
domain, Anh is larger than 1 but less than 1.5 hops. In the theoretic calculation, 1.5 hops 
are used for Anh in this scenario. Furthermore, in the theoretic calculations, the Anh values 
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are set as 1.3, 1.5, 2, and 2.25 hops for 10, 30, 50, and 100 nodes respectively. In all 
experiments, it is less than 20% experimental area covered by FA. In the theoretical 
calculation, we set A'nh to 1.25Anh. In Figure 23 (a) and (b), it shows that the overhead 
either for initiating an integrated network or reissuing 0 certificates increases when the 
size of MANET increases. As shown in Figure 23 (a), to initiate an integrated MANET 
without a security has less overhead than the secure scenario because MSs in an 
unsecured network may hear, even eavesdrop an advertisement from a neighboring 
without going through the FA. With security, as can been seen from the calculation of 
Initiatin~MANET (D), the communication complexity for initiating an integrated 
network is 0 (02). However, it could not significantly affect the scalability because each 
MS only registers with FA once when it enters the network. The network maintains the 
certificates with the communication complexity of 0 (D). This also can be seen from 
Figure 23 (b) that the overhead for certificate issuing does not show significant additional 
overhead of security. In addition, the certificate for each MS typically is updated just 
before the expiration of its certificate. 
As seen from Figure 23 (a) and (b), the experimental results are less than theoretic 
values. It is because the estimated Anh and A'nh values in theoretical calculation are larger 
than experimental values. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The integrated Internet and MANET provides the Internet connectivity for MSs and 
ad hoc communication. The proposed security protocol protects the Internet connectivity 
and ad hoc route discovery from various attacks. Compared to the security solution for 
pure ad hoc networks, the proposed security protocol takes advantage of infrastructure-
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based Internet authentication to enhance the trustworthiness amongst MSs. On the base of 
overall authentications among MSs, FA and HA, malicious nodes can be effectively 
excluded from participating ad hoc routing activities. The ad hoc routing security is 
achieved by the certificates issued by FA. The certificates exclude those unauthorized 
nodes from misleading FA discovery and ad hoc route discovery. The extensive 
experiments show the security achievements and the efficiency of the protocol. 
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PARTB 
ON SECURE MOBILITY MANAGEMENT IN 




MULTI-HOP CELLULAR IP: A NEW APPROACH 
TO HETEROGENEOUS WIRELESS NETWORKS 
This chapter proposes a new Heterogeneous Multi-hop Cellular IP (MCIP) network 
that integrates multi-hop communication with Cellular IP. MCIP increases the coverage of 
the wireless network and improves the network robustness against adverse propagation 
phenomena by supporting communication in dead zones and areas with poor radio 
coverage. MCIP includes three components: location management, connection 
management and route reconfiguration. Location management IS responsible for 
maintaining the location information for Mobile Stations (MSs) III a local domain. 
Connection management establishes an initial path for data transmission and a route 
reconfiguration mechanism is proposed to take advantage of various multi-hop connection 
alternatives available based on terminal interfaces, network accessibility and topology. 
Our simulation results show that MCIP performs well in networks of various sizes 
including scalability, throughput, and packet delay. 
6.1 Introduction 
In the near future, a large number of Mobile Stations (MSs) will be equipped with 
multiple radio interfaces for wireless access to the Internet. A multi-mode MS with 
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multiple air interfaces (cellular interface, Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.16 etc) 
and different data rates will be able to access cellular Base Stations (BSs), WLAN or 
WMAN Access Points (APs). In this scenario, the integration of multi-hop ad hoc 
communications with infrastructure based (or single-hop) wireless networks, such as 
wireless WANs (e.g., 2.5G, 3G, and 4G), wireless LAN (e.g., IEEE 802.11 a1b/e/g and 
HiperLAnl2) and wireless MANs (e.g., IEEE 802.16), is fundamental to improving the 
coverage and performance of the integrated network [2]. In addition, multi-hop 
communications can be used to increase the utilization and capacity of a BS by 
decreasing the co-channel interference via lowering the transmission power either of the 
BS or of the MSs [44] [49]. Also, the integration can be useful in achieving load-
balancing by forwarding part of the traffic from an overloaded cell to a free neighboring 
cell [45] [49]. Many communication scenarios may benefit from heterogeneous multi-hop 
networks with the desirable properties of ubiquitous coverage and higher data rates. The 
integration of multi-hop communications with infrastructure-based networks is not a 
simple task, however. It involves numerous challenges including efficient spectrum 
utilization, integrated routing, Quality of Service (QoS) support, security, and mobility 
management 3. In this chapter we consider the mobility management and routing 
problems, which are two basic building blocks required to support the desired seamless 
handoffs across heterogeneous networks. The proposed Multi-hop Cellular IP (MCIP) 
protocol integrates multi-hop relaying with Cellular IP [36] [37] and Mobile IP [34] [35]. 
As in Cellular IP, the MCIP protocol differentiates between local and global domains. A 
local domain is a local wireless network consisting of MSs, cellular BSs and/or WLAN 
APs and an Internet Gateway. In order to simplify the description of MCIP, we use the 
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term BS on generic sense to refer to any network attachment point that provides wireless 
access to MSs, i.e., a cellular BS or a WLAN AP. Also, we define single-hop MSs as the 
MSs that are able to communicate directly, in a single-hop, with a BS, while multi-hop 
MSs are the ones that connect to the BS through multi-hop ad hoc routes. MCIP provides 
mobility support for single or multi-hop MSs inside a local domain, while mobility 
between local domains or networks is handled through legacy Mobile IP. Moreover, the 
MCIP maintains the basic features of Cellular IP, as it provides fast and smooth mobility 




A micro-mobility management for heterogeneous multi-hop networks; 
A connection and multi-hop routing configuration scheme for increasing 
network coverage and capacity. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: the background and related work are 
discussed in Section 6.2. Then, the heterogeneous MCIP network model is proposed in 
Section 6.3. Section 6.4 describes the details of location management, connection 
management and route reconfiguration in the proposed MCIP protocol. The MCIP 
implementation issues are identified in Section 6.5 and experimental results are provided 
in Section 6.6. Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 6.7. 
6.2 Background and Related Work 
5.2.1 Mobility Management Protocols 
Mobile IP [34] [35] performs its mobility management with two entities: home agent 
(HA) and foreign agent (FA). HA and FA advertises their existence by periodically 
sending advertisement on the home network and foreign network respectively. When a 
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MS visits a foreign network, it picks a care-of-address (COA) from the beacon message 
advertised by the FA and initiates a registration procedure by sending a registration 
request to FA. The FA then forwards the registration request to the HA. After creating the 
mobility binding for the MS, HA responds to FA with a registration reply message 
carrying out the registration result. Then, FA forwards the registration result to the MS so 
that the MS can receive the packets from the correspondent node (CN) via the HA, 
Internet, and FA. 
Mobile IP provides a continuous Internet accessibility for a MS at its visiting foreign 
network, but it is inadequate in terms of seamless handoff support in micro-mobility 
environment where transitions between network attachment points could be frequent. 
Every time a MS changes its attachment point, Mobile IP requires the MS to register with 
the network and create a mobility binding which causes significant delay during 
migration. The Cellular IP [36] [37] protocol provides efficient mobility and handoff 
support for frequently moving MSs. In Cellular IP network, a gateway separates cellular 
access network from the Internet. In a local cellular access network, there is no need for a 
MS to register with FA when MS moves from a BS to another, thereby supporting fast 
handoff using HLR-VLR. 
5.2.2 Mobility Management in Heterogeneous Networks 
Consider the communication scenario shown in Figure 24. As can be noted, MS3 can not 
obtain services from the Internet via standard Cellular IP because: (i) MS3 is located 
outside the direct transmission range of any BS or it is in a poor coverage area; and (ii) 
standard Cellular IP only supports single hop communication from a MS to a BS. In fact, 
if MS3 and other intermediate MSs (e.g., MS 2 and MS 1 in Figure 24) were equipped 
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with dual-mode radio interface (e.g., cellular and IEEE 802.11), MS3 could connect to 
the Internet via a multi-hop route (MS 3-2-I-BS-Internet, as shown in Figure 24). In 
order to allow such a communicating scenario, a new architecture is needed for providing 
efficient mobility management and routing schemes that support heterogeneous multi-
hop communication. 
c Core IP network with Mobile IP 
Internet 
Multi -hop Relay: IEEE 802.11 Global Mobility Multi·hop Cellular IP 
Figure 24. Heterogeneous Multi-hop Access Network and Mobile IP. 
Existing mobility management protocols are not optimized for multi-hop 
heterogeneous networking scenarios. Mobile IP can support global mobility, but it is not 
designed for micro-mobility management in a local domain as shown in Figure 24. On 
the other hand, Cellular IP suffers from two key drawbacks in a multi-hop heterogeneous 
scenario: (i) it does not support communication between heterogeneous wireless networks; 
(ii) it cannot provide service to MSs that are out of the coverage or have poor signal 
quality from a BS. Therefore, it is necessary to design new mobility management 
architectures and protocols that exploit the multi-hop communication paradigm and 
support seamless mobility in ubiquitous multi-hop heterogeneous scenarios. 
If a MS moves outside the coverage of a BS or moves into an area with poor signal 
quality, the mobility management protocol should have the capability of detecting the 
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possibility of reaching a BS through a multiple-hop path. In general, the integration of 
multi-hop communications imposes important challenges including location management, 
route creation and maintenance. The location management requires that single hop or 
multi-hop MSs periodically report their locations to the network so that they can be 
reached when data packets are received from the Intemet. In addition, a single hop or 
multi-hop MS must be able to detect and construct a path to a network attachment point 
(BS) in order to have connectivity "anytime and anywhere". However, the multi-hop 
routes between MSs and BSs could be easily broken due to the mobility of intermediate 
MSs. Therefore multi-hop route creation and maintenance are important issues for 
efficient integration of multi-hop communication and Intemet accessibility. The key 
challenges in this environment can be summarized as follows: 
• How to track multi-hop MSs at the fixed network components (BSs)? 
• How to create communication route from a multi-hop MS to a BS? 
• How to handle route reconfiguration if intermediate nodes in multi-hop route 
move away? 
• How to improve connection quality and performance (which is changing due to 
mobility) by route reconfiguration? 
5.2.2 Mobility Management Related Work 
Several routing protocols have been proposed for integration of multi-hop 
communication in wireless networks. These protocols can be divided into two categories: 
multi-hop cellular networks and multi-hop WLAN networks. The architectures for the 
cellular multi-hop networks include A-GSM [43], MCN [44], iCAR [45], MADF [46], 
UCAN [47], ODMA [48], and SOPRANO [49], and Two-Hop-Relay [50]. On the other 
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hand, architectures for multi-hop WLAN networks include HWN [51], I-hop and 2-hops 
Direct Transmission [52]. 
Multi-hop cellular network (MCN) [44] and Ad hoc GSM (A-GSM) [43] extend the 
coverage of a BS by using multi-hop relaying. MCN enables two MSs to communicate 
with each other via multi-hop relaying or through a BS. Ad hoc GSM (A-GSM) supports 
communication in the dead zones or poor radio coverage areas. Opportunity driven 
multiple access (ODMA) [48] breaks a single CDMA transmission from a MS to a BS 
into several multiple wireless hops, thereby reducing the transmission power and co-
channel interferences. In UCAN [47], MSs with a low data rate in the downlink channel 
with the BS can constructs a multi-hop route using relay nodes with better downlink rates 
to connect to the BS. The iCAR [45]and MADF [46] address the problem of cellular 
congestion due to unbalanced traffic in a cellular system. The iCAR system diverts the 
traffic from an overcrowded cell to a neighboring cell that has lower load by making use 
of dedicated stationary relay stations. Similarly, MADF diverts the traffic of MSs in a hot 
spot BS to its neighboring cold spot BSs by the relaying through other MSs. SOPRANO 
[49] advocates self-organization at the physical, data link, and network layers for the 
purpose of optimizing the capacity of multi-hop cellular network. The Two-Hop-Relay 
architecture [50] exploits the availability of dual-mode terminals that can act as ad hoc 
relaying station between a single hop and multi-hop domains. 
In I-hop and 2-hops Direct Transmission [52], besides the option to communicate 
through the AP, two MSs can directly communicate (one-hop direct transmission), or can 
use an intermediate relaying station in a multi-hop transmission. The Hybrid Wireless 
Network (HWN) [51] architecture allows each cell (BS) to select the operation mode 
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between the typical single-hop or in the ad hoc mode. The motivation for this scheme is 
that a single-hop mode performs better for sparse topologies, while the ad hoc mode is 
well suited for dense topologies, where in network connectivity can be ensured. The BS 
runs an algorithm to decide the operation mode that maximizes the throughput based on 
the topology information received from the nodes. A detailed comparison of multi-hop 
architectures can be found in 3. 
If the Mobile IP protocol [34] [35] is used to support handoffs between BSs in all the 
above multi-hop cellular and multi-hop WLAN networks, an update message must be 
sent to the MS's home agent (HA). After creating a new location binding for the MS 
through the FA, the HA will send the result to the MS via the FA and the visiting BS. 
This incurs unacceptable delay in the Internet environment. With a large number of MSs, 
the process of registration at every move generates an unacceptable signaling load across 
the network. Also, Cellular IP cannot be used for the mobility management scheme 
integrated networks. A BS in a standard Cellular IP network can only record single hop 
radio mapping of MS, but it cannot do much for multi-hop MS such as recording, 
constructing, and maintaining a route. 
6.3 Multi-hop Cellular IP Architecture and Design Challenges 
5.3.1 Multi-hop Cellular Network Model 
This section discusses the architecture of a multi-hop heterogeneous MCIP network, 
which is shown in Figure 25. The architecture includes HAIFA, Internet Gateway Router 
(IGW), BSs, and MSs. For clarity, the network is divided into global and local domain. 
The FA or HA address are used as local domain identifier and IGW address is the Care-
Of-Address (COA) for local domain. In the global domain, Mobile IP supports the global 
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mobility for MSs with the granularity of wireless access networks. An lGW, a FA and a 
set of BSs constitute a local wired network. A local domain is connected to global 
Internet via an IGW and the BSs are interconnected through wired links and routers. BSs 
serve as the communication bridges for MSs. Cellular BSs and WLAN APs can be co-
located in the hot-spot area as shown in Figure 25. The deployed MS can be a single 
radio mode or multi-mode with multiple radio interfaces. A dual- mode MS can access a 
cellular BS by the cellular interface and a WLAN AP by using the WLAN interface. 
Furthermore, a dual-mode MS can directly communicate with other WLAN capable MS 
in the ad hoc mode. MSs at a given location could be either within or outside the 
coverage of cellular BSs and/or WLAN APs. As shown in Figure 25, MS3 is located at 
the radio-uncovered-area and a multi-hop route (path MS3-MS2-MSl) is required for 
MS3 to communicate with a BS and obtain the Internet service. 
Router Internet Gateway 





:---..::b:ill ~SI I I I 
"'iib mobii'eIP ;;;1;;0 I I I I 
~_......;:i;",ji; ...--_ 1 : 
I I I Global domain Local do~nain I I I I 







" I Home/Foreign Agent I ~H~--i'~---j,~"-L-",----~- . .. I : rTl''+-"" 
~'~ 1 
eN: Correspondent Node, r : 
• 
BS: Base Station 
AP: Access Point 
Radio covered Ar~ 
Radio Uncovered Area ~-.; ~-~ __ ~S3---'-_=--P-'~ 
Co-located BS and AP Area .. ~ MS: Mobile Station 
Figure 25. Heterogeneous Multi-hop Cellular IP Network Model. 
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5.3.2 Design Challenges 
There are three critical issues for providing Internet service for MSs in the MCIP 
network of Figure 25, namely: (i) location management for idle MSs, (ii) connection 
management, and (ii) multi-hop route reconfiguration for active MSs. Based on the 
location management scheme, the fixed network, i.e., BSs, can track the location of each 
MS in the local domain, while each MS can record the accessible BSs for Internet 
connection. Connection management provides bi-directional Internet accessibility for 
MSs. It allows the network to locate a single hop or multi-hop MS when the lOW 
receives the first data packet from the Internet to delivery to a MS. It also allows a single 
hop or multi-hop MS to set up upstream connection with a CN in the Internet. However, 
the bi-directional Internet accessibility cannot be achieved in a straightforward way due 
to the mobility of MSs and multi-hop route. For example, in Figure 25, MS3 constructs a 
multi-hop route (MS3-MS2-MS1) to BS1 and registers with the FA at a given instant. 
After some time, MS3 moves to another location as shown in Figure 25, and the 
established multi-hop route (MS3-MS2-MSl) is broken. At this moment, data packets 
coming from the Internet for MS3 will be delivered to BS 1 and these packets will be 
dropped because the multi-hop route has been broken. In order to maintain up-to-date 
location and routing information about all MSs, a significant overhead will incur due to 
the mobility of MSs that causes frequent changes in the multi-hop routes. Thus, an 
efficient location and connection management scheme is required to maintain bi-
directional Internet connectivity for MSs without excessively overloading the network 
with location update messages. 
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Due to MS mobility in a local domain, there is not only the possibility of having 
broken routes, but also the possibility of finding an improved relaying path for 
communication. In both cases the original route has to be re-configured to provide 
improved connectivity. Thus, a route reconfiguration approach is essential for providing 
efficient communication with higher quality route for data transmission, i.e., less delay, 
higher speed, or less network congestion. Multi-hop route reconfiguration requires multi-
hop routing detection, construction, and maintenance as MSs are communicating with the 
Internet and moving in a local domain. 
Routes between MSs and BSs are needed for location reporting for idle MSs, and are 
also required for data packet transmission for active MSs. The route used for reporting 
MS location may be different from the route used for transmitting data packets. Smaller 
overhead in the network and less delay in reporting location can be achieved if the MS 
uses a larger range operating air interface. For example, in Figure 27, dual-mode MSs 2 
can report its location to BS using cellular radio interface due to longer operating range 
and shorter delivery latency. However, MS2 can transmit data packets to BS2 via MS 1 
using the IEEE 802.11 air interfaces to achieve higher communication speed. This 
separation of routes for location reporting/paging and data packet transmission is 
proposed in MCIP to provide improved performance and is described in the following 
section. 
6.4 Heterogeneous Multi-hop Cellular IP Protocol 
In MCIP, MSs operate in one of two states: idle and active. In the idle MSs are 
inactive while the active MSs are receiving or sending data packets. Figure 26 illustrates 
the state machine of a MS. If there is data to be transmitted or received, the MS 
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immediately moves to the active state after starting up the connection management. In the 
active state, the MS starts the procedure of route reconfiguration as needed. After 
finishing data transmissions, the MS returns to the idle state again, and it only executes 
the location management. Figure 26 also shows the basic functionalities provided by 
MCIP, namely, location management, connection management, and route reconfiguration. 
In addition, MCIP uses the concepts of multi-hop paging and routing caches to 
implement location management and route reconfiguration, respectively. Each block in 
Figure 26 is described in details in the remaining of this section. 
CM Data 
Packet 
LM: Location Management 
CM: Connection Management 
RR: Route reconfiguration 
Figure 26. MS State Machine and MCIP functionalities. 
5.4.1 Multi-hop PagingIRouting Cache 
MCIP uses multi-hop paging caches for maintaining the location of MSs and uses 
multi-hop routing caches for keeping the multi-hop routes for data packet transmission. A 
multi-hop paging/routing cache stores a single or multi-hop route between the IGW and a 
multi-hop MS. The IGW maintains a paging cache with a route to each of its associated 
MS. The IGW also maintains a routing cache for each active MS where the route is used 
to send data packets. At the same time, each MS keeps paging and/or routing cache 
information, depending on its current state. An idle MS periodically reports its location to 
its IGW and updates the multi-hop paging cache with the multi-hop route. On the other 
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hand, an active MS keeps an additional cache, the multi-hop routing cache, with the route 
used for data transmission. Each paging and routing caches have associated timers called 
Paging Interval Timer (PIT) and Routing Interval Timer (RIT), respectively. A PITIRIT 
is initialized at paging/routing cache creation. When a PIT or RIT expires, the 
corresponding paging or routing cache is cleared. Figure 27 illustrates the multi-hop 
paging and routing caches stored at the lOW for MS2. As shown in Figure 27, when MS2 
is idle, the corresponding multi-h.op paging cache stored by the lOW has the path: IOW-
BSI-BS2-MS2. In contrast, when MS2 moves to the active state, MS2 or BS2 initiates a 
route discovery by IEEE 802.11 interface (if available) for constructing a multi-hop route 
for data transmission. Then, a multi-hop routing cache for MS2, with the route IOW-
BSI-BS2-MS I-MS2, will be created after the process ofroute discovery is completed. 
IGW : Cache for id le MS3 
Mult i-hOp Paging Cache (IGW-BS I-BS2-MS 3) 
lOW: Cache for act ive MS2 
Multi-hop Paging Cache ( IGW-BSI-BS2-MS2) 
Mu lti-hop Routing Cache (lGW -BS I-BS2-MSI-MS1) 
IGWL~ ____ ~~~~~ __ ~~ 
BSI 
Home/Foreign Agent 
Roule for data packet transmission: 
Route for location IEEE 802.11 
re art: cellular interface 
Figure 27. Multi-hop Paging and Routing Caches. 
Each MS creates its multi-hop paging cache when it enters a local domain. In addition, 
each MS periodically sends page-update packets to the lOW and updates its multi-hop 
paging cache so that the MSs and the network can track each other. The multi-hop paging 
cache provides location information for the purpose of downlink connection 
establishment between the Internet and the MS. Based on the multi-hop paging cache for 
a MS, the lOW has the knowledge of 
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• the wired route from IGW to the BS that the MS is associated with, 
• the single or multi-hop wireless route from the associated BS to the MS and, 
• the number of hops from the associated BS to each MS. 
On the other hand, the multi-hop paging cache stored at the MS provides the 
following information: 
• the BS the MS is associated with, 
• the number of hops between the MS and its associated BS and, 
• the multi-hop route between the IGW and the MS. 
The processes of creating and maintaining the multi-hop paging and routing caches 
are discussed in Section 5.4.3 and Section 5.4.4. 
5.4.2 MCIP Overview 
MCIP supports several connectivity scenarios and involves different procedures for 
creating connections in each case. We provide an overview of the protocol's operation in 
this section, while the details are described in the following sections. 
There are two types of connection establishment for a MS: (i) Downlink (Internet-
>MS), and (ii) Uplink (MS -> Internet). In the first case, when the IGW receives the first 
data packet from the Internet for a MS, the IGW, based on its paging cache, sends the 
packet to the BS, where the MS is currently associated. Then, the BS initiates the process 
of connection establishment towards the MS (see Section 5.4.4). In the second case, a MS 
initiates the process of connection establishment with the Internet if the multi-hop route 
from the MS to the Internet stored in multi-hop paging cache is stale. The MS constructs 
a route using the range-based search process described in Section 5.4.2. After the 
connection is established, the MS creates a multi-hop routing cache by sending a route-
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update packet to lOW. Then, the MS enters into an active state and starts up the route 
reconfiguration scheme. 
The route reconfiguration scheme is achieved by updating the multi-hop routing 
cache for data transmission between the lOW and an active MS, Therefore the path from 
the Internet to the MS is kept fresh for data transmission. The following events trigger the 
update of the multi-hop routing cache 
• periodic update timer expires, 
• the MS performs a handoff between neighboring BSs and 
• a new higher quality multi-hop route is identified. 
5.4.2 BSIMS Search Algorithm 
MeIP involves two important route discovery procedures: the BS search algorithm 
for locating a MS, and, the MS search algorithm to find the nearest available BS. The 
proposed search algorithms reduce the search overhead by limiting the search range 
through a TTL (time to live) field in each search packet. When a MS (BS) detects a 
broken route to BS (MS) during the transmission of a page-update or data packet, the MS 
(BS) starts a search process for a new route to the destination. A search-request packet is 
transmitted by the source through the available air interface (cellular and/or IEEE 802.11) 
with a search range set by the TTL field. The initial value of TTL is set to the number of 
hops recorded in the paging/routing cache. If the first attempt fails, the next search range 
is incremented by 1 until the TTL reaches a maximum hop number (Mhop)' The interval 
between issuing two continuous search-request packets is called the Search Interval. 
Upon receiving the search-request packet, an intermediate MS responds with a search-
reply packet if it has a fresh route to a BS. Otherwise, it decreases the TTL by 1, and then 
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forwards the packet as long as TIL is greater than zero. The search-request packet floods 
through the network within the TTL range. When the destination receives the search-
request packet, it returns a search-reply packet with the reverse route. 
MS searching range: TTL =2, and MS 
1--p,-3can!!!,!.::~~~BS ,. ." k'" - ...... - ..... / \ " \ 123 ~~ MS searchmg range TTL =3, and BS - _;t-_ -=.... . -MS-3 finds a BS 
MS 3 sets different searching ., 
ranges fOT finding an available 
BS 
Figure 28. MS Search Process for Locating an Available BS. 
Figure 28 describes a MS search process. When MS3 detects that it has lost connectivity 
with the BS in Figure 28, it sends a search-request packet with TTL=2, which is the 
number of hops recorded in its multi-hop paging/routing cache. If the search-request 
packet cannot reach any available BS , as shown in Figure 28, MS3 then enlarges its 
search range by setting a larger TTL (TTL=3). The searching process will continue until 
the largest search range (Mhop) or a reply message is received from a BS. The BS closest 
to the MS (in number of hops) responds with a search-reply packet. The search-reply 
packet will be forwarded to the MS3 via the reverse multi-hop route. After the MS search 
process, a multi-hop path will be established between the MS and the responding BS. The 
multi-hop path can then be used to update multi-hop paging and routing caches. 
Figure 29 illustrates a similar search process that is executed by a BS to locate a 
destination MS3. As the path stored in the multi-hop paging/routing cache for a MS 
becomes stale and the BS needs to send data to the MS, the BS transmits the first search-
request packet with the search range (TIL) set to 2, as recorded in the multi-hop 
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paging/routing cache for MS3 (see Figure 29). If the search-request cannot reach the 
destination MS, the BS enlarges the search range (TTL = 3 hops). As MS3 responds with 
a search-reply, the BS updates the downlink path to MS 3 (MSI-MS2-MS3). 
BS searching range: TIL =2, and the 
~s cann each host 3 .;". -:;;-·· ..... 1-.-:.:-·· . -. . -.l!,.S searching range: TIL =3 , and / I' . theiaS finds host 3. . I .. 2 · 3..-----r-
'. . ~ J "".,. 
.' BS -/ . 
-:'::" ' - .-.-.- . .J : ::: : - ';. --.---':r--l~ 
BS sets differen seare mg 
ranges for finding the host 3. 
Figure 29. BS Search Process to Locate a Destination MS. 
5.4.3 Location Management 
Location management allows the fixed network (lGW and BSs) to track each MS in 
its local domain. If the MS has not yet registered with the HA via the FA, it initiates the 
Mobile IP registration process and then sends a page-update packet to the IGW, which 
replies with page-reply packet after creating the multi-hop paging cache for the MS. As 
illustrated in Figure 30, MS2 constructs a multi-hop route to BS3 via MSI after the 
search process is completed. The page-update packet is forwarded to IGW through the 
path MSI-BS3-Router-BS2-BSl. After creating a multi-hop paging cache for MS2, a 





BS6 Paging-update packet 
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HAIFA MS 2 sends paging-update packet and creates multi-hop 
paging cache for MS 2 (IGW-BS I-BS2-Router-BS3-
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Figure 30. A Page-update Packet Creates a Multi-hop Paging Cache. 
When an idle MS moves and the path established via a previous BS is lost, the MS 
initiates a new search process to locate a new nearest BS and a new multi-hop paging 
cache will be created by a page-update packet. The old multi-hop paging cache will be 
cleared after the expiration of the PIT. For instance, in Figure 31, when MS2 moves away 
from BS3, the route from MS2 to BS3 is broken. Hence, MS2 initiates a search process, 
and then receives a reply from BS6, which has the shortest route to MS2. A new page-
update packet will be forwarded to the IGW via BS6 as shown in Figure 31. A page-reply 
packet will be returned to MS2 from the IGW through BS6 after updating its multi-hop 
paging cache. The paging routing cache at BS3 and router will be automatically cleared 
after the RIT expires. 
Internet Gateway 
BS3 0 I 
2 
Paging-update packet 
HAIFA MS 2 sends paging-update packet by a new multi-hop route 
to BS6 and updates multi -hop paging cache for MS2 (IGW-
BS I-BS2-BS5-BS6-MS2), IGW replies paging-update packet 
carrying the result. 
Figure 31. Update of Multi-hop Paging Cache for a Moving MS 
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5.4.4 Connection Management 
Downlink Connection (Internet 7 MS): When a data packet for a MS arrives at IGW 
via the Internet for the first time, the location information in the multi-hop paging cache 
is used to establish the downlink connection with the MS. First, the IGW forwards the 
data packet to the BS through which the MS is currently accessing the network. Then, the 
BS delivers the packet to the destination MS by following the multi-hop paging cache 
route for the MS. However, the route in the multi-hop paging cache for the MS may be 
, 
stale, because of the mobility of MSs. In this case, the BS initiates a BS search process, 
as described in Section 5.4.2, to find a new route to the destination MS. For example, in 
Figure 31, the data packets for MS2 are" initially forwarded to BS6. However, MS2 
moves to a new position before the connection is established, as shown in Figure 32, and 
BS6 cannot reach MS2 directly as recorded in its multi-hop paging cache for MS2. Then, 
BS6 uses the search procedure to find a new route to MS2. Eventually, the data packets 
will be delivered to the destination as a new multi-hop route is created via MS3. Then, 
after receiving the first data packet from the Internet, MS2 turns to active state and sends 
a route-update packet to the IGW for creating multi-hop routing cache for MS2. 
Meanwhile, MS2 starts up the route reconfiguration scheme described in the next section 
for exploring an improved path. 
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Figure 32. Creating Multi-hop Routing Cache at the First Data Packet from the Internet. 
Uplink Connection (MS -7 Internet): In the case of uplink connections, the MSs 
forward the packets to their IGW by following its multi-hop paging cache. The IGW 
forwards the packet to the destination by following the Mobile IP protocol. Because of 
the mobility of MSs, the route in the multi -hop paging cache for the MS may have been 
broken since the last update. In this case, the MS initiates a search process to find a path 
to the nearest BS. After a new route is found, the MS turns to active state and creates its 
multi-hop routing cache by issuing a route-update packet to the IGW. The IGW responds 
to the MS with a route-reply packet after creating the multi-hop routing cache for the MS. 
Consider the example in Figure 32, where MS 2 tries to establish an uplink connection 
with the Internet, but its paging routing cache has stale information, which indicates BS6 
as the next hop to forward uplink packets (MS2 was under coverage of BS6, as shown in 
Figure 31, but it has moved to the new position shown in Figure 32). Because of the stale 
routing information, BS6 cannot receive the packets sent by MS2, and the link layer of 
MS2 can detect the link breakage and report it to network layer. Then MS2 initiates a 
search process to find a path to an available BS. After a new route has been constructed 
as illustrated in Figure 33, the data can be delivered to the IGW, which forwards the data 
137 
to the corresponding node in the Internet. Meanwhile, MS2 creates a multi-hop routing 
cache by issuing a route-update packet, to which, the IGW responds with a route-reply 
packet that is forwarded through the reversed path obtained from the route-update packet. 
Thereafter the multi-hop routing cache is maintained by route reconfiguration scheme 
during the period of packet transmission. 
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Figure 33. Creating Multi-hop Routing Cache at the First Data Packet Sending to the 
Internet. 
5.4.5 Route Reconfiguration 
A multi-hop route may include wired and multi-hop wireless links. The wired part of 
the route is the path between the IGW and the BS that the MS is currently associated with, 
and the wireless part of the route is the path between the BS and the MS. The route 
reconfiguration procedure periodically updates both the wired and wireless parts of a 
route in the multi-hop routing cache. To update a multi-hop routing cache, a MS sends 
out a route-update packet to the IGW before the expiration of the RIT. After updating its 
multi-hop routing cache, the IGW replies to the MS with a route-reply packet. The route 
reconfiguration has two main goals: 
• To keep the multi-hop routing cache fresh and, 
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• To improve the quality of connection between the multi-hop MSs and BSs if 
possible. 
Recall that the multi-hop route stored III multi-hop routing cache is used for data 
transmission. If this multi-hop route becomes stale, data packets will be lost. The route 
reconfiguration has the responsibility of rediscovering a new path if the current route is 
broken. The multi-hop routing cache is updated after the route discovery process and the 
data packets are redirected to the new path. The discovery of higher performance path 
during route reconfiguration is based on BS's accessibility, terminal interfaces, and 
network topology. For instance, if a dual-mode MS detects a higher speed transmission 
path via IEEE 802.11 interface, then it can construct a new and improved path for 
communication. As shown in Figure 32 and Figure 33, MS2 establishes an initial 
connection through path MS2-MS3-BS6. When a route reconfiguration scheme is 
performed after the arrival of MS4, MS2 detects a higher speed route through MS2-MS4-
MS5-BS6 as shown in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34. Update of Multi-hop Routing Cache During Packet Transmission. 
In order to maintain the connection for data transmission, the following events result 
in an update process of the multi-hop routing cache of a MS: 
139 
Link Broken: When a link breakage toward a BS (MS->Intemet) is detected at the link 
layer and reported to the network layer, the MS suspends the process of packet 
transmission and initiates a MS search process to construct another multi-hop path to an 
available BS. After receiving the search-reply from a BS, the MS sends out a route-
update packet for the purpose of updating its multi-hop routing cache. If new BS is 
different than the old BS, the new data migration process implements handoff in local 
domain. On the other hand, if a link toward a destination MS (Intemet->MS) is lost, the 
BS suspends the process of data transmissions and issues a BS search process to locate 
the destination MS. The MS responds the BS search process with search-reply. At the 
same time, the MS initiates the process of updating its multi-hop routing cache by 
sending a route-update packet. In the end, the BS restarts the process of packet 
transmission. 
New BS: A moving MS keeps a record of available BSs, even though the current data 
transmission path may be fresh. For a single hop MS, it keeps listening to the beacons 
from BSs and determines whether a migration to a different BS should be encouraged or 
not. For a multi-hop MS, it detects an available BS by a MS search process. If a BS with 
fewer numbers of hops is found, the MS updates the multi-hop routing cache so that the 
data packets could be forwarded through the new BS. If a multi-hop MS receives a 
beacon directly from a BS, it switches the current connection from multi-hop to single 
hop. At the same time, the MS updates its multi-hop routing cache. In this case, a multi-
hop hop communication has been migrated to single-hop. The processes of BS detection 
and data packet migration implement the hand-off in the local domain. 
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Higher quality multi-hop route: Due to the dynamic nature of multi-hop networks, the 
initial path determined by the connection management may not provide the desired 
performance. Therefore, it is essential to have a route reconfiguration protocol for MCIP, 
which will be responsible for: (i) exploring the path with higher performance; (ii) 
redirecting dataflow from a path to another. Four possible connection alternatives 
between a MS and a BS are proposed for higher performance in the MCIP network. 
Figure 35 illustrates various connection alternatives (I-IV) for data transmission. 
I. MSs located inside the radio coverage of a BS may communicate with the BS 
directly, e.g., MSl, MS2, MS3, MSll, and MS14 in Figure 35. 
II. MSs (e.g., in Figure 35, MS4, MS5, and MS6) located outside the radio coverage of 
a BS can established multi-hop routes to the BS with the help of other MSs. This 
kind of multi-hop route extends the service coverage of the BSs. For example, in 
Figure 35, MS5 contacts BSI via the path <MS5, MS4, MS2, and BSl>. 
III. A single hop connection from a MS to a BS can be broken into several wireless 
hops. For example, in Figure 35, MS7 is under the coverage of BS 1; and the path 
from MS7 to BSI can be broken into a multi-hop route <MS7, MS3, BSl>. This 
connection alternative could reduce the transmission power and co-channel 
interferences. 
IV. A MS located inside BS's coverage area may communicate with a neighboring BS 
by using multi-hop relaying. For example, in Figure 35, if BSI is overloaded and 
BS2 has a small traffic load, MS8 could communicate via BS2 using the multi-hop 
path <MS8, MS9, MSlO, BS2>. Otherwise, the communication of MS8 would be 
blocked in the BSl. The intermediate nodes (e.g., in Figure 35, MSs 9 and 10) 
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could be some user terminals or some stationary relays. This feature relives the 
cellular congestion by diverting traffic from an overcrowded cell to a neighboring 
free cell. 
I-IV: Connection Alternatives 
5 
Figure 35. Connection Alternatives. 
A MS may migrate from one connection alternative to another depending on the 
quality of the connection. When a MS detects a connection alternative with higher 
performance, the MS issues a route-update packet for the purpose of updating its multi-
hop routing cache. Then, the MS or BS redirects the data packets to the new connection. 
If a dual-mode MS experiences low performance using its cellular interface, the MS 
initiates a MS search process using another radio interface (e.g., IEEE 802.11). After a 
new path is found, the MS updates its multi-hop routing cache and redirects its dataflow 
to its new interface. For instance, in Figure 36, MSs 1 and 2 are dual-mode MSs having 
cellular and IEEE 802.11 g interface. Initiall y connection management for MS 1 
establishes the single hop connection to the BS as shown in (Connection Alternatives I). 
As MS 1 moves, the route reconfiguration protocol detects that an AP can be reached 
through MS2 via its IEEE 802.11 interface. Then, MS 1 constructs a multi-hop route to 
the AP (Connection Alternatives II). After updating the multi-hop routing cache, the data 
flow of MS 1 migrates from its cellular interface to IEEE 802.11 interface. 
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Figure 36. Connection Alternative Migration. 
5.5 Protocol Implementation Issues 
In MCIP, the lGW maintains a multi-hop paging cache for each idle MS at all time. 
On the other hand, an active MS maintains its multi-hop routing cache fresh. The MS 
also takes advantage of various communication alternatives for interacting with the 
heterogeneous MCIP environment. The implementation of such architecture is influenced 
by many design factors. The design factors considered here include the interaction with 
BS beacon advertisements, control packet overhead, mobility and PITIRIT selection. This 
section provides an overview of these design factors and their impact on our 
implementation. 
5.5.1 BS Beacon Advertisement 
A BS in the MCIP network advertises its presence periodically with beacons carrying 
F NHA address, IGW address, and its BS address with a sequence number. The MSs in 
the transmission range of a BS can directly receive the beacons. The MS outside the radio 
coverage could obtain beacons by flooding. However, the flooding of beacon may result 
in the overhead of relaying beacons periodically. Instead of this proactive solution, in 
MCIP, MSs obtain beacons in an on-demand manner. MSs outside the radio coverage of 
any BS obtains the BS information by querying its neighboring MSs. For instance, when 
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a MS outside the any BS is switched on, it sends a BS-query packet out. The neighboring 
MSs having the fresh BS information responds the MS with BS-query-reply packet and 
the route to the BS. 
5.5.2 Control Packet Overhead 
MCIP uses eight control packets: page-update packet, page-reply packet, route-update 
packet, route-reply packet, search-request packet, search-reply packet, BS-query packet, 
and BS-query-reply packet. These packets are regular IP packets with new options so that 
the packets can be understood in a local MCIP domain. The packets never reach outside 
the local domain. These packets have the MS identifier, which can include the MS's IP 
home address. Because the search-request and search-reply are broadcast packets, they 
have a broadcast identifier to avoid duplicate transmission and reception during 
forwarding. When an intermediate MS receives search-request packet, it appends its 
address in the packet for the purpose of constructing the reverse multi-hop route to the 
destination. The overhead of control packets in a multi-hop communication is influenced 
by many factors, including mobility of MS, PIT/RIT, BS/MS search algorithm and its 
parameters (e.g., the maximum search range), the network topology, and density of MSs. 
Following strategies are used in our implementation to control the overhead including: 
• Not only paging/route-update packets but also registration/routing/data packets 
are used to create or update multi-hop paging/routing caches. 
• A single paging/routing/data packet updates multiple paging and routing cache 
not only for the sending MS but also for all the intermediate relaying MSs. For 
example, in Figure 30, the page-update packet sent by MS2 can result in the 
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multi-hop paging updates for both MS2 and MSl. In this case, MS1 has no need 
to send an extra page-update packet until the next PIT expiration. 
• When a MS is powered on without any BS information (e.g., beacon), it starts 
up a query process to obtain BS information. In order to reduce the number of 
MS searching process, a MS learns BS information from control/data packets 
and update its multi-hop paging/routing cache either sent by the MS or other 
MSs. For instance, in Figure 32, the BS search process at BS6 results in the 
update of multi-hop paging/routing cache of MS2. In addition, MS3 obtains the 
path to BS6 from this process and the multi-hop paging/routing cache for MS3 
can also be updated since the MS3 acts as the intermediate relaying MS for 
reaching MS2. 
5.5.3 Mobility and PagingIRouting Interval Timer (PIT IRIT) 
PIT and RIT are two key parameters that determine the performance of the MCIP 
protocol. The MSs having a higher value of PaginglRouting Interval report their locations 
to IGW with less frequency causing smaller overhead in the wireless network. If the 
PaginglRouting Interval is large for frequently moving MSs, it is more difficult for the 
network to locate the MSs when required. In case of a MS moving away from the 
maximum search range of BS without reporting its location, the Internet connectivity will 
be lost until the next update of multi-hop paging cache. Compared with a higher value of 
PITIRIT, a lower PITIRIT value will result in heavier overhead in the wireless network 
because of frequent control packet transmissions. Mobility is the key factor in deciding 




In the local domain of a heterogeneous MCIP network, the handoff of MS from a BS 
to another is called intra-domain-handoff. The processes illustrated in the Figure 30 and 
Figure 31, where MS2 migrates from BS3 to BS6, implement the intra-domain-handoff. 
In this case, the MS updates its multi-hop paging cache through a new BS. On the other 
hand, for an active MS, the intra-domain-handoff is implemented by route 
reconfiguration scheme that is illustrated in Section 5.4.5. In this case, the MS updates its 
multi-hop routing cache and redirects its dataflow via the new BS. If a MS moves from a 
local domain to another local domain, the handoff is called inter-domain-handoff. The 
inter-domain-handoff is implemented through regular Mobile IP. In a dual-model MS, the 
service migration between two different radio interfaces, e.g., from a cellular interface to 
IEEE 802.11 interface, is called vertical handoff. The basic procedure of a vertical 
handoff has three steps: 
• 
• 
Improved path detection: A dual-model MS communicates with a BS (BS1) 
with an air interface (address: IP1) and detects a single or multi-hop route to 
another BS (BS2) in a new air interface (address: IP2), which provides higher 
performance such as data rate and power consumption. 
Address & route binding: The MS issues a routing-paging packet to BS2 
including !PI and !P2. If the BS2 accepts the handoff request, BS2 forwards the 
request to the IGW so that the IGW can create a mapping from !PI to !P2. 
Meanwhile, after creating a multi-hop routing cache that is associated with IP2, 
the IGW replies a route-reply packet to the MS through BS2. The multi-hop 
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routing page will be cleared after the expiration of the PIT that is associated 
with IPI. 
• Flow redirection: After the process of address and route binding, all packets 
from the Internet with IP1 will be forwarded to the MS through the new 
interface (lP2) and the new BS (BS2). 
As illustrated in Figure 35, a MS redirects a connection from its cellular interface to 
its IEEE 802.11 interface when the MS obtain a route to an AP. 
5.6 MCIP Performance 
We have performed a simulation-based analysis of the MCIP protocol, in which we 
have measured three commonly used performance metrics: 
• Routing Overhead: The average number of transmitted control packets for 
maintaining the bi-directional Internet accessibility per MS in the network 
during a given period. 
• Packet Delivery Fraction: The percentage of data packets received by the 
destination in comparison with the number of data packets generated by the 
source. 
• Average Packet Delay: This is the average packet delay between a MS and 
the IGW, which includes the wired routing delay and wireless transmission 
delay in a local domain. 
5.6.1 Experimental Configuration 
The experiments were conducted in the NS-2 [73] simulator. In the experimental 
implementation, a link is considered as broken when three continuous transmissions fail 
over the link. The link layer detects the link state and reports the network layer when a 
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link is broken. Figure 37 illustrates the experimental scenanos considered. The 
dimensions of each scenario are as follows: 
• Scenario -1, 1500m x 1500m simulation area with 5 BSs, 
• Scenario -2, 1774m x 1774m simulation area with 7 BSs, 
• Scenario -3, 2000m x 2000m simulation area with 9 BSs. 
As shown in Figure 37 (A), (B) and (C), a router represents the Internet with certain 
delay. Each router connects to HA, eN and IGWIFAIBSl. In all scenarios, the BS1 is not 
only configured to act as an access point, but it also implements the functionalities of the 
IGW and the FA. In each local domain, the BSs are interconnected by wired interfaces 
with a fixed delay. The three different domains (scenarios) represent the different sizes of 
multi-hop networks. Each domain has several BSs (5, 7, and 9) and different number of 
MSs (75, 105, and 133) so that the three cases have the same MS density. The MSs move 
according to the random waypoint mobility model and the maximum speed of a MS is set 
between 1 to 25 mls during the lifetime of simulation runs according to a uniform random 
distribution. The pause time is consistently 10 seconds between each movement. The 
transmission ranges of each MS and BS are set as 250m. Table 6 shows the summary of 
some simulation parameters used in the experimentation. Each data point shown in the 
following figures is averaged over five runs with different seeds and random node 
distributions. Each hop-wise wireless transmission of a packet is counted as one 
transmission in all experiments. In all experiments the simulation runs for 600 seconds. 
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M: mobile hosts 
Scenario-I: 1500m x 1500m 
(A): Experimental Scenario -1: 5 BSs in the 1500m x 1500m domain 
Scenario-2: 1774m x 1774m 
(B): Experimental Scenario -2: 7 BSs in the 1774m x 1774m domain 
Scenario-3: 2000m x 2000m 
(C): Experimental Scenario -3: 9 BSs in the 2000m x 2000m domain 
Figure 37. The Experimental Configurations. 
T bl 6 E a e t I t xpenmen a parame ers 
Parameters Setting 
BS beacon Interval 10.0 s 
BS/MS Search Interval 1.5 s 
Paging Interval Timer (PIT) 30s, 45s, 60s 
Paging timeout (for clearing multi-hop paging cache) 60s, 90s, 120s 
Routing Interval Timer (RIT) 3s 
Raging timeout (for clearing multi-hop routing cache) 6s 
Number of MSs 75,105,133 
Maximum Search Range (Mhou) 4 hops 
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5.6.2 Overhead for Bi-directional Internet Connectivity 
The first goal of this experiment is to measure the overhead for maintaining bi-
directional Internet accessibility under different mobility levels (maximum speed varying 
from Im1s to 25m1s). It can be observed from Figure 38 (a), (b) and (c) that when 
mobility increases the routing overhead per MS increases. For the same paging interval in 
each scenario, the routing overhead per MS increases sharply at lowers mobility. It can 
also be observed that when MSs move faster than 15 mis, the routing overhead saturates. 
This occurs because at higher speeds, the topology changes significantly during the 
paging intervals. Thus, there is no significant different in control packet overhead 
between speeds of 15 mls and 25 mls. 
The next goal of this experiment is to test the effect of paging interval on the routing 
overhead of maintaining the bi-directional accessibility. In the three scenarios (see Figure 
38), the paging cost is highest when the paging interval is 30 seconds while the paging 
cost is lowest when the paging interval is 60 seconds. Mobility is the key factor affecting 
the paging interval. Higher mobility MSs should have a smaller paging interval, while 
lower mobility MSs can have a larger paging interval. The value of the PIT of a MS is 
typically on the MS mobility time scale. 
The third goal of this experiment is to test protocol scalability. Scalability refers to 
the property of maintaining the routing overhead per MS constant, as the size of a MCIP 
network increases. In a local domain, there may be many BSs but the overhead for each 
MS to maintain its route should not increase with the growth of the network. Because the 
proposed MCIP limits each BSIMS search range by setting a TTL value, the MSs outside 
the search range have no impact on the BS/MS search overhead. In the experiment, 
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different sizes of networks (l500m x 1500m < 1774 m x 1774 m < 2000m x 2000m) 
were used and the MSs were randomly distributed over the simulated area. In order to test 
the network scalability, these networks are set with same MS density and BS radio 
coverage rate. Also these networks run with the same MCIP parameters (e.g., Paging 
Interval). It can be observed from Figure 38 CA) (B) (C), the average number of 
transmission per MS in each network is almost the same when the PIT and maximum 
speed are the same. It can be seen that when the maximum speed is 5 m1s and the PIT is 
60s, the average number of transmission is about 60 in each of the three scenarios in spite 
of the different sizes of networks. 
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Routing Overhead over Mobility (5cenarlo-3 965s 133 MSs) 
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(C) Scenario -3 
Figure 38. Overhead for Bi-directional Internet Connectivity. 
5.6.3 Performance of Data Transmission 
In order to observe the performance of data transmission 1Il the MCIP network, 
connection alternatives I, II and IV (see Figure 35) are analyzed in each scenario. Five 
constant bit rate (CBR) traffic flows from a source to a destination node were simulated. 
The CBR data packets size is 512 bytes and the sending rate is 10 packets per second. In 
the five connections, two connections are initiated by the CN and three randomly selected 
MSs start three connections. As shown in Figure 39, the packet delivery fraction in each 
scenario drops when mobility increases. High mobility causes more frequent connection 
breaks and routing paths changes. However, in general, multi-hop connections achieve a 
very high packet delivery rate. It can be observed from Figure 39 that there is not a 
significant difference in packet delivery fraction for the three scenarios of our 
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Figure 39. Packet Delivery Fraction. 
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1 
5 10 15 20 25 
Maximum Speed (mls) 
Figure 40. Packet Delay. 
Recall that the packet delay refers to the average transmission latency of eBR a data 
packet between a MS and the IGW. This includes the wired routing delay between the 
IGW and the BS that the MS is associated with. This also includes the multi-hop wireless 
transmission delay between the associated BS and the MS , which is affected by buffering 
during multi-hop route discovery, queuing at the interface queue, retransmission latency 
at the MAC layer, and propagation delay. Figure 40 shows that the average delay 
increases slightly as the mobility increases. As described in Section 5.4.5, the MS always 
uses the BS having best metrics (the shortest path in the experiments) for communication 
with the Internet. When the MS moves, the route reconfiguration detects a new BS (a BS 
having shortest multi-hop path) for communication. Therefore, the movement of the MS 
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causes no significant increase of the average packet delay. The increase shown in Figure 
40 is primarily caused by the buffering during connection establishment. Higher mobility 
causes more frequent broken link during the period of CBR transmissions, and the MSs 
with higher mobility run the route reconfiguration scheme more frequently. On the other 
hand, as can be seen from Figure 40, the scenario 1 has least delay and scenario 3 has 
highest delay when MSs have the same mobility. It is because the local wired routing 
delay from a BS to IGW in the three scenarios increases when the number of BSs 
increases. The wired routing delay is much lower than the Internet delay because all BSs 
are within a local domain. The increment of the local wired routing delay is not 
substantial in comparison with the Internet delay. 
5.7 MCIP Conclusion 
The wireless communication in the near future will take advantage of dual-mode MSs, 
heterogeneous network accessibility, and multi-hop communications. Heterogeneous 
MCIP represents a new approach to support micro-mobility in wireless network. This 
chapter defines the general framework for Multi-hop Cellular IP and identifies some key 
implementation issues. Also, the chapter presents some important experimental results 
that show the applicability of MCIP to integrate multi-hop and single hop networks in 
local domains. The design of heterogeneous MCIP could be further improved and some 
of the open issues include: how to reduce control packet overhead and efficiently detect 
available BS during data transmission; and how to efficiently support various connection 




PROTOCOL FOR MULTI-HOP CELLULAR IP 
A Multi-hop Cellular IP (MCIP) network differentiates global and local domains in 
terms of macro/micro-mobility in heterogeneous multi-hop communication. However, a 
MCIP network is vulnerable to various attacks and compromises during macro/micro-
mobility process in an adversarial environment. Existing MCIP protocol does not provide 
macro/micro-mobility security protection for mobile stations. In this chapter, we 
introduce and evaluate a secure macro/micro-mobility protocol (SM3p). In the proposed 
SM3p, mobile IP security has been extended for supporting macro-mobility across local 
domains through the process of multi-hop registration and authentication. In a MCIP 
local domain, a certificate-based authentication achieves the effective routing and micro-
mobility protection from a range of potential security threats. Our evaluation and 
simulation demonstrates the effectiveness of the SM3P. 
The proposed secure macro/micro-mobility protocol (SM3p) provides MCIP network 
protection from various network attacks that could occur due to macro and micro 
mobility in heterogeneous multi-hop communication. When a MS visits a MCIP network, 
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it needs to execute the secure global registration and authentication only once. In the 
MCIP local domain, the certificate-based authentication protects the multi-hop route 
discovery and micro-mobility of a MS from one BS to another. In the SM3p, we assume 
that a MS and the visiting MCIP network don't have any prior security association. The 
key contributions of the SM3p are: 
• Secure single-hop and multi-hop registration and authentication in support of 
macro-mobility; 
• Secure multi-hop paging/routing cache update for maintaining micro-mobility; 
• Secure multi-hop route discovery for micro-mobility. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: the background of macro/micro-
mobility for MCIP networks is discussed in Section 6.1. Then the security threat model 
for MCIP is presented in Section 6.2. After defining the security assumptions and key 
issues in Section 6.3, Section 6.4 describes the details of the SM3p for securing 
macro/micro-mobility. The security achievements are discussed in Section 6.5. The 
implementation and simulation results are also presented in Section 6.5. Some of the 
related work is discussed in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 concludes the chapter. 
6.1 Security Thread of MCIP 
Security support is a key issue in deploying MCIP network for any application. In this 
section, the macro/micro-mobility security threats for MCIP network are discussed. The 
MCIP macro-mobility between local domains could be exposed to three types of attacks 
including: forged BS, unauthorized network access, registration attacks. The micro-
mobility within a local domain could also suffer from various attacks including multi-hop 
paging/routing poisoning and multi-hop routing attacks. 
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6.1.1 Macro-mobility Attacks 
• Forged BS 
In a MeIP network, an attacker can attack the multi-hop wireless network by 
advertising itself as a genuine BS using some forged messages or duplicate beacons 
recorded from a correct BS or obtained by eavesdropping. When the MS hears the 
fraudulent beacons from the forged BS, the MS assumes that it is within the radio 
coverage of a genuine BS and then initiates a registration procedure. A registration 
request is issued from the MS to the forged BS. Furthermore, the forged BS replies the 
MS with a bogus registration reply carrying the acceptance of the registration request. 
After receiving the registration result, the MS further assumes that it has obtained the 
Internet connection through the forged BS and disconnects its communication from the 
genuine BS. One by one, the forged BS could entice a number of MSs to disconnect with 
the genuine BSs and establish connections with the forged MS either by single hop or 
multi-hop route. However, the MSs cannot obtain any Internet service correctly from the 
forged BS. For instance, in Figure 41, malicious MS3 (i.e., forged BS) advertises a high-
speed connectivity to the Internet by sending bogus beacons to its neighbor. After hearing 
the beacons from the forged BS (i.e., MS3) but without realizing the fraud, MS2 and 
MS5 register with MS3 by a single hop. After registrations, MS2 and MS5 believe they 
have connected with a BS with a higher speed, and thus disconnect the connection with 
the genuine BS (i.e., BS1). An attacker using forged BS achieves the following: 
• The forged BS captures registration information of MSs such as their home IP 
addresses, home network IP addresses. It can also break a proper Internet 
connection and can cause unwarranted registration delay. 
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• The forged BS can act as the gateway to the Internet and can seize the data packet 
or capture sensitive personal or network data of MSs. 
The connection between MS2 and the 4f"HA 
,Q FA may be corrupted by attacker MS3,·&·:···.,·.,·., ...... . 
MS"\ 821. . // ~;i.: D~., ......... ~~ .... ~ ~ :Q M~f: ..... :::::·::~.···/ BSI FAlIG~""""................ .. /.,, ... CN 
MS5 MS3 Internet 
MS3 is a malicious MS that may act as a forged BS or 
malicious intermediary node. 
Figure 41. Macro/Micro-mobility Attacks in a MCIP Network. 
• Unauthorized Network Access 
A malicious MS may access the MCIP network and enjoy free network usage by way 
of single hop or multi-hop communication. After entering the Internet, the attacker may 
use some techniques like Medium Access Control address spoofing to gain access to the 
network infrastructure. For instance in Figure 42 attacker MS 1 connects to the Internet 
and sends a malicious ARP (address resolution protocol) reply to the Router associating 
MSl's Medium Access Control address with MS2's IP address. At this moment, the 
Router thinks the MS 1 is MS2. Next, MS 1 sends a malicious ARP reply to MS2 
associating MS l' s Medium Access Control address with the Router's address. In this 
case, the MS2 believes MSI is the Router. Finally, MSI can access the session between 
MS2 and MS3. In this case, all data packets from MS2 will be redirected to MSI and 
MS 1 forwards the received data packet from MS2 to Router again. In the end, Router 
forwards the packets to MS3. In the opposite direction, all packets from MS3 will be 
forwarded to MSI and MSI sends the packets to MS2. MSI implements the man-in-the-
middle attack. In this manner, MS 1 intercepts the traffic between MS3 and MS2. 
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Figure 42. Unauthorized Network Access and Man-in-the-middle Attack. 
• Registration Attacks 
The registration procedure imposes several senous security threats. Three typical 
types of registration attacks include registration poisoning, bogus registration, and 
registration replay. 
• Registration Poisoning 
A malicious MS in the MeIP network can poison the registration procedure. For 
example, in a MeIP network, a multi-hop MS registers with the MeIP network through a 
multi-hop route with the help of some intermediate MSs. A malicious MS can entice a 
multi-hop MS to choose it as an intermediate MS by claiming a short or fast route to a BS. 
When a malicious MS is selected as the intermediate MS for a registration MS, the 
malicious MS can modify or drop the MS's registration request/reply before forwarding 
to the next hop. When the malicious MS modifies or rejects the registration request, the 
MS cannot correctly register with the foreign network. If the malicious MS modifies the 
registration result in a registration reply, the MS cannot access the Internet. For instance, 
in Figure 41, when MS5 moves to the MeIP network, it initiates a registration by sending 
out a registration request to MS3. When MS3 receives the registration request from MS5, 
MS3 modifies the address of MS5' s home network in the registration request before 
forwarding the request to BS. Based on the modified request, the FA will forward the 
request to a wrong HA so that the MS cannot obtain a successful registration reply from 
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the correct HA. Registration poisoning prevents multi-hop MSs from obtaining services 
from the wired network. 
• Bogus Registration 
It occurs when a malicious MS does a fake registration by masquerading itself as 
someone else using a spoofed or invented IP address. The bogus registration causes a 
wrong mobility binding at its HA so that all packets are tunneled to a illegitimate MS 
instead of the correct MS. By a bogus registration, the attacker obtains the right to access 
the Internet so that it can implement further attack on the MeIP network or the Internet. 
For instance, in Figure 41, MS3 does a forged registration by masquerading itself as MS5, 
and then all the packets coming from Internet for MS5 are forwarded to MS3. In this case, 
MS5 cannot receive any packet from the Internet. 
• Registration Replay 
In replay attack, an attacker records a legitimate registration packet and replays the 
packet for the purpose of creating a false registration. In Figure 41, MS3 may repeatedly 
forward a copy of registration request originated from MS5 and cause BSIFA and MS5's 
home network to initiate the process of registration many times. Without protection, the 
attacker could perform valid but unwanted operations afterwards by sending old 
messages. 
6.1.2 Micro-mobility Attacks 
• Multi-hop Routing Attacks 
Multi-hop route discovery is responsible for detecting the multi-hop routes between 
MSs and BSs in the local domain. An attacker may exhibit its actions in the form of 
refusing to participate fully and correctly in multi-hop route discovery according to the 
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principles of integrity, authentication, non-duplication, confidentiality, and cooperation. 
Therefore, multi-hop routing attacks can be grouped into five categories: anti-integrity, 
impersonation, duplication, and anti-confidentiality. 
• 
• Anti-integrity is the action of breaking the integrity of a message. Modification is a 
typical example of anti-integrity. The malicious MSs modify, inject or delete some 
fields of a routing packet, and then forward the packet with falsified values in the 
packet fields. These fields may include the source or destination address, hop count, 
sequence number, etc. 
• Impersonations are those actions in which a malicious station spoofs an existing or 
forged IF address, or uses broadcast address to generate or duplicate one or more 
messages, and then forwards them to other MSs. In Figure 41, MS3 may 
masquerade itself by spoofing an invented address or an IP address of a MS. With 
the spoofed address, MS3 could entice MSS to use MS3 as the shortest route for 
reaching BSI. And then MS3 can compromise MSS's communication. 
• In a duplication attack, a malicious MS sends a legitimate message more than once. 
These duplicated messages cause multiple receptions and processing overhead on 
adjacent MSs. 
• In an anti-confidentiality attack, an attacker may reveal sensitive information, such 
as private key. Stealing, eavesdropping, guessing, brute-force and cryptanalysis are 
some ways for an attacker to identify sensitive information. 
Multi-hop Paging/Routing Cache Poisoning 
The BS in a MCIP network suffers from multi-hop paging/routing cache poisoning 
due to multi-hop communication. To support the micro-mobility and multi-hop 
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communication, the routing cache is needed at each BS to record the multi-hop routes 
between the BS and each attached multi-hop MS. When a MS moves from one BS to 
another, the multi-hop paging/routing cache of the MS should be updated as illustrated in 
Chapter 5. The multi-hop paging/routing cache of a MS may be poisoned in several ways. 
For instance, when a multi-hop MS sends a multi-hop page/route-update packet for 
creating or updating its multi-hop paging cache, the malicious MS may modify the packet 
that could result in multi-hop paging/routing cache poisoning. Also, a malicious MS may 
send a wrong page/route-update packet on behalf of a genuine one. And the IGW and BS 
update the routing information for the genuine MS with the wrong information sent by 
the malicious MS. To locate a multi-hop MS, the BS finds the first hop MS in multi-hop 
paging/routing cache that can reach the destination MS. The data packet from the BS will 
forwarded, hop-by-hop, to the destination in accordance with the multi-hop route. When 
a multi-hop route is poisoned, the BS cannot locate the destination MS by following the 
multi-hop route provided in the BS cache. For instance in Figure 41, MS3 sends a multi-
hop page/route-update packet to IGW on behalf of MS5, and IGW updates the multi-hop 
paging/routing cache from MS5-MS2-BSI-IGW to MS5-BSI-IGW. In this case, the 
packets of MS5 from the Internet will be lost due to the incorrect routing information 
until MS5 updates its multi-hop paging/routing cache next time. 
6.2 Assumptions and Key Definitions 
In a MCIP network, the infrastructure servers (i.e., HA, FA) act as the authentication 
and key management center for the multi-hop wireless communication, which is 
fundamental to MCIP mobility security. For a MS, its HA is supposed to be the most 
trusted server [39] [40] [41]. Its HA has the capability to manage the MS's billing and 
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credentials when the MS has any malicious action [74][75]. Due to mobility, we assume 
that there is no a priori security association (SA) between the MS and the visiting FA. 
Otherwise, it will impose heavy burden on the key management if each MS shares a 
permanent key with each FA [41]. Table 7 depicts the notations used for describing SM3P. 
In the global domain, the SM3p takes advantage of existing security associations (SAs) 
and key management solutions: 
• A MS and its HA share a secret key: (SMS-HA) [39] [41] . This key establishes SA 
between the MS and its HA. 
• The HA and the FA have their public-private keys (KHA/KIHA, KFA/K-IFA). These 
keys establish SA between the HA and the FA [74][75]. 
In the local MeIP domain, the SM3p defines the following MeIP domain keys. 
• PubliclPrivate Key. Each BS or router in a MeIP local domain (e.g., BS1, BS2 in 
Figure 43) has a pair of public and private keys. For instance, the BS1 in Figure 
43 has its public and private keys, i.e., KBSI/KIBSI. The private key is kept secret 
by each BS or router, and the public key is wrapped up with its identification by 
FA with a certificate (i.e., CertBs1-FA = «BSl id, FAid, KBS1, Tissue, Texpire» Kl FA). 
Tissue is the issuing time, and Texpire is the expiration time. 
• Neighboring Shared Secret Keys: Each fixed component in a MeIP network, 
including BS, router and FA, shares a secret key with its neighboring fixed 
components. For example, in Figure 1, BS2 connects with BS1 and FA by wired 
cable and shares the secret keys SBSI-BS2 and SBS2-FA with the two neighbors 
respectively. The symmetric neighboring keys are used to calculate the message 
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authentication code (MAC l ) during the exchange of control packets within the 
local wired domain. 
T bl 7 N t a e o atlOns use d f d or escn mg 
M,N Concatenation of two messages M and N in the order specified 
Rx, Rx' A registering step with an issued message Rx. Rx' is the variant of Rx 
A->B A message is forwarded from A to B 
MSHM MS home IP address 
HA'd, FA'd, IGW'd, HA, FA and Gateway IP address 
«M»K Digital signature of the message M by using the private key K 
<M>K MAC value of the message M by using the secret key K 
{M}K Encrypt M by using the key K 
Certx, Certx.y Certificate of X, Certificate of X issued by Y 
SMS.HA Shared secret key between MS and HA 
KxK1x Public and private key of X 
N, Nonce issued by X, e.g. HA, MS, FA 
t Timestamp 
6.3 Secured MacrolMicro-mobility Protocol Design 
The SM3p has been designed to address macro/micro-mobility security including 
mobile IP authentication for multi-hop MS, paging/routing integrity, and multi-hop route 
discovery at MCIP networks. The security protocol requires that each MS provides 
authentication information upon entering the local domain of a MCIP network. If a MS 
does not have the security binding with the local domain, the MS must register with its 
HA and the visiting FA to get its identity verified before using the MCIP network. At the 
same time, during its registration, each MS also authenticates the MCIP network (i.e., 
FA). After the mutual authentication, each MS obtains a certificate from the FA. Each 
MS discards the multi-hop control packets from a MS without a valid certificate. The FA 
can filter data packets and discard those that don't belong to a registered MS. 
1 In this chapter, MAC refers message authentication code 
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Is 
I: Single hop registration and authentication by SMSI-HA 
and FA Issues a certIfIcate to MS I after regIstratIOn • 
2: Multi-ho re istration and authentication b SA (SMS-HA) and 
FA issues a certificate to the multi-hop MS after registration 
I BS3 (B53 is connected to a B5 or FA in the same local domain) 
Figure 43. Security Associations (SAs) in a MCIP Network 
When MCIP control packets (mobile IP or MCIP packets) is transmitted between two 
components in the local MCIP domain, the MCIP domain keys protects the integrity of 
the packet as shown in Figure 43. There are two types of registration and authentication: 
single hop and multi-hop, as shown in Figure 43. During registration, the single or multi-
hop MS, FA, and HA authenticate one another. With a secured registration and 
authentication, a MS can establish a pair of temporary public and private keys (KMS/K'MS) 
during the period of its visit to the MCIP domain. The computation of public and private 
keys is performed by the HA when a MS registers with the HA through the FA. The 
computed public key of the MS is forwarded to the FA and the MS with a signature of the 
HA (R6 in Section 6.3.1 or 6.3.2). And the private key of the MS is encrypted and 
delivered to the MS secretly (in Section 6.3.1 or 6.3.2). 
When a single or multi-hop MS receives a successful registration reply from the FA, 
the MS obtains an authenticated public key of FA (KFA). The public key of the 
successfully registered MS is enveloped into the MS's certificate (CertMs-FA = «MSHM, 
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FAid, KMS, Tissue, Texpire» KI FA) (R7 in6.3.1 or 6.3.2). The certificate may read: "it is 
certified that the public key (KMS) of the MS (MSHM) is issued by FA (FA.id) starting from 
the issue time (Tissue) until the expiration time (Texpire). Each certificate has the signature 
of FA. Since each registered MS has an authenticated public key of FA, they can validate 
the certificate using the public key of FA (KFA). Before the expiration of a certificate, MS 
requests to update its certificate if the MS is still in the MCIP local domain. The 
certificate can be used as the security token for micro-mobility security. For instance, if a 
registered MS (e.g., MS2, which is a neighboring MS of MS1 in Figure 41) receives a 
control packet from the neighboring MS 1 such as: < <page-update packet> > KI MS1, 
CertMsI-FA, MS2 first validates the legality of the certificate of MS1 (CertMsI-FA = 
< <MS1 HlI1, FAid, KMS1, Tissue, Texpire» Kl FA) by verifying the signature of FA with the 
public key of FA (KFA ) and checking the issuing and expiration times of the certificate. If 
the certificate is validated, the MS reads the public key of MS 1 (KMS1 ) from the certificate, 
and uses it to verify the authenticity of control packet. In the next cycle, if MS2 receives 
another control packet from MS 1 with the same certificate, the MS2 can verify the packet 
directly using the public key of MS 1 without validating the certificate again. 
During the MS's registration, the FA creates the multi-hop paging/routing cache to 
record the single or multi-hop route between the MS and the lOW. Thereafter, when the 
MS changes its Internet attachment in the MCIP local domain (e.g., MS3 moves from 
BS1 to BS2), the migration is implemented by micro-mobility. The micro-mobility 
maintains the multi-hop paging/routing cache so that the MS and the network can reach 
each other when required. In the proposed SM3p, the certificates of MSs protect the 
integrity of paging/routing-update packets and prevent unauthorized multi-hop 
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paging/routing cache poisoning. Figure 43 illustrates the need for following security 
modules to be implemented for SM3p protocol: 
• Secure single-hop registration and authentication in support of macro-mobility; 
• Secure multi-hop registration and authentication in support of macro-mobility; 
• Secure micro-mobility in local domain 
o Secure searching of BS by a MS and secure route creation 
o Secure multi-hop paging/routing cache update for micro-mobility 
6.3.1 Secure Single-hop Registration 
Rl D +t- R3 R4 R5 ~ .. ~L!§]~~ 
R9 R8 R7 R6 
Figure 44. Registration for a Single-hop MS. 
The process of the single-hop registration implements the macro-mobility for single 
hop MSs. The registration for a single-hop MS, which is under the radio coverage of a BS, 
creates a secured macro-mobility binding at the MS's HA. At the same time, during the 
process of secured registration, the FA issues a certificate for the single hop MS that is 
valid in the MCIP local domain. A BS in the MCIP local domain advertises its presence 
periodically to MSs with beacons. The FA on behalf of each BS creates the beacons and 
each beacon has a certificate of the FA. If a single-hop MS has not yet registered with the 
MCIP network, it follows the steps of registration and authentication outlined in 
Figure 44. For instance, MS 1 in Figure 44 uses this procedure for registration. 
Beacon: 
(Rl) BS->MSs: «M]» K]FA, CertFA 
Where M] is beacon, FA id , IGWid, BSid, Seq; 
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Where FAid is the FA address; IGW id is the CoA address; BS id is the BS address; Seq is the sequence number 
Registration for a single-hop MS: 
(R2) MS -> BS1: < M3> SMS-HA; 
Where MFRegistration Request, FA id, IGWid, HA id, MSHM, NMS, NHA, R1 
(R3) BS1 -> BS2: < R2, BS1,,/>SBSJ-BS2 
BS2 validates R3 using SBSJ-BS2 
(R4) BS2 -> FA: < R2, BS1id,BS2id>SBS2-FA 
FA validates R4 using SBS2-FA 
FA records the route for the MS 
(R5) FA->HA: R2, NFA 
HA (upon receipt of R5): 
Validates R2 using SMS-HA 
Checks whether FAid in MJ= FAid in M3 
Validates CertFA based on existing PKI at HA 
Validates «MJ» Ki FA using the authenticated KFA 
Computes a pair of public and private keys (KMS' Ki MS) 
Continues with the steps in [33] (34](Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., updating the mobility binding 
(R6) HA->FA: M4, «M4» K i HA, CertHA; 
Where M4 = M5, M6, NFA; 
Where M5 = Reply, Result, FAid, HAid, BSid, MSHM, KFA, KMSN'HA, NMS 
Where M6 = < M5, {KJ MS} SMS-HA > SMS-HA 
FA (upon receipt of R6): 
Validates NFA 
Validates CertHA based on existing PKI at FA 
Validates « M4» K J HA using the authenticated KHA 
Creates multi-hop paging I routing cache at IGW for the MS 
Issues a certificate for the MS: CertMs_FA = «MSHM, FAid, KMS, Tissue> Te:qJire» K J FA, 
Logs this message as the history trace of the MS, 
Continues with the steps in [33] [34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., creating mobility binding 
(R7) FA->BS2: <M6' CertMs_FA> SBS2-FA 
BS2: 
Validates R7 by using SBS2-FA 
Creates multi-hop paging I routing cache for the MS 
(R8) BS2->BS1: <M(i, CertMs_FA> SBSJ-BS2 
BS1: 
Validates R8 by using SBSJ-BS2 
Creates multi-hop paging I routing cache for the MS 
(R9) BS1->MS: M6, CertMs_FA 
MS (upon receipt of R9): 
Validates < M6> SMS-HA using SMS-HA 
Obtains KFAfrom M5 
Validates CertMs_FA using KFA 
Obtains private key (KJ MS) by decrypting {KJ MS} SMS-HA using SMS-HA 
Continues with the steps in [33] [34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., recording the registration result 
On receiving a beacon from a BS, the MS 1 compares the FA address, the CoA 
address, the BS address, and the sequence number with those of previously received 
beacons. The sequence number is incremented every time a new beacon is issued by the 
BS. The MS discards the duplicate beacons. If it is a fresh beacon, the MS records the 
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beacon. An unregistered MS cannot validate the authenticity of the beacon. This task is 
left to registration and authentication process for unregistered MSs. First the MS creates a 
registration request (R2) and then sends it to a BS (e.g., BS1 in Figure 45) directly. The 
MAC, which is created by using the secret key (SMS-HA), maintains the integrity of the 
registration request. Then the registration request (R2) is forwarded to the FA hop by hop 
with the relays of BSs (R3 and R4). Each intermediate BS appends its address so that the 
FA can construct the reverse route between the IGW and the MS. The FA then forwards 
the registration request to the MS's HA after appending the FA's nonce (R5). While 
receiving the registration request, the HA checks the integrity of the registration request 
by using SMS-HA. Then FA is verified for preventing any camouflaged FA. After the series 
of verifications, the HA computes a pair of public and private keys (KMS, Kl MS) for 
securing micro-mobility of the MS in the MCIP local domain. The private key is sent to 
the MS secretly with encryption (R6). 
Upon receiving the registration reply from the HA, the FA validates the HA using the 
HA's public key. After the authentication of the HA and the registration reply (R6) from 
HA, the FA records the MS's public key. The FA now creates a multi-hop paging cache 
for the MS. The FA returns a registration reply (R7) back to the MS. When the MS 
receives the registration reply from the FA via the reversed route, the MS validates the 
registration reply message using SMS-HA. The MS is then sure that the HA is valid and the 
public key of FA (KFA) is authenticated because of the authentication of the registration 
reply message. In the end, the MS obtains the registration result, its private key computed 
by its HA and certificate issued by FA. Once the MS receives a successful reply from its 
HA, it is guaranteed that FA and keys are valid. The beacon is verified at its HA. 
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6.3.2 Secure Multi-hop Registration 
The process of a multi-hop registration implements the macro-mobility for a multi-
hop hop MS. A multi-hop MS, which is outside the transmission range of all BS in the 
MCIP local domain, obtains beacons with the help of other registered MSs. The beacon 
forwarded by a registered MS carries the original beacon issued by a BS and, the home 
address of the registered MS as well as its signature. For instance, MS obtains beacon 
from MS1 in Figure 45, in which MS1 sends MS with (R1'), which is« R1, MS1» K 
I MS1 , CertMsl-FA. However, as for an unregistered MS, it cannot verify the FA and its 
neighbors because the MS does not have the authenticated public key of the FA and the 
authenticated public key of the neighboring MS. The task is left to the process of the 
secure multi-hop registration of the MS. The multi-hop registration can be used to create 
a secured macro-mobility binding at the HA for the multi-hop MS. The steps of securing 
multi-hop registration are illustrated in Figure 45. 
Figure 45. Registration for a Multi-hop MS. 
Beacon Relaying: 
(RI) BS->MSs: «MJ» KIFA' CertFA; 
Where MJ is beacon, FAid, IGWid, BSid, Seq; 
Where FAid is the FA address; IGWid is the CoA address; BSid is the BS address; Seq is the sequence number 
(RI') MSI->MS: «M2» K-JMSl> CertMsJ-FA; 
Where M2is RI, MSI 
Registration for a Multi-hop MS: 
(R2) MS -> MS1: < M3> SMS-HA, RJ' 
Where M3=Registration Request, FA id, IGWid, HAid, MSHM, NMS, NHA, R1 
(R2') MS1 -> BS1: «R2, MS1 HM » K1MSbCertMS/_FA 
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BS1 (upon receipt of R2 '): 
Validates R2' using KMSJ in CertMSJ_FA 
Validates R1' using KMSJ in CertMSJ_FA 
(R3') BS1 -> BS2: <R2, MS1 HM, BS1 id>SBSJ-BS2 
BS2 validates R3' using SBSJ-BS2 
(R4') BS2 -> FA: < R2, MS1 HM, BS1id, BS2il,>SBS2-FA 
FA validates R4' using SBS2-FA 
FA records the multi-hop route for the MS 
(R5) FA->HA: R2, NFA 
HA (upon receipt of R5): 
Validates R2 using SMS-HA 
Checks whether FAid in MJ = FAid in M3 
Validates CertFA based on existing PKI at HA 
Validates «Mj» K J FA using authenticated KFA 
Computes a pair of public and private keys (KMS, K J MS) 
Continues with the steps in [33] [34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., updating the mobility binding 
(R6) HA->FA: M4, «M4» K J HA, CertHA; 
Where M4 = Ms, M6, NFA; 
Where Ms = Reply, Result, FAilb HAid, BSilb MSHM, KFA, KMSN'HA, NMS 
Where M6= < Ms, {KJMSJ SMS-HA > SMS-HA 
FA (upon receipt of R6): 
Validates NFA 
Validates CertHA based on existing PKI at FA 
Validates « M4» K J HA using authenticated KHA 
Creates multi-hop paging / routing cache at the IGW for the MS 
Issues a certificate for the MS: CertMs_FA = «MSHM, FA id, KMS, Tissue, Texpire» K' FA 
Logs this message as the history trace of the MS 
Continues with the steps in [33] [34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., creating the mobility binding 
(R7) FA->BS2: <M6' CertMs-FA> SBS2-FA 
BS2: 
Validates R7 by using SBS2-FA 
Creates multi-hop paging / routing cache at BS2 for the MS 
(RS) BS2->BS1: < M6, CertMs_FA > SBSJ-BS2 
BS1: 
Validates RS by using SBSj-BS2 
Creates multi-hop paging / routing cache at BS1 for the MS 
(R10) BS1->MS1: «M6' CertMs-FA» K J BSb CertBSJ 
Validates RlO by using KBSJ 
(R9) MS1->MS: M6, CertMs_FA 
MS (upon receipt of R9): 
Validates < M6> SMS-HA using SMS-HA 
Obtains KFAfrom Ms 
Validates CertMs_FA using KFA 
Obtains private key (KJ MS) by decrypting {KJ MSJ SMS-HA using SMS-HA 
Continues with the steps in [33] [34] (Perkins, Mobile IP support), i.e., recording the registration result 
As seen from Figure 45, the basic operations in multi-hop registration are similar to 
single-hop registration. The FA and HA has the same steps either in single hop or multi-
hop registration (R5 and R6). Also, upon receiving the registration reply (R9), the multi-
hop MS has the same operations as single hop registration such as verifying the 
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registration reply and obtaining its private key. However, the multi-hop registration has 
three differences compared to single hop registration: 
1. The registration request of the multi-hop MS is forwarded to a BS (BS 1 as shown in 
Figure 45) by multi-hop. Each intermediate MS has a signature and its next hop MS 
validates the signature before signing and forwarding until the request is received 
by a BS (R2-R2'), 
11. Before forwarding the registration request to FA (R3'), the BS validates the 
intermediate MSs and the beacon. If there is any error during the process of 
verifying the beacon or intermediate relaying MS, the BS denies the registration 
request, and 
Ill. The registration reply message is returned back to the multi-hop MS by the secured 
multi-hop forwarding (RlO) with signature and verification. 
Each MS only registers with MeIP network once either by single hop or multi-hop. 
After registration, the migration from one BS to another and the change of multi-hop 
route are implemented by the process of micro-mobility as explained in the next section. 
6.3.3 Secure Micro-mobility 
As a MS moves in local domain, it may experience low data rate at current 
connection or lose the connectivity to the current BS. In such cases, the MS initiates a 
route discovery to find a BS with better connectivity by issuing a search-request packet 
with its signature and the attachment of its certificate. The search-request packet is sent 
out on an available radio interface (e.g., cellular or IEEE 802.11). The certificate of the 
MS acts as the security token during the forwarding of the route discovery packet. Upon 
the reception of a routing packet, the intermediate MS verifies the MS from which the 
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searching-request packet is received, and then forwards the route discovery packet again 
after appending its address, its signature, and its certificate. When a BS receives the 
searching-request packet, it verifies the intermediate MSs. Then it sends a search-reply 
packet with its signature. The search-reply packet will be forwarded to the source MS 
with the reversed route without modification. The MS initiated searching process for 
locating a BS is depicted in Figure 46. Before moving, the MS has its multi-hop routing 
cache (Path: MS-MS3-MS2-BS3-BS4-IGW) through BS3 with its cellular radio interface 
(address: IPe). When MS moves to the new location, MS detects a new BS (R11-R14) 
with its IEEE 802.11 radio interface (address: IPw). In R11, MSHM is the address IPe. In 
the end, BS1 replies with a route of (MS-MS1-BS1). When MS receives the search-reply 
packet (R14) from BS1, the MS initiates the process of micro-mobility from BS3 to BS1 
as illustrated in the next subsection. 
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Figure 46. Secure MS Searching Process for Locating BS. 
Secure MS Searching Process: 
(Rll) MS broadcasts: «M7» KI MS, CertMs 
Where M7= searching-request packet, FA;d' lGW;d, MSHM, IPw, t, NMS 
MSl validates Rll using KMS 
(R12) MSl broadcasts: «Rll, MS1 HM>> K IMSh CertMsl 
BSl validates R12 using KMSI 
(RI3) BS1->MS1:« Ms» K IBSh CertBsl 
Where Ms= searching-reply packet, FA;d, IGW;d' MSHM, IPw, MSl HM, BShl, t, NMS 
MSl validates RJ3 using KBSI 
(RI4) MS1->MS:« RJ3» KIMSJ, CertMsl 
In a MCIP local domain, a MS implements the micro-mobility by updating its multi-
hop paging/routing cache, from which a MS can change its network attachment from one 
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BS to another in a heterogeneous multi-hop environment. Figure 47 shows the steps to 
update a multi-hop route, which prevents unauthorized multi-hop cache update. The 
private key of the source MS protects the integrity of the page/route-update packet. In 
Figure 47, while communicating with its cellular interface (address: IPc), MS moves to a 
new location and detects a new BS with its IEEE 802.11 interface (address: IPw). Due to 
higher performance of IEEE 802.11, the MS initiates a micro-mobility switch from BS3 
to BS 1 with a vertical handoff from its cellular radio interface with IPe to its IEEE 
802.11 radio interface with IPw. The MS updates its multi-hop paging/routing cache 
through BSl, which is a WLAN AP. 
• The MS issues a page/route-update packet (e.g., R15 as shown in Figure 47) 
with the destination of the lOW carrying its migrating multi-hop route (lPw, 
MSI HM , BSl id). 
• The paging/routing update packet is forwarded to the FA via BS 1 hop by hop. 
Each intermediate MS and BS validates the authenticity of the packet. 
• The FA authenticates the MS by using the MS's certificates. After 
authentication, the FA finally updates paging/routing cache and replies with a 
paging/route-reply packet (R16) to the source MS. The FA creates a mapping 
between the two IP addresses (lPe and IPw) so that data packets from the 
Internet with IPe can be redirected to IPw [76]. 
• After updating the multi-hop paging/routing cache, the data packets of the MS 
will be delivered according to the multi-hop route in the updated multi-hop 
paging/routing cache. 
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Figure 47. Securing Micro-mobility. 
Secure Multi-hop Paging/Routing Update: 
(RI5) MS->FA: «M9» K 1MS' CertMs 
Where M9 = page/route-update packet, FAid, IGWid, MSHM, IPw, MSI HM, BSh(, N MS. NFA 
FA validates « M9 » KI MS using KMS 
FA updates the multi-hop paging/routing cache for the MS and creates a mapping from MSHM (IPe) 10 IPw 
(RI6) FA->MS:« Mj(»> KIFA 
Where MJO = paging/route-reply packet, FAid, IGWid, MSHM, IPw, NMS. N'FA 
6.4 Security Analysis 
This section evaluates the security achievements and performance of the proposed 
SM3P. The computation overhead of the proposed protocol depends on many factors, for 
instance, the algorithms of key creation, signing and verifying as well as the key length 
and security level. Currently, there are a number of asymmetric key cryptosystems in the 
literature, e.g., RSA, EIGamal and Elliptic Curve DSA [77]. An implementation of the 
key creation, signature and verification based on the elliptic curve cryptography is 
implemented for evaluating the performance of the proposed approach. 
The proposed SM3p achieves the goals of preventing the attacks in macro/micro-mobility 
of: 
1. Forged BS 
2. Unauthorized network access 
3. Registration attacks (registration poisoning, bogus registration, and registration 
reply attack) 
4. Multi-hop paging/routing cache poisoning 
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5. Multi-hop routing attacks (anti-integrity, impersonations, and anti-confidentiality) 
This section describes the above security achievements in detail. 
Forged BS: After a forged BS broadcasts a fraudulent beacon (a forged Rl = «MJ» 
K J FA CertFA) to declare itself as a genuine BS, the beacon could be received by either a 
registered MS or an unregistered MS. The registered MS can identify that the beacon is 
incorrect by validating the signature of the beacon since the genuine BS has an 
authenticated public key of FA (KJ FA), which is obtained during its registration and 
authentication (Validates < M6 > SMS-HA using SMS-HA, Obtains KFAfrom Ms in Section 
6.3.1 or 6.3.2). 
An unregistered MS cannot verify the forged beacon. However, if the MS uses the 
forged beacon to register with the forged BS, the forged BS cannot provide a correct 
registration reply (R6 or R7) due to lack of SMS.HA. Therefore, the unregistered MS knows 
that the registration reply from the forged BS is incorrect at the step: Validates < M6 > 
SMS-HA using SMS.HA in Section 6.3.1 or 6.3.2. If the forged BS forwards the registration to 
a correct FA, the correct FA will reject the beacon because the forged BS does not have a 
legal public key. If the forged BS forwards the registration to the MS'HA, the HA 
verifies the beacon in the step: "Validates CertHA based on existing PKI at FA" in 
Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 and will discard it. If the forged BS replays an outdated beacon, 
it can be checked out by the registered MS, BS, or FA due to the non-duplication 
protection at each beacon (timestamp). When a malicious intermediate MS creates a 
fraudulent beacon (Rl': M2=« forged-Rl, forged-MS» K1MS, forged-CertMs-FA), the 
registered MS will reject the beacon using the authenticated public key of FA. As for an 
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unregistered MS, the fraudulent beacon will be identified in the step: BSl verifies the 
CertMs-FA by KFA in Section 6.3.2. 
Unauthorized network access: An unregistered MS cannot access the Internet and 
MCIP network due to lack of proper certificate (CertMsl-FA =«MS1HM, FAd, KMS1, Tissue, 
Texpire» Kl FA) that is issued by FA (R7 in Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2). Registered MSs will 
discard all packets issued or forwarded by the unregistered MS. 
Registration attacks (registration poisoning, bogus registration, and registration 
replay): 
(A) Registration poisoning: The secret key (SMS-HA) between a MS and its HA maintains 
the integrity of registration against poisoning during the forwarding of registration 
packets (registration request or registration reply). The MAC value at R2 (M3) and R6 
(M6) prevents any modification. 
(B) Bogus registration: When a malicious MS does a fake registration by masquerading 
itself as someone else with an invented or spoofed address, the malicious MS issues a 
forged registration request (forged R2). The forged registration will be identified by the 
HA at the step: Validates R2 using SMS-HA in Section 6.3.1 or 6.3.2. This is because the 
malicious MS has no knowledge of secret key (SMS-HA) which is associated with the 
invented or spoofed address. 
(e) Registration replay: Nonce (e.g., NMS, NHA, and NFA ) is used in all registration and 
control packets to ensure that these packets contain a unique identification to prevent 
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replay attack. Each registration or control packet issued by an originator has a nonce, and 
a new nonce in the reply packet indicates the next nonce for the next request. 
Multi-hop paging/routing cache poisoning: The multi-hop paging/routing cache for a 
MS is created after its secured registration is carried out as discussed in Section 6.3.1 or 
6.3.2 (Creates multi-hop paging / routing cache at IGW for the MS). Then, the 
paging/routing cache is updated as discussed in Section 6.3.3 (R15-R16). The page/route-
update packets are issued with a signature by the source MS. The signature of the source 
MS protects the page/route-update packet from modification during the forwarding from 
the source MS to the FA. The FA authenticates the source MS and the paging/routing 
packet before updating the multi-hop paging/routing page (FA updates the multi-hop 
paging/routing cache for the MS) as discussed in Section 6.3.3. 
Multi-hop routing attacks (anti-integrity, impersonation, anti-confidentiality, and 
duplication): 
(A) Anti-integrity: The search-request packet is signed by using the private key of each 
sender. The receiver verifies the certificate and the signature of the sender (Rll- R14 in 
Section 6.3.3). Each registered MS keeps its private key secret. Therefore, the signature 
and verification prevent anti-integrity attacks. The corresponding search .. reply packet is 
signed by the destination, which maintains the integrity of the search-reply packet during 
the forwarding from the destination to the source MS. 
(B) Impersonation: The certificate, which is issued and signed by FA, prevents 
impersonation during multi-hop forwarding through signing and verifying (Rll-R14 in 
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Section 6.3.3). In the certificate, the MS's address and its public key are bound together. 
The binding is unique because of the uniqueness of the MS' s IP address. The certificate 
can not be forged because of the signature of FA in each certificate. All registered MSs, 
which have the authenticated public key of the FA, can verify the certificate. Therefore, it 
is difficult for any MS to masquerade itself by spoofing or inventing an address in multi-
hop route discovery. 
(C) Anti-confidentiality: Each MS has a pair of public and private keys after registration 
and keeps its private key secret. Sensitive data can be transmitted after encrypting with 
the receiver's public key at the sender. Only the receiver can decrypt the messages by 
using its private key. 
(D) Duplication: A nonce and timestamp in each routing packet prevent duplication. 
6.4.2 Performance Analysis 
6.4.2.1 Experimental Configuration 
The experiments were conducted III the NS-2 simulator [73] to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the proposed SM3P. The configuration of an experimental MCIP network 
is shown in Figure 48. A router in the global domain represents the Internet with certain 
delay (0.01 seconds). The functionalities of BS1, the FA, and the IGW are integrated as a 
node. A HA as well as an IGWIFAlBS1 is connected to the router. In the local domain, 
seven BSs are connected by wired cable. The dimension of the local domain is 1770m x 
1770m with 133 MSs, which are randomly located in the domain. All the functionalities 
of above components are implemented under a Pentium IV 2.8 G with 516 MS of 
memory. 
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Figure 48. Experimental Configuration. 
To simplify our experimental configuration, the experiments ignore the authentication 
delay at PKI authorities (AAA) [74]. As for the asymmetric operations, the experiments 
based on elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) [77] are carried out to evaluate the 
computation overhead for key creation, signature, and verification. The elliptic curves are 
usually defined over binary fields F2m (M 2: 1) or prime fields Fp, p> 3. The experiments 
here implement the elliptic curves defined over prime fields. The implementation of ECC 
is based on the software ECC library in [77] because of its portability and ease of use. 
The HA and FA can generate system parameters, a prime P, elliptic curve E, base point 
G = (x,y), and order r of the point G so that they can compute a pair of public and private 
keys as required. The prime P is generated based on security level. Since the size of P is 
equal to 160 bits long, the ECC has the same level of security with RSA and DSA with a 
1024-bit modulus [77]. The experiments choose P as 163 and 175 bits long. In the 
following, let P = x donate the size of prime P. The HA and FA generate an elliptic curve 
having suitable order r by using the complex multiplication method with a discriminant 
D [77]. The value of Dis 40 in the experiments. In the stage of initiation, the FA and HA 
and local domain BSs are configured with public and private keys according to the 
proposed SM3P. Each data point shown in the following figures is averaged over five 
runs with different MS distribution. The number of hops in multi-hop communication is 
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the key factor in increasing the transmission delay. Thus, the experiments are conducted 
based on different number of hops from a MS to a BS (a single-hop or multi-hop MS). 
6.4.2.2 Impact of Security on Macro and Micro mobility 
The macro/micro-mobility delay is primarily impacted by communication and 
computation delay. The communication delay of a packet includes all the latencies of 
multi-hop wireless forwarding, MCIP local wired network, and the Internet. The local 
network has less delay for a packet transmission than that of the Internet. In the SM3p, 
the computational delay is primarily caused by the cryptographic operations: symmetric 
or asymmetric. The symmetric cryptographic operation is very efficient in generating and 
verifying authenticator. In general, it is one-thousandth of the asymmetric cryptographic 
operation [41]. For instance, an AMD Opteron 1.6GHz processor under Linux 2.4.21 can 
perform a stream cipher encryption/decryption using Panama Cipher (little endian) 
algorithm at 344.781 Megabytes/second [78]. It can perform a MAC computation (and 
verification) with HMAC/MD5 algorithm at 152.381 Megabytes/second [78]. Based on 
these observations, symmetric cryptographic operations are not considered for mobility 
delay in the simulations. 
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Figure 50. Micro-mobility delay for single hop and multi-hop MSs. 
The macro-mobility delay is the interval from the issue of registration request to the 
completion of all registration and authentication operations. As shown in Figure 49, for 
secured or unsecured macro-mobility, registration delays increase when the number of 
hops from MS to network attachment (BS) increases. It is because the increase of hops 
results in more wireless transmission and computation delay at the intermediate MSs. 
Security never comes for free. The registration delays caused by security operations are 
higher than that of registrations without security because the security feature involves 
computation overhead during registration. The macro-mobility delay also increases when 
the size of the prime field increases because the timings for ECC operations increase for a 
larger prime field (175 > 163 bits long). 
Micro-mobility delay for a MS is the interval from the initiation of paging/routing-
update packet to the verification of paging/routing-reply packet. During this period, the 
MS updates its multi-hop paging/routing cache in a safe manner and migrates from one 
BS to another. As seen from Figure 49 and Figure 50, the micro-mobility delay is less 
than that of macro-mobility when the MS has the same number of hops to the BS. The 
secured micro-mobility delay increases linearly and does not show significant additional 
overhead of security. It is because the process of a macro-mobility not only has the 
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communication and computation delay at multi-hop wireless network and local network, 
but also has the delay in the Internet and the significant delay in the HA and FA 
authentications. When a registered MS migrates from a BS to another in the MCIP local 
domain, there is no need for the MS to registers with its HA again. Thus, the MCIP 
micro-mobility protocol significantly reduces the delay. 
6.4.2.3 Impact of Security on Route Acquisition Delay 
Figure 51 shows the delay of MS search process for locating the neighboring BS due 
to micro-mobility based on different hops from a source MS to BS. The delay is the 
interval from the issue of searching-request packet to the moment of finishing the 
verification of the searching-reply packet from a BS. It is clear from Figure 51, the 
security authentication results in extra route discovery delay because of the computation 
overhead at each intermediate MS for signature and verification. For single hop MSs, it 
learns the BS information by listening to the beacon from the BS and checks the 
authenticity of beacon by using the public key of FA. This is why the route delay is much 
smaller when hop count is one. 
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Figure 51. Routing Acquisition Delay for BS Detection. 
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After the process of route discovery, MS obtains the route to the new BS, but it can 
not use the route for internet connection immediately because of the stale mobility 
binding. Otherwise, the packets from the Internet will be directed to the previous 
associated BS rather than the new BS. As shown in Figure 50, the higher delay occurs if 
the MS updates its new network attachment (new BS) with a macro-mobility process. In 
the proposed SM3p, the migration using the process of micro-mobility has lower delay 
compared to the scheme using macro-mobility process as shown in Figure 51. 
Meanwhile, some schemes such as packet buffering can be used to reduce the packet 
drop during the period of link breakage and migration. 
In the proposed SM3p, instead of using secret key-based (symmetric) primitive, the 
certificate-based scheme (asymmetric) achieves the scalability. There may be a large 
number of MSs in a MCIP local domain but only a small percent of MSs are active 
sending or receiving packets. In the case of symmetric cryptography, each MS should 
have a secret key with every other MS, which makes it unappealing for key establishment 
and management. In our protocol, each MS only need to maintain its private key, its 
certificate, and the public key of FA. By using the public key of the FA, the MS can 
verify all the certificates from other MSs, and further validate the authenticity of the MSs 
and their packets. 
6.4.1 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have presented the SM3p to secure macro/micro-mobility for 
MCIP network. The SM3p extends the mobile IP security for registration and 
authentication for single hop or multi-hop MS. During the process of registration, the 
SM3p prevents forged BS and registration attacks. After a mobile IP registration, each 
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MS obtains a certificate for providing effective micro-mobility protection when the MS 
moves from a BS to another in the MeIP local domain without re-registration and re-
authentication at the migrating BS. During the process of micro-mobility, the SM3p 
provides the multi-hop routing prevention in accordance with anti-integrity, 
impersonation, anti-confidentiality and duplication. The performance of the proposed 
SM3p approach shows that the macro-mobility delay is higher than micro-mobility delay. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The secure Internet connectivity and mobility management are two crucial issues in 
designing an integrated internet and heterogeneous multi-hop network. This chapter 
summaries our contributions in this dissertation and discusses and future works for 
secured communication for heterogeneous multi-hop networks. Section 7.1 illustrates the 
conclusion drawn from our works, and Section 7.2 discusses the future research. 
7.1 Conclusion 
7.1.1 Secure Communication for Integrated Internet and MANET 
In an integrated internet and heterogeneous multi-hop network, a multi-hop route 
discovery protocol is required to support multi-hop wireless communication. At the same 
time, as discussed in Chapter 3, the route discovery protocol should cooperate with 
mobile IP protocol to provide the global internet connectivity. A multi-hop MS located 
outside the coverage of the BS can effectively detect the availability of a BS by a process 
of a route discovery. The route discovery protocol further enables the MS with capability 
to reconfigure a new route to the Internet when current path is broken due to intermediary 
node mobility. It can be seen from our analysis and experimental results in Chapter 3, the 
effectiveness of such integration protocol should be: 
• Providing efficient bi-directional connection, 
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• Lower overhead and higher throughput, 
• Less connection delay for communication establishment and packet forwarding. 
In an integrated network, an adversary may modify the routing packet from a 
neighboring MS. As discussed in Chapter 2, many attacks may happen in an integrated 
network. The security protocol proposed in Chapter 4 integrates mobile IP security and 
ad hoc security for providing security protection for integrated Internet and MANET. 
This security protocol requires that each MS provides authentication information upon 
entering the multi-hop network. If a MS does not have the security binding with the 
network, the MS must register with the HA and the FA to get its identity verified before 
using the multi-hop heterogeneous network. This prevents unauthorized access to multi-
hop network. At the same time, during registration, each ad hoc host also authenticates 
the FA through the HA. In the proposed model, each MS only chooses the authenticated 
MSs as ad hoc relaying stations. The FA can filter data packets and discard those that do 
not belong to an authenticated MS. The security protocol achieves the following goals. 
• Multi-hop heterogeneous network provides services only to authenticated MSs. 
• Only authenticated MSs must be used in multi-hop routes. The route creation 
process must only involve trusted and authenticated MSs. 
• Only authenticated routing information should be used in the updates of 
paging/routing caches. 
The first goal is achieved by requiring the registration of all MSs. During registration, 
the MS, the FA, and the HA are authenticated on the whole. Our proposed mechanisms to 
establish distributed trust relationship for a multi-hop MS have three steps (i) the multi-
hop MS sends its credentials to the network (BS) so that the BS can authenticate the MS, 
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(ii) the multi-hop MS validates the BS so that the MS can trust the BS for accessing the 
network, and (iii) after the mutual authentication, the MS can create a security binding 
with the integrated network. The second goal is achieved by enforcing signature and 
verification along a multi-hop route during the construction of the route. The signature 
verification prevents the attacks of the anti-integrity and impersonation. The third goal is 
met by authentication of a MS before BS updates a paging/routing cache. 
7.1.2 Secure Mobility Management in Heterogeneous Multi-hop Wireless 
Networks 
Since the standard mobile IP protocol suffers from limitations (e.g., latency, frequent 
handoff) as illustrated in Chapter 5, the proposed MCIP protocol provides multi-hop 
communication with micro-mobility support by integrating multi-hop communication 
with Cellular IP. The MCIP divides a multi-hop wireless network into separate domains 
and each domain has an lOW for providing internet accessibility. The BSs are connected 
with each other by wired or wireless links. Because of lo(;al domain, a MS doesn't need 
to register with its HA every time when it moves from a BS to another in a local domain. 
In order to support micro-mobility, the MCIP includes three components: location 
management, connection management and route reconfiguration. Location management 
is responsible for maintaining location information for idle MSs in a local domain. 
Connection management constructs an initial path for data transmission if a MS is 
moving to active state for sending or receiving packets. In the active state, a route 
reconfiguration mechanism is proposed to take advantage of various multi-hop 
connection alternatives available based on terminal interfaces, network accessibility and 
topology. 
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In our secure macro/micro-mobility protocol, each BS has a security association with 
its MCIP local domain (i.e., IGW) and shares a secret key with its neighboring BSs to 
facilitate the process of authentication. The proposed SM3p for MCIP network includes 
two components: secure macro-mobility and secure micro-mobility. Before obtaining 
service via a local domain, the MS authenticates with the visiting local domain by a 
secure macro-mobility protocol, and creates a security association with the domain. Then, 
when the MS moves from a BS to another, a secure micro-mobility protects the process 
of multi-hop paging/routing cache update of the MS. 
7.2 Future Recommendations 
7.2.1 Secure Communication for Integrated Internet and MANET 
Each MS has limited power and computational capability. Thus, a security protocol 
for interconnection between the Internet and MANET should be developed in a way that 
a multi-hop MS can effectively authenticate with the visiting network or other MSs. The 
private/public key-based protocols cause heavy computation delay compared to secret 
key-based cryptosystem. However, it is hard for the secret key-based scheme to achieve 
scalability due to key management. In the future, a hybrid scheme should be developed to 
facilitate the authentication process with high efficiency and scalability. At the same time, 
the selfishness is a key issue for multi-hop security that should be considered in the future. 
During the data transmission phase, an adversary that acts as the intermediary relay node, 
gets hold of the data packets and mistreats them. In a multi-hop network, the protection 
for routing security cannot guarantee each intermediary MS to forward the data packet in 
accordance with the routing table. It is possible to develop a collaborative scheme to 
encourage packet forwarding in the heterogeneous multi-hop network. 
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Meanwhile, protecting wireless and mobile infrastructure is anther topic that should 
be addressed in the future work. The BSIAP protection for future work will primarily be 
focused on: 
• Access control: As illustrated in Chapter 2, a BS may be accessed and 
reconfigured according to the attacker's convenience. The sensitive information in 
the BS such as routing information and keys may be captured. Thereby the BS 
should be protected by some security policies to against unauthorized access and 
operations. 
• Protecting personal information: The personal information of a MS should be 
properly protected III the device or on the internet relevant databases. The 
identification such as IP address, secret keys, certificates and other sensitive 
information should be stored in a proper manner so as to prevent getting 
compromised and running as a malicious MS. 
7.2.1 Secure Mobility Management in Heterogeneous Multi-hop Wireless 
Networks 
The objective of mobility management is to provide a fast hand-off scheme for MSs, 
which is supported by different layers of the network protocol stack, including (i): 
network layer, (ii) link layer, and (iii) cross layer design for handoff management. In the 
future, we can focus on the link layer and cross layer-design to improve our MCIP 
scheme proposed in Chapter 5. 
As a very important issue, the link layer provides crucial information (e.g., signal) for 
a MS to determine whether it initiates a handoff or not. On the network layer, the 
topology and velocity information can be helpful for mobility management. The future 
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mobility solutions in the integrated network should be developed based all these 
information to optimize location management, connection management, and 
reconfiguration scheme. More research should be done about the handoff management 
protocols including horizontal handoff, e.g., from one IEEE 801.11 AP to another IEEE 
802. 11AP, and vertical handoff, from an IEEE 802.11 AP to a cellular BS. A handoff 
process can be facilitated by cross layer design for the purpose of reducing the handoff 
delay by detecting the signal strength, or predicting the movement of the mobile station. 
The secure macro-mobility and secure micro-mobility protocols can be developed in 
several ways. The proposed SM3p for MeIP network uses the HA as the authenticatilon 
server. In some cases, the HA on the Internet may be bogus and thus cannot be truslted 
for authentication. Therefore, new approaches (e.g., third party authentication) may be 
developed with a stronger scheme of macro-mobility authentication. During a micro-
mobility authentication, the domain IGW maintains the security information (i .. e., 
certificate) for the MS roaming in the domain in a secure manner. Besides a secure 
handoff process, a future work for secure micro-mobility is how to monitor and measure 
the local domain information (e.g., the credit or reputation of a MS in the domain) to 
prevent the attacks from inside or outside. 
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An integrated Internet and MANET with SIze of n nodes is considered. The 
implementation of the key creation, signature generation and signature verification here 
follows the ECDSA signature techniques as an example of a digital signature for the 
integrated Internet and MANET. In the integrated Internet and MANET, the FA is 
responsible for choosing system parameters, a prime P, elliptic curve E, base point G = 
(x,y), and order r of the point G. kG is a group-point obtained by multiplying the base-
point G by the scalar K. The system parameters are published by FA and shared within 
the integrated Internet and MANET. If these parameters are not system-wide parameters, 
each MS selects its elliptic curve and base point. In this case, these parameters are 
included in the MS public key. Also let Hash (m) be the secure hash algorithm (SHA-l) 
and know to all in the system. 
Key Generation: A node MS chooses an integer, marked as 'l(1iJv{S, as its private key, 
where 1:::; 'l(1iJv{S:::; r-l. Then MS calculates 'l0vfs= 'l(liJv{SG as the public key of the MS. 
Signature Generation: 
To sign a message (m), a MS generate a random number u, where 1:::; u :::; r-l and 
computes, 
199 
(i): V = u G = (xv, Yv) and c = Xv mod r, where c is an integer I:::: c:::: r-1, if c = 0, 
the MS another random number u', and starts with the step (i) again. 
(ii): d = u- 1(Hash (m) + 'l(11JvfS c) mod r. If d = 0, the MS another random 
number u', and starts with the step (i) again. 
MS outputs (c, d) as the signature of message (m). MS submits m, c, and d. 
Signature Verification: 
To verify the signature of a message (m, c, d) from a sender, the receiver calculates, 
(i): h = d- 1 mod r. 
(ii): hI = 9lasfi (m) h mod rand h2 = c h mod r 
(iii): P = fil G + fi2 'l0vf.s = (xp' yp) and c' = xp mod r 
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